Friday, April 28, 2023

The Prague Summit & possible cover-up of Nordstream affair

PREFACE/ISSUE

Every good crime requires a plot and a twist.

       The Nordstrean was not a "perfect crime" bua strategic blunder

Previously we have established that the UK is the main prime suspect  here 

How so that the responsible government is still not yet found?

"The Prague Castle non-Mystery"




It was supposed to be a new European nations club


20 Sept 2022UK considers joining new European nations club

The UK is weighing up whether to attend a new European political "club of nations" next month.

The first meeting of the "European Political Community" is due to be held in Prague in early October.

26 Sept 2022, Monday - Nordstream pipelines are attacked.  

27 Sept 2022 - Ursula von der Leyen defines the affair is a "sabotage" not "an act of state terrorism"

[M: This set the history on a crossroad of a cover-up - read here]

30 Sept 2022 - Liz Truss to attend first meeting of European nations club




I. Investigations of crime scene ended 

1 Oct 2022 - For the European Political Community, meeting is the message

European Union leaders will discuss the security of crucial infrastructure when they meet in Prague next week following damage to the Nord Stream pipelines that many in the West have said was caused by sabotage.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was tied up with a crucial parliamentary debate at home, bringing the number of leaders down to 43 from the originally envisaged 44.

[M: It is possible that Mette Frederiksen did not want to do anything with this or has already been onboard and considered the decision done deal. Or? See here.] 

3 Oct 2022 - Joint statement by Ministers of the Joint Expeditionary Force

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace met virtually with ministers from Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) partner nations to discuss attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

The JEF condemns in the strongest terms the reckless sabotage in the Baltic Sea. It is discussing security responses, including increased maritime presence and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities. It will seek to deter further such acts, reassure allies and demonstrate collective commitment to the security and stability of the region. Ministers discussed increasing shared intelligence assessments to ensure common situational awareness, as well as cooperation to secure critical infrastructure. The JEF will ensure complementarity, alignment and transparency with NATO as well as the investigation led by Danish, Swedish and German authorities.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace added:

In this period of heightened concern for all like-minded partner nations, it is right that we act with speed, agility and collective resolve to actively demonstrate our shared commitment to mutual security.  

[M: The UK is the prime suspect, it still can "condemn the blatant sabotage" and be perpetrator explaining that there was no other way how to stop Russia and hurt it financially, explaining how they have prepared and are ready to balance, help allies,... /s] 

5 Oct 2022 - US considering offering to analyse underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations

The US Navy’s processing of the sonar signatures – the term for the unique underwater sounds – provided by Sweden and Denmark could boost the investigations by providing a more detailed picture of what was in the area at the time of the pipeline explosions and what caused them, sources said... 

Each type of underwater machinery like submarines, torpedoes and vessel engines makes a unique sound that is called a “sonar signature,” and the US has an extensive library of these sounds.

6 Oct 2022 -  The support at the gas line ended.

On October 6, the Armed Forces' support to the Coast Guard at the gas pipeline was suspended. This when the on-site investigation was deemed complete by the authorities that led it and the request for support was thereby withdrawn. The SWE HSwMS Belos returns to other activities.


6 Oct 2022 - Swedish authorities announced on October 6 they 

...had conducted an underwater inspection of the site and collected "pieces of evidence". Meanwhile, Danish police on Tuesday said they had completed several inspections of the leaks in the Danish zone, together with the intelligence service PET.

Another probable cause, according to a British military source, is that the Russians special ops may have discreetly laid mines from a disguised commercial vessel and detonated them days or weeks later. 

 

II. Diplomacy, Stockholm syndrome, Denial or Cover-up?

6 Oct 2022 - Prime Minister urges Europe to ‘stand firm’ against Russian aggression ahead of regional summit

Prime Minister Liz Truss to attend European leaders’ meeting in Prague to galvanise the response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Prime Minister will urge leaders to stand united in the face of Russian aggression as Europe faces “its biggest crisis since the Second World War”, when she addresses a regional summit in the Czech Republic today [6th October]. 

In a series of bilateral meetings and plenary sessions in Prague, the Prime Minister will encourage countries to go further and faster to end Europe’s reliance on Russian hydrocarbons and “usher in a new era of resilience and independence.”

She will call on leaders to commit at the summit to keeping gas and electricity interconnectors open this winter and is expected to hold talks on joint projects to develop new nuclear and offshore wind capacity. 

[M: Well, the UK after Brexit was kicked out joint energy market. The destruction of Nordstream enables to get back in. Wind power could not be sold to EU markets unless WOULD EU be supplied by cheaper energy from Russia.]  

6 Oct 2022 - PM Liz Truss: Time to find common cause with our European friends

Security, energy and migration are three of the most urgent priorities for the British people, so they are top of my agenda too. That’s why I am travelling to Prague for today’s European leaders’ meeting.

Today’s meeting is not an EU construct or an EU alternative. I am very clear about that. It brings together governments from across Europe, around a third of whom are outside the EU. A post-Brexit Britain, as an independent country outside the EU, should be involved in discussions that affect the entire continent and all of us here at home. We are taking part as an independent sovereign nation, and we will act as one.

Brexit was never about the UK stepping away from our proud and historic role as a leading nation in the region and beyond. We always believed we would find new ways of working that reflected our shared values and interests.

Our actions in Ukraine have shown this to be true. No European country has done more than the UK to arm the Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and to lead the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. Yet our actions are all the stronger because of the way that we collaborated with our European friends.

6 Oct 2022 - Liz Truss: Ending European reliance on Russian energy...

and tackling the criminal gangs that traffic people across Europe are priorities that President @EmmanuelMacron and I shareGood to agree closer cooperation on these areas with our French friends today.


6 Oct 2022 - UK-France Joint Statement

Prime Minister Liz Truss and President Emmanuel Macron met in the margins of the first Summit of the European Political Community in Prague.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed the strong and historic ties between their two countries. They agreed to hold the next UK-France Summit in 2023 in France to take forward a renewed bilateral agenda.

[M: why do allies need to ensure their friendship? What if UK blew up Nordstream where FRA is a shareholder? Would this explain the choice of the meeting words?] 

Energy transition and decoupling from Russian hydro-carbons are common challenges. The Prime Minister and the President discussed advancing bilateral cooperation in particular on energy. They reaffirmed their belief that both renewable and nuclear energies are part of consistent strategies to achieve energy transition and strategic autonomy.

[M: Liz Truss words sinc with UK statements about ending European reliance on Russian hydrocarbons - post here] 

They confirmed the full support of the UK and French Governments for the new nuclear power station at Sizewell and expect the relevant bodies to finalise arrangements in the coming month. 

6 Oct 2022 - UK Gov:  Meeting European leaders in Prague today,

... the Prime Minister welcomed the strong show of unity against Russian aggression.
The UK will continue to work with our allies to secure our energy supply, tackle people smuggling gangs and stand up to despots.

 



6 Oct 2022Prime Minister welcomes ‘powerful show of solidarity’ at European leaders’ meeting

Prime Minister Liz Truss said:

Leaders leave this summit with greater collective resolve to stand up to Russian aggression. What we have seen in Prague is a forceful show of solidarity with Ukraine, and for the principles of freedom and democracy.

The UK will continue to work with our allies to deliver on the British people’s priorities, including ending our reliance on authoritarian regimes for energy and reducing costs for families, tackling people smuggling gangs, and standing up to tyrants

7 Oct 2022 - France is a friend, UK PM Liz Truss admits after ‘jury’s out’ campaign claim

Truss met Macron for a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the president’s European Political Community meeting in Prague, aimed at bringing the continent together in the face of Russian aggression...

 ...She told UK broadcasters before Thursday’s meeting she had worked “very, very closely” with the president and the French government in Paris.

We’re both very clear the foe is (Russian President) Vladimir Putin, who has through his appalling war in Ukraine threatened freedom and democracy in Europe and pushed up energy prices which we’re now all having to deal with,” she added.

7 Oct 2022 - Informal meeting of heads of state or government

Main results

EU leaders met in Prague to discuss Russia’s war against Ukraine and its impact on the energy situation in Europe, including its economic ramifications. 

Remarks by President Charles Michel following the informal meeting of the EU heads of state or government in Prague 

[M: Note that him and Ursula von der Leyen are, based on available data, prime suspects of cover-up as they were the very first to frame and define the attack as "sabotage" not the "terrorist attack". See my post about it here.]  
 
...This gives me the opportunity to say a word about yesterday’s meeting - a historic meeting because, for the first time, the countries of the European continent, 44 countries that share the same ambition to work together for peace, prosperity and stability, had the opportunity to meet for the first time in this new format... 

...We have taken decisions to strengthen the sanctions imposed against Russia as we need to increase pressure on the Kremlin. In addition, both today and yesterday, we stressed the importance of reaching out to third countries in order to counter the Russian narrative....

...We have also had the opportunity today, in this informal meeting of the European Council, to address this fundamental issue of the energy situation. Let us be clear, we all understand that Russia has unleashed a war against the Ukrainian people, who are suffering from this war on a daily basis and who are courageously fighting for the values we share and for their own future, but also for the future of the European project and of Europe itself. Indeed, Russia has launched an energy missile against the European continent and the world. We are facing an energy crisis....

 [M: To sum it up... We are united... We impose more sanctions ... We are in energy crisis together... This looks to me like a joint decision / policy of a coordinated cover-up.

We have had the opportunity to address three issues that we feel are extremely important and for which European action is indispensable. Firstly, it is important to take action to reduce consumption and demand. Initial decisions have been taken on the initiative of the European Commission, and thanks to the rapid work done by the Czech Presidency, we will continue to ensure that consumption is reduced. 

The second point is the question of security of supply. We have been working for some months now to ensure that stocks can be built up as much as possible. This is a good step, and it is important. Since before the summer, we have also been discussing the importance of gradually setting up platforms for the joint purchase of energy resources. We had the opportunity to revisit this subject today, and we perceived increasing support for continuing to make progress. Especially, for example, to be able to replenish stocks when it becomes necessary to do so again. This is one of the examples that were mentioned, for which the Commission has made proposals in its roadmap. 

[M: Well, the UK has been really preparing for this day in advance, changing its energy security strategy several times, post Brexit and it paid out, it became net energy exporter later on. Considering it is a prime suspect of the sabotage this is, in my opinion, quite a reason to suspect EU top politicians for a treason] 

The third element is the question of prices. This is having a painful impact on families and on households. It may also be painful for our businesses, and it has an economic impact. I would also like to say today that we felt a shared desire on the part of European leaders to be mobilised with a common ambition to reduce the price of energy resources and to work with the Council and the European Commission, so that this Council meeting must be seen today as a strategic step leading towards the next European Council, which should be an opportunity to move forward in terms of taking the required measures into consideration.

[M: Families and households are collateral damage.]  

Countering Russian narratives

Russia’s war against Ukraine is having huge consequences that go beyond Europe, including in terms of the global food security crisis. In this context, EU leaders stressed the importance of reaching out to third countries to counter Russian narratives and expressed their determination to support their partners across the world in addressing food security issues. 

[M: So what if this was NOT Russia? Does it mean EU is actively pursuing a goal of covering-up?]

7 October 2022 - European Council President Charles MichelRussia has launched an energy missile against the European continent and the world. 

7 Oct 2022 - Truss declares Macron a friend as pair forge working relationship

Prime Minister Liz Truss labelled Emmanuel Macron a "friend" as they announced plans to work together at the first meeting of a new political club of nations.

Ms Truss had declined to say whether the French president was a "friend or foe", during her leadership campaign.

The French president said he hoped for a "new phase" in post-Brexit relations.

The pair agreed to step up cooperation on "ending" small boat crossings in the Channel and announced a summit in 2023.

Leaders from the European Union (EU), the UK, Turkey, Norway and the Balkans attended the first European Political Community (EPC) meeting in Prague on Thursday.

They discussed energy, migration and security, with a particular focus on the war in Ukraine.

The summit, billed as a European Political Community beyond the EU, has been championed by Mr Macron, who told reporters on Thursday it sent a "message of unity". 

Standing up to Russia


 Following the meetings, Ms Truss said: "Leaders leave this summit with greater collective resolve to stand up to Russian aggression."

"What we have seen in Prague is a forceful show of solidarity with Ukraine, and for the principles of freedom and democracy."  

15 Oct 2022 - The priority must be stability and a strong focus on 

...reducing energy costs and financial stewardship. Liz Truss made a tough call today but the duty of a PM has to be security - both economic and national.

3 Nov 2022 - UK’s Defence Committee refused access to UK Special Forces in heated debate with Defence Minister.

In a British Parliamentary Deference Select Committee on the 2nd November, 2022, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, has been challenged for his failure to permit members of the Defence Select Committee access to UK Special Forces.

In a heated exchanged, the Committee chair, Tobias Ellwood MP said that the UK Special Forces were not the best in the world ‘about scrutiny’, and that the Special Forces – including units such as the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Services (SBS) – were “not above scrutiny.”

When asked if the Ministry of Defence could facilitate a visit to Hereford, home of the SAS, the Deference Minister said “no” and went on to argue that “this committee does not have oversight of Special Forces and its operations.”

The chair of the Defence Committee disagreed, saying: “I’m sorry, we have oversight of the Armed Forces in the UK Defence.”

Mr Wallace then said the Special Forces were very busy in operational work.

...Earlier this year, Action on Armed Violence raised concerns about a lack of parliamentary oversight of the UK’s Special Forces...

21 Oct 2022 - UK is helping countries to reduce THEIR dependency on Russia

Yesterday the UK sanctioned Iran for supplying Russia with drones used to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. This is just the latest example of how Russia threatens Ukraine’s energy securityThe UK is helping countries reduce their dependency on Russia.

24 Oct 2022 - A statement on the Chief of the Defence Staff’s call with the Russian Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov:

"The military leaders both agreed on the importance of maintaining open channels of communication between the UK and Russia to manage the risk of miscalculation and to facilitate de-escalation."

The conversation followed the Defence Secretary’s call with his Russian counterpart yesterday and a call between the Foreign Ministers of France, the UK, and the USA last night. 

23 Nov 2022 - Boris Johnson Causes A Stir With Claims About Europe’s Initial Response To Russian Aggression

23 Nov 2022 - “After all my anxieties...I pay tribute to the way the EU has acted. They have been united. The sanctions were tough.”

17 March 2023 - High-level meeting on Troll A platform

On Friday, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, and President and CEO of Equinor Anders Opedal visited the Troll A platform.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised the Troll A platform as ‘an impressive structure, absolutely vital to heat homes and power industries across Europe, and important for our security. Because we have seen how Russia has tried to use gas as a weapon to prevent us from supporting Ukraine. It has failed, not least because of platforms like this one. They are key to help reduce Europe’s dangerous dependency on Russian gas.’

[M: This is sick, Merkel said that Russia has not used gas as a weapon here 18 June 2022 - Merkel defends Nord Stream 2 decision

Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel has defended her decisions to build the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea. "I didn't believe in change through trade, but in connection through trade, with the second largest nuclear power in the world," Merkel told the editorial network Germany.

But it wasn't an easy decision. "The thesis at the time was that once Nord Stream 2 is operational, Putin will stop supplying gas through Ukraine or even attack it." The West ensured that gas was still routed through Ukraine and that they continued to receive transit fees.

Merkel pointed out that Russia then attacked Ukraine on February 24, when gas was not yet flowing through Nord Stream 2. "In this sense, gas was not a weapon," Merkel said. 

Liquid gas was too expensive for the German economy

Merkel also justified the procedure at the time with economic considerations. "At the time, the German economy opted for pipeline gas transport from Russia because it was economically cheaper than liquid gas from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates and later also from the USA," she explained.

They were willing to use taxpayers' money to support the construction of two terminals for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Germany. "But until the last day of my tenure, no company built an LNG terminal in Germany because there was no importer who would have booked long-term capacities in advance because of the high price.".

 


Tuesday, April 25, 2023

The Definition, Severity and Accountability of the Nordstream Affair

PREFACE/ISSUE

What is Nordstream affair legally?

The use of force by a state is generally only permissible in self-defense or with the authorization of the UN Security Council. 




...the determination of whether an act constitutes state terrorism or sabotage or other definition involves a fact-specific analysis and will depend on the particular circumstances of the case...

2017: "...the lack of formal state ownership means cables [and other undersea infrastructure] do not have strong established protection in international law..." [found byBilly Bostickson] " 


The NordStream affair is a criminal act due to its intentional nature. But what kind of act is it?

I. DEFINING THE CASE

IF a state actor attacks secretly pipelines in Baltic Sea which are in ownership of two companies registered in Switzerland (Nordstream AG and Nordstream 2 AG) while the Nordstream AG shareholder structure is 51% Gazprom which itself is some 50%+ of shares owned by Russian state, what is it? Was it attack against Russia, Gazprom, Shareholders, EU citizens?

Other shareholders of Nordstream 1 are German company Wintershall Dea AG, PEG Infrastruktur AG (E. ON), N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie and ENGIE jointly owning 49%. The Nordstream 2 AG is fully owned by Gazprom, those same other shareholder companies provided only loans in size of 49%.

 There are several options for definition what the act is:


Sabotage

Sabotage is generally defined as the intentional damaging or destroying of property for political or military purposes, and could be considered an act of terrorism if it causes harm to civilians or non-combatants.

Act of terrorism

The state terrorism generally refers to acts committed by a state or its agents that are intended to intimidate or coerce a population or government, and that violate international law or fundamental human rights.

Act of aggression

If the attack was carried out by a state actor, it could be considered an Act of aggression and a breach of the United Nations Charter, specifically Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force by one state against another.

War crime

Additionally, if the attack targeted civilian infrastructure, it could be considered a War crime under the Geneva Conventions.

An armed attack 

An armed attack, n the other hand, generally involves the use of force by one state against another and is typically considered a violation of international law. However, the specific circumstances of the attack would need to be evaluated to determine if it meets the threshold for an armed attack under international law. 

How so that some politicians defined that it was a sabotage" so early already on 28th of Septemebr?

They must have known who was behind and why it happened!

-> This aspect is researched in this post: Who said it is a "Sabotage" first? 


II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Determining the legal implications of an attack on the Nordstream pipelines would be a complex and fact-specific analysis, and would depend on a variety of factors including the location of the attack, the motives and intentions of the attackers, and the impact of the attack on the companies and countries involved:

1. If it is a Sabotage, then against whom?

  • If the attack was carried out with the intent to disrupt the operation of the Nordstream pipelines and to cause damage to the companies and their assets, it could potentially be considered an act of sabotage against them under the laws of the countries involved.

  • If the attack targeted the Swiss companies Nordstream AG and Nordstream 2 AG specifically, and the intent was to harm these companies or disrupt their operations, then it could potentially be considered an act of sabotage against Switzerland. However, this would depend on the specific laws of Switzerland and the circumstances of the attack.

  • If the attack on the Nordstream pipelines occurred with the intent to harm or disrupt the operations of Gazprom, the Russian state-owned company that is the majority shareholder of Nordstream AG and the sole owner of Nordstream 2 AG, it could potentially be considered an act of sabotage against Russia. This would depend on the specific laws of Russia and the circumstances of the attack.

  • If the attack targeted the Nordstream pipelines and the intent was to harm or disrupt the operations of the companies involved, including Gazprom as the majority shareholder of Nordstream AG and the sole owner of Nordstream 2 AG, as well as the other shareholder companies such as Wintershall Dea AG, PEG Infrastruktur AG (E. ON), N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, and ENGIE, then it could potentially be considered an act of sabotage against all of the companies and countries involved. Again, this would depend on the specific laws of the countries involved and the circumstances of the attack.

2. If the motive, intentions and execution are aimed against Russia then...

    If the attack on the Nordstream pipelines were carried out by another state or group of states, and constituted a use of armed force in violation of the UN Charter, it could potentially be considered an act of aggression against Russia.


    3. If the motive, intentions and execution are aimed against EU interests for example to improve own political, security or economical situation then...

      The determination of whether an attack on the Nordstream pipelines would constitute a war crime against EU citizens would depend on the specific circumstances of the attack and the applicable legal framework.

      4. In General
        Under international humanitarian law, attacks on civilian objects, such as pipelines, are prohibited unless the objects make an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances at the time.

        Moreover, even if the pipelines are considered military objectives, any attack on them must be conducted in a way that distinguishes between military objectives and civilian objects, and must not cause excessive harm to civilians or civilian objects.

        If the attack on the Nordstream pipelines were carried out in violation of these rules and resulted in harm to civilians, it could potentially be considered a war crime under international law.

        However, it is important to note that the determination of whether an act constitutes a war crime is a matter for a court of law to decide based on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.

        [M: Hence my original investigation Who said it is a "Sabotage" first? - How is it possible that Leyen and Michel were able to determine that it was a sabotage without knowing who has done it and what were motives???] 

        The motive or purpose of the attack, such as whether the United Kingdom (in this hyphotesis considered the prime suspect) was seeking to enrich itself or undermine the energy security of the EU, would not be a decisive factor in determining whether the attack constituted a war crime.

        However, it could be a relevant factor in assessing the nature and extent of the harm caused by the attack and the legal implications for the United Kingdom and its officials or agents who may have been involved in the attack.

        If an attack on the Nordstream pipelines were to occur and it caused harm to EU citizens, several factors would be considered to determine whether it constituted a war crime. These factors would include:

        1. Intentionality: Was the attack deliberate, and was the intention to cause harm to civilians or civilian objects?
        2. Proportionality: Was the attack proportional to the military advantage sought, and was it conducted in a way that minimized harm to civilians and civilian objects?
        3. Distinction: Were measures taken to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, and was the attack directed only at legitimate military targets?
        4. Precautions: Were all feasible precautions taken to avoid or minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, including by giving effective advance warning of attacks that may affect them?
        5. Military necessity: Was the attack necessary to achieve a legitimate military objective, and was it conducted in a way that respected the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience?
        6. Accountability: Were those responsible for planning and executing the attack held accountable for any violations of international law that may have occurred?
                              These factors are outlined in international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, and are used to assess whether an attack violates the laws of war and constitutes a war crime. Ultimately, the determination of whether an attack on the Nordstream pipelines would constitute a war crime against EU citizens would depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the attack, and would need to be made on a case-by-case basis.

                              III. NSP2AG

                              SOURCE - LEGAL CASE


                              IV. SEVERITY

                              The Nordstream pipelines is European Key Energy Infrastructure. The potential severity of the consequences of such an act would likely be a relevant factor in any legal analysis of whether the act constitutes state terrorism, sabotage or other illegal conduct. 

                              12 Oct 2022 - Russia claims attack on NordStream is "act of state terrorism" .


                              "The recent terrorist attack on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 natural gas pipelines was aimed at undermining the energy security of the entire continent", Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday.

                                

                              V. ACCOUNTABILITY

                              12 Oct 2022 - Putin says goal behind Nord Stream attack was to undermine continent’s energy security

                              Putin described the attack on the Nord Streams as "a most dangerous precedent." "It shows that any vital transport, energy or utility infrastructure is now in jeopardy regardless of where it is located or who operates it or whether those are subsea pipelines or ground-based ones."

                              [M: Was a similar "can of worms" or a new precedent established like in case of Kosovo?] 

                              12 Oct 2022 - Russia claims attack on NordStream is "act of state terrorism" .

                              The recent terrorist attack on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 natural gas pipelines was aimed at undermining the energy security of the entire continent, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday. 

                              16 Oct 2022 - Sahra Wagenknecht: Government refuses information on pipeline attacks


                              The member of the Bundestag had asked the responsible ministries for information before and after the explosions - in vain.

                              "For reasons of public interest" no further information is given

                              The federal government had "come to the conclusion, after careful consideration, that further information for reasons of state welfare - not even in a classified form - can not be given."

                              The reason for this is the "third-party rule" for international cooperation between the secret services. According to this, the international exchange of knowledge is subject to particularly strict confidentiality requirements. "The requested information thus affects secrecy interests that require protection in such a way that the public interest outweighs the parliamentary right to information and the right of the members of parliament to ask questions must, exceptionally, take second place to the federal government's interest in secrecy." 

                              For this reason, the federal government does not answer Wagenknecht's question "which NATO ships and troops" have been in the areas where the damage occurred since gas supplies through Nord Stream 1 were suspended, and which Russian ships and troops in that area period were sighted. This answer "would also include the disclosure of information that particularly affects the welfare of the state," writes the Foreign Office. Therefore, a classification and filing of the requested information is out of the question, "because even the slight risk of disclosure cannot be accepted".

                              18 Oct 2022 - Are sabotage of submarine pipelines an ‘armed attack’ triggering a right to self-defence?

                              A main difficulty in situations such as the damage on the NordStream pipelines, is that the State invoking the right to self-defence bears the burden of proving the facts showing the existence of such an attack against it by a particular State (International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), Oil Platforms (2003), [51]). In this connection, generic announcements that an attack or other incident will take place prior to the explosions are insufficient evidence to support that any subsequent attack is the work of the State making such public statements (Oil Platforms, [60]).

                              An ‘Armed Attack’ against Whom? According to the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (1986) [191], as well as in Oil Platforms [51], an ‘armed attack’ involves ‘the most grave forms of the use of force’. ‘Other less grave forms’ of use of force do not meet this threshold. In Nicaragua, the Court had considered the distinction between an ‘armed attack’ and mere ‘frontier incidents’, and relied on the following criteria to draw this distinction: the ‘scale and effects’ of the attack [195], and the ‘circumstances and motivations of the attack [231]. The ‘scale and effects’ criterion is particularly relevant for assessing whether blowing-up major transboundary pipelines may constitute an ‘armed attack’. 

                              However, whether attacks on pipelines on the continental shelf and the EEZ as well as on the high seas, would constitute the most grave form’ of use of force qualifying as an ‘armed attack’ against a particular State (or States) is not straightforward.
                              Separately, although pipelines do not have flags, like vessels, they are owned and operated by companies incorporated in some State jurisdiction.

                              The question arises whether States in whose jurisdiction the company that owns and/operates the pipeline are incorporated may be the victim of an ‘armed attack’ against the pipeline, giving rise to its right to self-defence. In the case of NordStream, this would be Switzerland.  

                               
                              [M: The attacker KNEW very well the legal difference between the attack near the the CS and EEZ. There are important points WHY it was done there. One can find hint of who could be involved and why.]

                              V. INVESTIGATIONS

                              There are 5 investigations: In Sweden, in Denmark, in Germany in Russia and by Nordstream AG & Nordstream 2 AG.

                              -> GERMANY

                              21 May 2022 - The investigators from the German Federal Criminal Police, BKA: 

                              -> SWEDEN


                              SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIONS:

                              - state actor involved, clear picture how it was carried out
                              - significant resources = unique/expensive tools involved
                              - significant knowledge = amateurs ruled out, site most likely checked by some special boats mapping the future bombing place
                              - anti-constitutional sabotage (possible co-conspirators in GER)
                              - serious violent attack on energy supply which could detriorate internal and external security of Germany = self explanatory, opens doors for non "sabotage" definitions
                              - RU surface boats approach ruled out
                              - Likely other states surface approach also ruled out, all ships months back checked, there was no leak about any other boat so seems no boat involved.
                              - Sumbarine, mini-submarine, sub-drones are investigated now
                              - "...very few companies or groups..." = hints to a sumbarine maker

                              [M: One suspected UK company comes to my mind msubs.com, unverified info that UK Def Min Ben Wallace is in board] 


                              VI. THE ROLE OF 2017´s SUNAK PAPER


                              Whether from terrorist activity or an increasingly bellicose Russian naval presence, the threat of these vulnerabilities being exploited is growing. A successful attack would deal a crippling blow to Britain’s security and prosperity. The threat is nothing short of existential.

                              [M: The same could be said about other countries including Russia]

                               



                              [M: How interesting that the key UK official representative
                               is so well versed in legal aspects of attacks
                               on the key undersea infrastructure.]
                              [M: Interesting points - location, choke points, ease of use]


                              Admiral James Stavridis, US Navy (Ret) foreword

                              [M: US, UK are aware that the aggressor enjoys plausible deniability]


                              Cables Have Inadequate Protection in International Law


                              [M: Internet cables and gas pipelines are both classified
                              as "critical infrastructure"]


                              "...Even accidental damage far from home can have significant consequences..."

                              [M: Internet cables and gas pipelines are both classified
                              as "critical infrastructure"]


                              [M: The UK has done it in the past already, in ascent to WWI - more here]


                              VII. SWEDEN ISSUES UPDATE OF PROBE


                               6 Oct 2022 - Strong suspicion of gross sabotage in the Baltic Sea

                               10 April 2022 - Sweden Issues Nord Stream Probe Update'

                              The Swedish Prosecution Authority said in a press release Thursday “analyses from objects seized during the crime scene investigations show traces of explosives on several of the foreign objects which were examined”. It called the September 2022 incidents “detonations” and said both pipelines one and two of the Baltic Sea gas conveyor mainly owned by Russia had taken a hit.

                              [M: Note avoidance of framing of the specification as  "sabotage/terrorist act" but as a "detonation"] 

                              [M: Note the "mainly owned by Russia". This hints to who is considered here the victim. A Russian state, not the SUI incorporated 2 companies with int. shareholders.]  

                              Mats Ljungqvist, who is overseeing the probe being conducted by the Swedish Security Service as public prosecutor of the National Security Unit, said in the report, “regarding the incident, there is no doubt that this is gross sabotage in international waters directed towards infrastructure, whose owner is not connected to Sweden”.

                              Russian state-owned Gazprom owns 51 percent of the two pipelines stretching a total of 760.56 miles (1,224 kilometers) between exporter Russia and destination Germany. Germany’s PEGI/E.ON and Wintershall Dea AG hold a 15.5-percent stake each and the Netherlands’ N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie and France’s ENGIE have nine percent each, according to the Switzerland-based owner. The Nord Stream twin pipeline systems have, according to the Nord Stream AG website, a combined annual capacity of about 1.94 trillion cubic feet (55 billion cubic meters) of gas. That capacity is, as stated on the website, “enough to satisfy the energy demand of more than 26 million European households”. 

                              “We got a pretty clear picture at the scene of the crime of who carried it out”, Ljungqvist was quoted as saying in the TASS report Thursday. “It cannot be ruled out that there are some private individuals who may have been the perpetrators. Still, our main lead is, of course, that a government is behind it - directly or indirectly”. 

                               

                              SUMMARY / CONCLUSION

                              • It is impossible that EU leaders could distinguish that the affair was a "sabotage" without knowing circumstances, intentions, motives and legal analysis of the case.

                              • Other part of my research hints that a warning was given just several days before the attack to key actors and that the explosives were already planted. This could complicate the legal and political implications of the incident.

                              • While the EU/NATO heads may not have had enough time to diffuse the explosives, or the situation, they could potentially be criticized or be even legally liable for not taking stronger measures to prevent the attack from happening. 

                              • Lastly, the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict and the political dynamics between the involved parties could also play a role in how the incident is analysed and resolved.


                              UPDATE:

                              May 7, 2023: On the investigation of the explosion of the Nord Stream gas pipelines
                                                      Zakharova, Russia, Ukraine
                                

                              [MRT: Special thanks to Odysseus @rwlander 
                              for pointing this video out - here]



                              Sources:
                              What Qualifies as Terrorism?