Monday, May 13, 2024

"NATO's Article 5 dog that didn't bark



NATO Collective defence and Article 5

  • The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

  • Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.

  • NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

Article 5

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

This article is complemented by Article 6, which stipulates:

Article 6

“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

    • on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
    • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”
Invocation of Article 5

The 9/11 terrorist attacks

On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, the Allies invoked the principle of Article 5. Then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.

Ownership and jurisdiction:

  • Based on maritime law pipelines are under the flag of the state who owns them. In case of Nordstream AG it is 51% Gazprom and 49% EU companies fro Germany, Austria, France and Netherlands. The ownership of Nordstream 2 AG is fully under Gazprom which is a publicly listed company in which the Russian state has majority stake of 51%.

Political and strategic motives - the definition of the event:
  • The determination of whether the action constitutes sabotage, a terrorist act, or an armed attack would depend on legal analysis and interpretation, as well as diplomatic negotiations between the affected parties.

    • Sabotage: Sabotage generally refers to the deliberate destruction or disruption of property, machinery, or equipment to hinder or damage operations. If the attack on Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG involves damaging infrastructure, facilities, or equipment with the intent to disrupt their operations, it could be classified as sabotage.

    • Terrorist Act: A terrorist act typically involves violence or intimidation carried out with political or ideological motives to instill fear or achieve certain objectives. While the term "terrorism" often connotes non-state actors, state-sponsored terrorism is also recognized. If the covert operation is conducted with the aim of causing fear or intimidating the population or the government of the target country (Russia or Germany, in this case), it could potentially be classified as a terrorist act.

    • Armed Attack: Under international law, an armed attack typically refers to the use of force by one state against another state, which may trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations CharterWhether the covert operation against Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG would rise to the level of an armed attack would depend on the scale, nature, and consequences of the operation. If the attack results in significant damage or casualties and is conducted with military force, it could be considered an armed attack.

An attack against whom?

1. Attack on a Swiss Company:
  • Both Nordstream AG and Nordstream 2 AG are enlisted in Switzerland hence attack against these is de jure an attack against two of its companies.  An attack on the company itself could be viewed as an attack on a Swiss entity. In this scenario, Swiss laws and international conventions related to the protection of businesses and property could apply.
2. Attack on Shareholder Companies:
  • If the attack were specifically targeting the interests of the shareholder companies (such as Gazprom, Wintershall Dea, Uniper SE, OMV, Engie, or Royal Dutch Shell), the legal implications would involve the laws and jurisdictions of those respective countries. It could potentially be considered an attack on the economic interests of those countries.
3. Attack on the State:
  • Whether an attack on Nord Stream AG or its shareholder companies would be considered an attack on a state would depend on the circumstances and the interpretation of international law.
    If the attack were deemed to have political or geopolitical motives, it could be perceived as an attack on the interests of the states where the shareholder companies are based. However, determining whether it constitutes an attack on the state itself would likely involve complex legal and diplomatic considerations.

The NATO dog that did not bark
  • IF the attack would have been done by Russia then the NATO Article 5 could have been theoretically triggered despite legal the ownership under assumption that the attack was against EU citizens to worsen their economical well-being in order to press their politicians from supporting Ukraine and making a deal with Russia. 

  • IF Russia attacked its own pipeline then the insurance payment is void (No payment occurs in two instances: self-sabotage clause and a war clause). IF Russia attacked its own pipelines with the intent and motive to impose economical burden against European countries and its citizens, then Russia could be framed as a state supporting terrorism and its frozen sovereign assets could be used for healing damages of EU citizens and states.

  • IF the attack would have been done by Ukraine then the NATO Article 5 could have been theoretically also triggered as an attack on member states by a non-nato state.

  • IF the attack was done by a non-state entity it would be very likely defined as a terrorist act.

Inverse considerations
  • When the 9/11 happened the NATO had immediately a meeting and the very next day the Article 5 was invoked.
NATO meetings in news from 26 September 2022 when Nordstream pipelines were attacked onward:

NATO statement about Nordstream

NATO said on 29th Sept 2022 that a series of leaks on the Nord Stream pipelines between Russia and Europe were the result of sabotage and that attacks on its members’ infrastructure would be met with a collective response from the military alliance.

Here is a list of known official statements by Prime ministers, Presidents, Foreign ministers and other high level politicians from the time of the event. It is important to look at who was pushing forward the claim that it was a sabotage and who was hesitant.

Conclusion:

Article 5 has NOT been triggered, which means that Russian involvement has been ruled out from day one. This also means that Ukrainian involvement was ruled out from the outset. The definition of the event as a "sabotage" by NATO and other politicians means that a terrorist act by a non-state entity has been also excluded.

It is safe to conclude that the identity, motives and purpose of the event were known to top level officials from early on. 

The joint statement by NATO members on 29 September that any (retaliatory, further) attack by Russia on its infrastructure would be met with the triggering of Article 5. This is in direct contradiction to the definition of the event as "sabotage". Would sabotage of another European pipeline with similar ownership be met with a different response?


SUMMARY:
 

The NATO basically publicly states that one of their member has attacked Nordstream pipelines and is warning against retaliatory actions.

Tuesday, May 7, 2024

The UK´s helps Ukraine to purchase more gas before the Nordstream is blown-up


20 Sept 2022 - Denys Shmyhal and Liz Truss discussed strengthening the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Great Britain

Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal and Prime Minister of Great Britain Liz Truss during the meeting on September 20 in New York (USA) discussed the development of bilateral cooperation, preparation for the heating season and the recovery of Ukraine.

Denys Shmyhal thanked Great Britain for comprehensive political support and practical help: "First of all, we are grateful for the weapons. This is our absolute priority today."

The parties touched on the issue of intensifying the supply of weapons for the defense of Ukraine and strengthening sanctions against Russian oil and gas. In the context of diversification of energy supply sources and preparation for the heating season, the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Great Britain discussed the need to increase their own gas production, in particular in Ukraine.

"We appreciate Great Britain's willingness to provide our state with the next tranche of $500 million through the World Bank for gas purchases. We are also interested in involving British business in the development of gas production in Ukraine. We expect that the Government of Great Britain will make the necessary decisions to insure British business in Ukraine against military risks," said Denys Shmyhal.


Summary:

There are no coincidences. The UK was preparing itself for the increase price of energy - see post here. Surprisingly the UK became after 44 years a new energy exporter on 29th of September, mere  days after Nordstream was destroyed - post here. The UK warned about an energy storm coming - post here and was actively preparing for increased energy prices. The UK was lagging after Brexit, its participation in an EU joint energy market ended but then suddenly the EU needed more energy and UK´s idling LNG import facilities were utilized - post here. the UK also aggressively pushed its companies to withdrew from Russian markets - post here. Liz Truss as a PM - post here

 


 

Monday, May 6, 2024

German fleet tracker wk37 and wk38 in Baltic sea

 

wk37 - 12 ships in Baltic sea

FGS Alster
FGS Bad Bevensen
FGS Baltrum
FGS Baumholder
FGS Fulda
FGS Juist
FGS Mittelgrund
FGS Munster
FGS Pultos
FGS Rottweil
FGS Sachsen
FGS Sleswig-Holstein



wk38 - 17 ships in Baltic sea

FGS Alster
FGS Bad Bevensen
FGS Baltrum
FGS Baumholder
FGS Fulda
FGS Juist
FGS Mittelgrund
FGS Munster
FGS Pultos
FGS Rottweil
FGS Sachsen
FGS Sleswig-Holstein
+
FGS Seehund 01
FGS Dillingen
FGS Gorch Fock
FGS Oldenburg
FGS Oste





Was something there already earlier?


14 Sept 2022 - two German ships near Bornholm



14 Sept 2022 - German navy ships are still hanging around there too
• M1063 Bad Bevensen - minehunter
• FGS F216 Schleswig-Holstein - frigate
• A52 Oste - ELINT

15 Sept 2022 FGS Alster in Stockholm’s port

16 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) leaving Kiel, Germany  

21 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) coming into Kiel, Germany




22 Sept 2022 - FGS Oldenburg inbound to Devonport this morning

24 Sept 2022 - German Navy Baden-Wurttemberg-class frigate FGS Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) southbound under the Storebaelt Bridge in Denmark - September 24, 2022 #fgssachsenanhalt #f224

26 Sept 2022 - FGS Gork Fock, FGS Spessart (#A1442), FGS Sachsen(#F219) at Kiel at dawn.

26 Sept 2022 - German Navy Frankenthal-class minehunters FGS Bad Bevensen (M1063) and FGS Fulda (M 1058) leaving Kiel, Germany

26 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) leaving Kiel, Germany

 

29 Sept 2022 - German Navy Frankenthal-class minehunter FGS Rottweil (M1061) in the Kiel Canal at the Kiel Locks

1 Oct 2022 - German Navy Oste-class electronic surveillance vessel FGS Alster (A50) coming into Helsinki


Summary:

It does not look like the 13-14/09 was the time when divers from Andromeda planted explosives. 



22, 23, 24, 25 September - SWE newspapers Dagens Nyheter report that Swedish navy was in the area a few days before the sabotage.






FGS Sachsen conducts ASW search near Rügen - Germany KNEW II.


27 Sept 2022 - German frigate FGS Sachsen near Nordstream exit to land

German frigate FGS Sachsen (F219)
 
appears to have conducted a search off the island of Rügen,
 
where Nord Stream  lands. 

From 0600 to 0830 UTC (gmt).

OTHER MOVEMENTS

21 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) coming into Kiel, Germany

22 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Hessen (F221) coming into Norfolk, Virginia

24 Sept 2022 - German Navy Baden-Wurttemberg-class frigate FGS Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) southbound under the Storebaelt Bridge in Denmark

26 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) leaving Kiel, Germany

30 Sept 2022 - German Navy Baden-Wurttemberg-class frigate FGS Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) coming into Kiel, Germany

3 Oct 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Hessen (F221) still pierside at Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia



Summary:
If GER navy ship Sachsen conducted search for a submarine/minisub/drone then the Andromeda story gets even more leaky. 



German Navy Commander: Russia's capabilities at the bottom of the sea - Germany KNEW

FGS Sachsen arriving in Tallinn on September 30, 2022

Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack, Commander of the German Navy in an interview on 3 Nov 2022.

[MRT: J.Ch. Kaack knew that the UK was threatening Nordstream pipelines. German, French and allied ships were protecting pipelines, searching for the undersea asset but in the wrong area, closer to the Lithuania. There is a strong case to believe that Norway warned not just the USA but also France and Germany about the UK plans to take down Nordstream.]  

"One of these challenges arose. One day before the Nord Stream 1 and 2 incident, I gave an interview to an influential German newspaper, where I gave a strong recommendation to thoroughly assess Russia's capabilities at the bottom of the sea," he said.

[MRT: Why would he do that? To start to blame Russia or to show that Russia has all its submarines out of the area so Russia would not be blamed which could ease the tense situation?]

"The basis for seeing possible events is a clear picture of the sea, or observation. If there is a clear picture of the air, surface or subsurface — almost clear, because you cannot always be completely sure — then you can look at anomalies in the system and then you can bring a special unit to the area where the anomaly was detected," Kaack said.

[MRT: stress should be in the word "...anomalies..." which hints to subsurface approach. It would be important to know what orders got German ad allied ships in the week before the event. Especially AFTER the USS Kaersarge left the Baltic sea as described here and Europeans were no more sheltered by US nuclear umbrella as said here. The next day was a chaos.]


Summary: 

The head of German Navy J. Ch. Kaack seemed to be aware of the subsurface danger to Nordstream pipelines. 

Kaack tells that the surface and air were under surveillance.

Kaack tells that there is an evidence in data anomalies about what happened.

It is unclear why German ship FGS Sachsen was in NE part of the Baltic sea in 30th of September when it was on 27th of September near the other end of Nordstream, neear its exit to Germany - here. Note that French naval ship Céphée was also in the same time operating in the NE part of the Baltic sea. Why? Was Germany expecting the attack in a wrong area?

 

 


 

Euro Asian Trade bottleneck countries in Mackinder Roadblocks hypothesis

In a ´theoretical´ geopolitical exercise aimed at slowing down or stalling Euro-Asian development and integration by imposing roadblocks to trade, development and intra-state economic activities, several key countries and regions could be targeted.

Is such hypothetical scenario purely speculative or grounded in real-world policies and intentions? Nonetheless, here are some potential targets that could disrupt Euro-Asian development and overview of major export countries in the region.

These are major surplus countries on Euro-Asia and weakened states. Lines represent what I call since 2014 "Mackinder roadblocks":


How can Euro-Asian development and integration be slowed/stopped?

Six Belt and Road Initiative corridotrs (BRI)
known also as One Belt One Road (OBOR) trade corridors

Trade and development is stopped or slowed down by imposing roadblocks on these following International Trade corridors and by weakening security in the region:


International transport corridors in Ukraine

  1. Ukraine: Control over Ukraine's territory, particularly its eastern regions and ports such as Odessa, could disrupt trade routes between Europe and Asia, particularly maritime trade in the Black Sea region and train corridor. As a transit country between Russia and the European Union, Ukraine plays a significant role in facilitating trade flows between Eastern and Western Europe. New Eurasian Land Bridge corridor also called the Second or New Eurasian Continental Bridge was derailed and investment shifted from Russian-Ukrainian route into

    Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.


  2. Turkey: Control over the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) could allow for the blocking or regulation of maritime traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, impacting trade between Europe and Asia. Disruption of this trade would be impossible at the moment as Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey are NATO states and Turkey holds the key to this trade bottleneck in form of 1936 The Montreux Treaty.
  3. Caucasus
    Azerbaijan: Located on the western shores of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan serves as a transit country for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. The country's ports, such as Baku, are important hubs for maritime trade in the Caspian region.
    Georgia: Situated in the Caucasus region, Georgia serves as a key transit route for goods moving between Europe and Asia, particularly via the Caucasus corridor. The country's ports, such as Batumi and Poti, are important hubs for maritime trade in the Black Sea region. Control over Georgia's territory and its ports on the Black Sea could disrupt maritime trade routes in the Caucasus region, impacting trade between Europe and Asia.
    Armenia
    : Despite its small size, Armenia occupies a strategic position in the South Caucasus and serves as a transit country for goods moving between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
  4. Syria:

    Syria's geographic location historically played a significant role in trade along the ancient Silk Road routes, particularly as a connecting point between the Mediterranean Sea and the rest of the Eurasian landmass. T

    he ongoing conflict and political instability in Syria have severely disrupted trade and economic activity in the region. Overland trade between the Middle East and Europe through this route is more or less stalled.

  5. Iraq: Situated at the crossroads of the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, Iraq has long been a vital link for trade between these regions. This Iraq's geographic location has historically positioned it as a crucial trade hub along the ancient Silk Road routes. However, due to various factors such as conflict, political instability, and infrastructure challenges, Iraq's role as a trade bottleneck on the old Silk Road has been diminished in recent times. Instability on land routes connecting to Turkey and Syria has disrupt trade flows between the Middle East and Europe.
  6. Iran: Positioned at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, Iran plays a crucial role in trade between Europe and Asia, particularly for goods moving by land or sea. Disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, controlled by Iran, could impact trade flows between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, affecting global energy markets and trade routes between Europe and Asia.

  7. Afghanistan: Control over Afghanistan's territory and its major transportation routes, such as the Khyber Pass and other border crossings, could disrupt overland trade between South Asia and Central Asia, as well as between Central Asia and the Middle East.

  8. Pakistan: Control over Pakistan's territory, particularly its ports on the Arabian Sea and land routes connecting to Central Asia and China, could impact trade flows between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

  9. Russia:

    With its vast landmass spanning both Europe and Asia, Russia plays a pivotal role in transcontinental trade. Key transportation routes, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway and various highways, pass through Russia, making it a critical bottleneck for goods moving between Asia and Europe. Important Northern corridor, North-South transport corridor.
  10. Kazakhstan: As the largest landlocked country in the world, Kazakhstan occupies a strategic position in Eurasia. It serves as a transit country for goods moving between China and Europe, with key transportation routes like the Eurasian Land Bridge passing through its territory. CCAWEC provides an alternative land route route between China and Europe which avoids Russian territory

  11. North Korea: Disruptions to maritime traffic and trade flows in Northeast Asia, particularly through control over ports and coastlines, is impacting trade between East Asia and the rest of the world, including Europe. The frozen conflict is a roadblock for NE Asian progress and development in the region.

  12. Taiwan: Control over Taiwan's territory and its ports could disrupt maritime trade routes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, impacting trade flows between East Asia and the rest of the world, including Europe.

SUMMARY:

Large countries on Euro-Asia: Russia, China, Iran and India are impossible to control. These sovereign countries pursuit their own sovereign interests and can not be controlled in medium to long term directly.

Several countries in Eurasia serve as significant trade route bottlenecks due to their strategic geographic location and due to the level of their transportation infrastructure.

These countries act as crucial nodes in the Eurasian trade network, and any disruptions or congestion in their transportation infrastructure can have significant implications for regional and global trade flows.

Several smaller states were lately purposefully destabilized, weakened. The maintenance of infrastructure was neglected, investments were prevented.

These ARTIFICIALLY created bottlenecks impact the flow of goods and commerce between Europe and Asia. They prevent or limit trade between surplus regions:



MACKINDER ROADBLOCKS (Artificially wakened states on old Silk Roads)

Ukraine: Ukrainian-Russian conflict

Russia: Economical and political sanctions

Caucasus: Azerbaijan-Armenian issue

Syria: Civil war

Iraq: Weak fragmented state'

Iran: Sanctioned

Afghanistan: Weakened state


Artificially induced migration as a weapon



More about this topic in this post:

Part I. - Mackinder Roadblocks against Euro-Asian development & integration - introSilk Road routes