PREFACE/ISSUE
Long term opposition to Russian energy exports: Boris Johnson stresses his implications to the pipeline that extend well beyond what is in Germany’s economic self-interest already in 2018.Brexit's Diminished Influence: Brexit has significantly undercut the UK's political and economic power, reducing its influence over European matters. This shift raises concerns over the UK's ability to negotiate and advocate for its interests effectively. The gradual withdrawal from EU affairs is accompanied with economical rise of Russia and rise of its influence through economical ties with EU members. The UK has found its political and economical influence substituted by old rival.
EU Energy market Coupling mechanism: The UK's departure from the EU's internal energy market in January 2021 has significant implications for its energy security. By leaving the EU, the UK no longer benefits from energy market coupling, which allowed for optimized energy trading and access to potentially cheaper electricity from EU countries. This has resulted in increased energy prices and reduced security, as the UK must rely more heavily on its own resources without the integrated support from the EU.
Integrated Review: The 2021 integrated review (into foreign, security and defence policy) correctly identified Russia as the greatest threat
Concerns over Nord Stream 2: The UK perceives Nord Stream 2 and Russian hydrocarbon exports in general as a geopolitical risk that strengthens Russia's reach and jeopardizes European security. High-profile officials, such as Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, have voiced apprehensions about the pipeline's potential to heighten Europe's dependency on Russian energy supplies and threaten Ukraine's sovereignty. The UK has openly voiced the project to be its both national security and economical risk.
Limited Response Options: The UK's ability to legally and administratively obstruct the Nord Stream 2 project has been constrained by its post-Brexit position. The analysis suggests that military intervention could be one of the few remaining avenues to halt the project, notwithstanding the expectation that sanctions would ultimately be rescinded.
Energy Strategy Shifts: In response to these vulnerabilities, the UK has aimed to diversify its energy sources, decrease dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, and enhance domestic energy production. These strategies reflect a broader transition from being an energy importer to becoming an exporter. The UK has achieved to become net energy exporter just 3 days after Nordstream was attacked on 29th of September 2022.
Toward developing alternative energy resources: The destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which has been a key conduit for Russian gas to Europe, could potentially enhance the UK's energy position by pushing European nations to seek alternative energy sources, including imports from the UK. This shift reduces Europe's dependency on Russian energy and may lead to more favorable trade conditions for UK energy exports, especially renewable energy. Additionally, increased prices for energy in Europe can create lucrative opportunities for the UK to export its own energy resources, thus boosting its energy security and economic resilience amid global market volatility.
Long term preparations: by promoting domestic energy production like opening more North Sea licenses, investing in developing offshore wind, investing in First UK-Germany power link, allowing fracking, diversifying supply sources, and reaching out to alternative energy exporters like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar in advance to highlight its possible role in becoming larger European energy hub, the UK is establishing a more robust energy strategy, positioning itself as a crucial player in European energy security
Plan of becoming energy supplier: At the 30 March 2022 meeting of the UK-EU Specialised Committee on Energy, the UK and EU agreed to facilitate regular exchanges on the security of supply. They specifically discussed establishing a Working Group on Security of Supply as a matter of priority. This is because there is insufficient LNG import capacity within the EU, but spare capacity in the UK as well as capacity on the pipelines from the UK to mainland Europe.
