PREFACE/ISSUE
"Exploring the UK underwater demolition capability in the view of NordStream affair"
In two separate posts I explored the possibility that it was a UK Astute class submarine which is MY main suspect:
In another post I have explored the rationale why a submarine would be the best delivery means:
But, submarine is just a means how to get near the target location.
PropellerHeads - On Her Majesty's Secret Service
UK underwater demolition capability explained:
There were 10 submarines in the Royal Navy Submarine Service as at 1 April 2022, consisting of: 6 Nuclear Submarines. 4 Ballistic Nuclear Submarines.
#1 - UK has two types of submarines - wiki overview: Fleet and Ballistic
[M: ballistic could be excluded as suspects, they are for nuclear detterence and not suitable for such operations]
#3 - Only these Astute class subs are so far operational:
Astute S119Ambush S120Artful S121Audacious S122
The Astute class submarines were designed from the outset to be fitted with (removable) a Dry Deck Shelter (DDS).
[M: My deduction is that Astute class sub with Chalfont was involved because of the need to provide delivery vehicle, divers and protection, this info ]
DDS hangar, Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV), Mass Swimmer Lock-Out (MSLO), CHALFONT Shore Facility (CSF) constructed by BAES at Faslane/Clyde naval base in Scotland.
The Faslane/Clyde naval base s where the DDS Chalfont is mounted to the submarine when needed (1-3 days). The large hallway is for subs.
On 10 June 2021 - New Submarine Training Facility Taking Shape At HMNB Clyde. The facility already hosts Chalfont training team.
A dry deck shelter (DDS) is a removable module that can be attached to a submarine to allow divers easy exit and entrance while the boat is submerged.
The host submarine must be specially modified to accommodate the DDS, with the appropriate mating hatch configuration, electrical connections, and piping for ventilation,[1] divers' air, and draining water. The DDS can be used to deploy a SEAL Delivery Vehicle submersible, Navy divers, or Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC).
The Astute class reputedly have a lock-in/lock-out transfer trunk permanently installed inside the sail that allows diver access to and from the submarine while submerged. When the DDS has fitted, this chamber is mated to the ‘hangar’ which can accommodate either a Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) or up to 20 divers and their equipment.
#6 - This dry dock facility was developed/procured under the code name of 'Project Chalfont' and is known as the "Special Forces payload bay".
Training is conducted at the purpose-built Chalfont Shore Facility (CSF) constructed by BAE Systems at HMNB Clyde. It is used by the Astute-class submarine.
The SDV release team consists of 2 officers, 2 enlisted technicians, and 18 divers.
2014 - Britain's super-sub: Navy unveils James Bond-style mini submarine carried on board HMS Astute which can launch from under water.2014. "A minisub dry dock used by the Special Boat Service (SBS) has been spotted in the wild". HMS Astute Shows Off SBS Minisub Dry Dock in 2014.
...the new SDVs can accommodate 8 fully equipped SBS commandos. Unlike the previous design, the new SDV will feature a periscope, doppler sonar array and advanced navigation systems which means the craft will be able to carry out its missions without surfacing to take GPS bearings.
The miniature submarine births in the Astute class boat's dry dock shelter and can be transported, submerged and undetected, for thousands of miles.
To be launched, the minisub's 'mother' sub rises to a relatively shallow depth before the minisub exits the dry dock and begins its mission.
Recovery of the minisub back into the dry dock is just as simple. The dry dock can be fixed to whichever Astute class submarine is required for a given SBS operation.
Even without a minisub present, SBS frogmen can still swim out of the dock, perhaps carrying inflatable craft up to the surface.
#8 - Three MK 11 Shallow Water Combat Submersibles (SWCF) fitting Chalfont purchased by UK in 2018. A blogger Covert Shores has excellent info about the SWCS.
(specification)
Another possibility is the Block II - details "S351 Nemesis".
2020 - USSOCOM Reveals Dry Combat Submersible Entering Service Soon
The Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) is a type of SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) which has a dry interior to allow the SEALs to arrive at their target fresher than the usual wet-sub where they have to wear their diving gear at all times. Illustration by H I Sutton.
For decades, the U.S. Navy SEALs have primarily used “wet” SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV) midget submarines where the passenger compartment is flooded to the temperatures and operational environmental conditions of the waters outside and the riders have to wear SCBA masks for breathing. To address SOCOM’s emphasis on BioTechnology and special forces Operators’ overall health and well-being, having a submersible with a pressurized dry interior allows for better Operator endurance, especially, for example, in the colder waters such as the Arctic.
As of July 2019, the first of the subs is undergoing advanced sea trials in the US with the second in production in the UK. Delivery of all three submersibles is expected to take place by January 2022. source
1st March 2022 - "Changes ahead for Navy diving teams in biggest shake-up in 25 years"
"For my unit this transformation means we can focus our attention on becoming experts in the field of maritime exploitation of conventional and improvised explosive devises and munitions – a capability that doesn’t exist anywhere else across UK defence."The Diving & Threat Exploitation Group continues to evolve and move with the times."We recognise and embrace modern, innovative technology such as autonomous underwater vehicles and remotely operated vehicles (known as AUVs and ROVs) to deliver operations and enhance training."
#10 - RN divers from the Fleet Diving Unit One (FDU1)...
...act as casing divers to support SF personnel when deployed onboard a DDS-equipped submarine, Alpha Squadron (DTXG’s special operations squadron), Echo Squadron (DTXG’s explosive exploitation experts).
UK Regulations, Guidance, Training and the Theory of Diving - details
(Even the top secret missions have to follow risk management, safety rules)
- ALPHA SQUADRON
(55 Specialist divers, engineers and mine warfare personnel) - BRAVO SQUADRON
(8 crew, 52 personnel Group strength) - CHARLIE SQUADRON
(38 personnel) - DELTA & ECHO SQUADRON
(unspecified / classified)
Some ROLES (of squadron leaders):
Tactical Diving Group (TDG) - is a specialist unit within the Royal Navy responsible for providing diving support and expertise to military operations. The TDG conducts a range of diving activities, including mine countermeasures, underwater repair work, and submarine rescue operations. The TDG also works closely with other specialist units within the Royal Navy, such as the Fleet Diving Group and the Submarine Parachute Assistance Group.
The Royal Navy's Advanced (High Threat) IED Disposal Operator (AHDO) is a highly specialized role within the Fleet Diving Group, which is responsible for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and other diving operations.
AHDOs are responsible for the safe and effective disposal of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in high-threat environments, both at sea and on land. They use their advanced training and specialized equipment to identify, render safe, and dispose of IEDs, which may include complex devices that are difficult to detect or access.
In addition to their EOD duties, AHDOs also have a range of other responsibilities, including conducting underwater search operations, providing support to other military units in hostile environments, and providing training and guidance to other members of the Fleet Diving Group.
The Joint Service Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) Operator is a role within the Royal Navy's Fleet Diving Group, which is responsible for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and other diving operations.
Joint Service IEDD Operators are trained to identify, render safe, and dispose of a wide range of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in various environments, including at sea and on land. They use a combination of specialized equipment and techniques to achieve this, which may involve using robots and other remote-controlled devices to minimize the risk to themselves and others.
As the name suggests, Joint Service IEDD Operators are part of a wider team that includes personnel from other branches of the military, such as the British Army and the Royal Air Force. They work together to provide a coordinated response to IED threats, both at home and overseas.
In addition to their core role in IEDD, Joint Service IEDD Operators also have a range of other responsibilities, including conducting underwater search operations, providing training and guidance to other members of the Fleet Diving Group, and working closely with other specialist units within the Royal Navy and the wider military.
Effective from 31 January 2022, the Fleet Diving Squadron has been transformed into the Diving & Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG). I am grateful to its Commanding Officer, MCDOA member Cdr Sean 'Central' Heaton MBE RN, for this information:IntroductionFollowing an initial phase of Transformation in 2020 which rationalised and restructured the FDS, there have subsequently been two senior level reviews of military diving. These have resulted in direction to conduct a second more ambitious and comprehensive transformation of FDS (T2). Through internal rebrigading DTXG is now structured to deliver Diving, Exploitation and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) force elements with greater availability, sustainability and lethality. Capitalising on the MCMV drawdown it will be resourced to meet the additional future requirements of a more technologically advanced and deployed RN. T2 has been forged around the previous transformation successes and now delivers a DTXG which is global, modern and ready to deliver.Key EffectsDTXG will deliver six key operational effects:
Naval Special Operations (NSOps) – Specialist diving, maritime and land EOD and maritime exploitation capabilities.Mine Hunting Capability (MHC) – Persistent mixed-gas underwater EOD and exploitation capabilities to the MHC.Maritime Task Group (MTG) – Persistent diving and In Water Maintenance & Repair (IWMAR) support to the QEC carriers and the MTG, capable of providing Under Water Force Protection (UWFP) to the whole force.Littoral Response Group / Future Commando Force (LRG / FCF) – Persistent mixed-gas diving and maritime and land EOD capabilities to the LRG or JEF(M), able to operate and integrate with Commando ForcesIn Water Maintenance And Repair (IWMAR) – Very high readiness diving capabilities, including confined space entry, to provide IWMAR and Battle / Peacetime Damage Repair (BDR / PDR) to SURFLOT and SUBFLOT platforms.Homeland Defence – Specialist diving, maritime and land EOD capabilities for MACA [Military Aid to the Civil Authorities], EOD under MOD / Home Office SLAs [Service Level Agreements] and Directives.
[M: Note the Echo squadron leader bio, does the capability match? "Dave assumed command of the Expeditionary Diving Group in Aug 21. " Is also in Faslane/Clyde, where there is Chalfont capability / training. Note that there are also other names with searchable profiles].
#12 - Delta & Echo Squadron: (DDU1, DDU1, EDU1 = "Echo squadron")
Delta & Echo Squadron globally deploys dedicated and motivated Clearance Divers armed with world class expeditionary diving and explosive ordnance capabilities to defeat and exploit complex conventional and improvised threats.
Delta & Echo Squadron are ready to deploy to a Task Group Navy on, under or near the sea around the clock on every day of the year to respond to, defeat and exploit complex Explosive Ordnance (EO) threats, both conventional and improvised.
The Squadrons are made up of three units with specific skill sets in addition to the above core operations.
Assisted by small teams of enablers such as medical, logistics, communications, and Mine Warfare Specialists - who operate our Automated Underwater Vehicles, Delta & Echo Squadron are ready to deploy 24hrs a day.
#13 - Echo squadron (EDU1)
Echo Diving Unit One (EDU1) is always at very-high readiness for global contingent Expeditionary Mine-Countermeasures (Ex-MCM) operations. EDU1's specialist skill set is to exploit any explosive ordnance through Maritime Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI(M)), including Mine Investigation and Exploitation and Maritime Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M-EOD) including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
A Clearance Diving Unit, EDU1 are capable of conducting underwater search and clearance of fairways, harbours and critical maritime infrastructure. Specialising in explosive ordnance exploitation, they can be the difference to key strategic and tactical advantage.
Diving equipment - Heliox/trimix mix for dives down to 390 feet
#14 - More about UK DTXG teamThe three units of Delta & Echo Squadron continue to succeed and excel at safely identifying and neutralising underwater threats, including any conventional or improvised explosive hazards, exploiting those threats to gain operational advantage.
UK DTXG team is a specialized unit of the British military's Special Boat Service (SBS). The team's primary role is to conduct covert maritime operations, including intelligence gathering, sabotage, and maritime counter-terrorism. The DTXG team is composed of highly trained and experienced operators who are proficient in a wide range of specialized skills, such as diving, explosive ordnance disposal, and small-boat handling.#15 - More about the Echo Squadron
The Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG) is a specialized unit within the British military's Special Boat Service (SBS) that is responsible for conducting a wide range of underwater operations, including diving, underwater demolition, and intelligence gathering. The DTXG is composed of highly trained and experienced divers who are proficient in a variety of specialized skills, including diving, underwater navigation, demolition, and the use of specialized equipment for conducting underwater operations.Fleet Diving Unit 1 (FDU1) provides support to United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF). FDU1 divers neutralise any explosive threats during SBS / SAS Maritime Counter Terrorism (MCT) operations. The unit maintains a very high state of readiness. The role includes Assault Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (AIEDD).
Echo Squadron is a specialized sub-unit within the UK Royal Navy's Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit, known as the Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG). The primary role of Echo Squadron is to provide explosive exploitation capabilities in support of naval operations.
Explosive exploitation involves the identification, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance in a safe and controlled manner. This is a complex and highly specialized task that requires a range of skills and expertise, including knowledge of different types of explosives, specialized equipment, and techniques for safely handling and disposing of explosive devices.
The members of Echo Squadron are highly trained and experienced EOD specialists who have undergone extensive training in explosive detection, disposal, and neutralization. They are also trained in a range of other skills, such as underwater search and recovery, diving, and tactical operations.
In addition to their primary role in explosive exploitation, members of Echo Squadron may also be called upon to support a wide range of other naval operations, including mine clearance, underwater search and rescue, and salvage operations.The work of Echo Squadron and the wider DTXG is critical to the success of many naval operations, as well as to the safety of naval personnel and civilians in and around the area of operations. The unit's specialized capabilities and expertise enable it to operate in some of the most challenging and hazardous environments, making it a valuable asset to the UK Royal Navy.
#16 - On 8 Feb 2022 - EXU-1, FBI Host Maritime Post-Blast Investigation Course at NAS Key West
KEY WEST, Fla. - Expeditionary Exploitation Unit 1 (EXU-1) and the FBI’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Section conducted a maritime post-blast investigation course at Naval Air Station (NAS) Key West, Florida, Jan. 19-28. The U.K. Royal Navy Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG) and three U.S. Navy explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, including technicians from EXU-1 and EOD Mobile Unit 3, collaborated to expand and develop their maritime post-blast exploitation techniques through seven days of classroom coursework, diving, and strategic case study analysis. The course coordinates the combined response of maritime exploitation capabilities by the Department of Defense, Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.K. Royal Navy to global maritime explosive attacks from strategic competition in the maritime domain.
“In terms of our outlook on current geopolitical events, what helps is having both of our groups looking at the same problem sets. Working together, information exchange is quite easy and prevents numerous delays. We are often in the same places and operating jointly, so our partnership constantly sharpens our skillsets and allows us to be more prepared,” he said. “Different events tie into intelligence gathering which we can all share with each other. That is critical because it allows us to be on the same page with one another before conflict happens. So when conflict does happen, we are all prepared.”
[M: No comment. Somebody will have to explain what happened there...]
[M: Is Hersh right, am I right? Are we both right?]
#17 - On 15 June 2022 - Royal Navy divers from Portsmouth undertake ‘importance’ explosives clearance using state-of-the-art drones in Lithuania.
Delta Diving Unit from the Diving & Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG) based on Horsea Island in Portsmouth, practised identifying – and neutralising – a range of explosive devices in the water and ashore across Lithuania.
[M: Practicing identification and blowing stuff. All right!]
#19 - HMS S120 Ambush & Alec Shelbrooke
4 October 2022 - HMS S-120 Ambush anchors in Fastlane, Clyde
[M: pls read the link, why does UK minister goes on his first visit to visit submariners in his suit, why is meeting not held on the shore? Why is the cargo bay still covered? Why is he telling "Ukrainian was is our war?" basically "we are in undeclared war with Russia" ... Why is the need to say that to them when they just seemed returned from mission???]
[Alec Shelbrooke is an ex Defence minister, it is possible to simply ask him about his role: @AlecShelbrooke, I noticed this news shortly in October why searching where were Astute class subs as I was suspicious already that such type would be the right match.]
Alec Shelbrooke - Minister of State for Defence Procurement
(In office 7 September 2022 – 26 October 2022)
In 2020, Shelbrooke was appointed Leader of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
On 7 September 2022, he was appointed Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence as part of the Truss administration because of his overt support for Liz Truss in her leadership campaign. Shelbrooke was then immediately sacked on 26 October 2022 by the new Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak and returned to the back benches.
#20 - The chain of command in Royal Navy from Monarch to SBS teams
- The Queen/King: The ultimate authority of the Armed Forces is the monarch, who is the Commander-in-Chief.
- Secretary of State for Defence: The Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for the overall direction and control of the Armed Forces.
- Chief of the Defence Staff: The Chief of the Defence Staff is the professional head of the Armed Forces and is responsible for the strategic direction and management of the Defence establishment.
- First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff: This is the professional head of the Royal Navy and is responsible for the fighting effectiveness, efficiency, and morale of the Naval Service.
- Director Special Forces (DSF): The DSF is the senior officer responsible for the United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF), which includes the Special Air Service (SAS), the Special Boat Service (SBS), and other special forces units.
- Commander UK Special Forces (C UKSF): The C UKSF is responsible for the overall command of UKSF operations.
- Commanding Officer, Special Boat Service: The Commanding Officer of the SBS is responsible for the operational command of the unit.
- Lieutenant Commander: A Lieutenant Commander is a mid-level officer who may be responsible for a department or team within a ship or shore establishment, and in the SBS, may be responsible for a specialized unit or team within the SBS.
[M: How does A.S. fit here?
Special post made: "The UK chain of command toward SBS"]
Concluding questions:
What was the official reason for him being sacked?
What is his relation to the Special Boat Services (SBS) team?
What was the reason that his 1st official trip in a new position was to visit sailors?
[M: A speculation offers that not everything went good or that he was some kind of "project manager/coordinator" responsible for some part. Just guessing. It is not even clear that UK was it.]
[Update 20-02-2022 Have I sucked him by that question? Was I right about Ambush already in October 2022 just a few days after the event?]
[Update 20-02-2022 I have found out that the head of the Faslane/Clude naval base was sacked about the same time as Shelbrooke. What coincidence! Could it be that he allowed press with pictures and cameras in the base after important operation ended? ]
Additional notes:
Denmark is aware of the vulnerability from the seabed
19 Oct 2022 - The bottom of the sea is the Danish Defence’s blind spot: 4 possible surveillance technologies
Johannes Kidmose does not consider it improbable that an enemy vessel would be able to sabotage a submarine cable, internet cable, or gas pipeline on the bottom of the sea in Danish waters without anyone discovering it before the damage has been done.Danish frigates have no sonars on board and are thus blind to what is happening down in the depths of the sea.
[M: Is this the reason that on 22, 23, 24, 25 September the SWE navy was called in as their boats do have this capability? Could this be that DK has was somehow triggered by a submarine, asked SWE to investigate even later allowing it to access its territorial waters and so SWE navy switched off their transponders?]
Could it be that the UK tried to frame the USA or escalate further but USA said "do NOT" !?
5 Oct 2022 - US considering offering to analyse underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations. Article speaks about “sonar signature”.
[M: It means DS/SWE have real sonar records and then DK PM Mette Frederiksen arranged ad-hoc meeting and met Liz Truss in London. See the other post here. I cross recheck and reference everything! DK is supposedly not having a boat with sonars anymore in services so it may have asked SWE to help to track which submarine was in their EEZ.]
[Note that in Northwood there is a NATO and UK navy HQ - did she fly to clarify that?]
What if it all started here?
Is it not strange, even really odd that PM makes visits to such low level all the way to a team of DTXG? This visit was also later done by Liz Truss.
While not impossible it was the UK, it does seem unlikely, but then so do all other ideas... however if it was them then I can't imagine that the knowledge of the secret mission would have been known to US/EU beforehand, so I think all of that analysis as to who met with who is not relevant..
ReplyDeleteNote that my investigation is VERY cross-referenced, uses verifyable public sources, and support the outcome that UK was involved and that the SBS teams Delta and Echo Squadrons were involved.
DeleteThe ONLY weak point is this: Danish straights are 19-24m deep so it is hard for a UK submarine to pass unnoticed.
The data I have collected shows with high probability that a submarine with some kind of "last mile delivery system" was used and that SWE, DK, GER and RU navy and air assets were after it.
The possible explanation is that it was a part of some JEF mission (UK-DK silent agreement) to let UK submarine to pass to Baltics without a trace at night or something like that.
As for the it was known "beforehand". Look at the post US-UK relationship... I have traced some "disagreements" about the "UK-US special status" after meetings of Truss-Blinken, Cleverly-Blinked, Truss-Biden. Her rhethorics is also confirming that UK may have been behind, words she told at UN assemble do not seem to be overreaction (we are cancelling pipelines of authoritarian regimes)... After this next day US had top level meetings with EU and on 23-09, just a 3D before Jens Stoltenberg demands ad-hoc meeting with Ursula von de Leyen for 26-09, nou journalists/photographers allowed... Very very odd.
Look also at "Who said it first" that it is a sabotage - that is very telling -> it had to be KNOWN at that point when they said it WHO did it. One can not make assumption that it was a sabotage if Russia was a suspect - they want international investigation, they call it terrorist act - definitions with higher liability. Russia is NOT therefore a suspect and EU KNEW latest at 27-28th latest who has done it.
I have also written a post about the Prague meeting in which it looks like the decision has been made it is a secret...
Dear Mortimer, you have done a great job, but as I see, your conclusions are very erroneous because even in your reasoning you ignore so many of the facts you have given. This is due to the fact that you are poorly versed in the technical side of this process. If you understood the nuances, you would never have come to the conclusion that a submarine was used to mine offshore gas pipelines. I will explain: you do not take into account the physiology of the diver, you do not understand how the DDS and the submarine are used and integrated, and much more. The tent at the stern of HMS Ambush has absolutely nothing to do with any covert operations. This is a standard tent that protects the entrance to the submarine from bad weather through the open aft hatch. And if it is so large and covers part of the side of the submarine, this can also be explained very simply - in this part of the boat there is access for connecting its systems to coastal support systems (look at the photo of this boat on Google) and you will see “doors” on the side submarine next to the stern hatch. And so on and so forth. Sorry for my English, I barely know it. :-)
ReplyDeleteDear Anonymous,
ReplyDeleteThank you for the input and appreciation.
The main objective is not to tell the one and only truth, I present the data for all to see.
As for the technical part of the mission. Is that the most important for any investigators? It is known that it was done by a government and there is just a limited amount of suspects.
As in the old story where Sherlock Holmes states to his friend:
"If you exclude all the impossible, what is left even if improbable must be the truth"
The statement has a deep meaning in this case. I have followed best practices of the common criminal investigation including profiling, the standardised process of data collection, verification, etc.
The crime has been done in government offices through formal and informal meetings of a small tight group who were involved in the mission directly or were in the know due to their job description.
The team which planted at the end explosives is the least important. Even if it would be a proxy hired team. The same applies. They are not the ones which we should go after. They did their best to do their job, they did not have the capacity to judge the semi-legality, rightfulness or other legal aspects of the mission. Those at the very top are responsible.
The technical side at the crime scene near Bornholm (for me crime scene is the government offices)? This post has been done in February and it just describes the very probable sequence of events.
There is lots of evidence of a sub-surface activity in the area in September, from ASW assets of several states to statements of Navy officials, to a known existence of the hydro-acoustic data... You can search the blog for such data.
One can also deduct the sub-surface approach from the position of the blast itself. Closest to the deep exit from Baltic sea, from the activities of SWE, DK ships which were in the area a few days before, from the location of the #1, #2 blasts (the second seems to be a secondary mining area would the first be inaccessible, and alas, it looks like perpetrators were disturbed and so they confused lines of NS2).
The DDS, Chalfont bay is a logical conclusion. It allows i/o access for teams of deep divers. Here is a good description:
https://www.navylookout.com/in-focus-royal-navy-submarine-special-forces-delivery-systems/
How exactly were bombs planted is a task for investigators, forensic, underwater blast masters who are best equipped to evaluate and deduct, present theories and test them.
DeleteI have offered approximate highly probable scenario. Now it is a job of journalists to ask questions.
Why S120 Ambush? Once you narrow down the list of suspects enough then there is just a limited amount of subs, minisubs, manned and unmanned toys ;o) which you certainly know.
How strange that just one sub returned to Clyde and how strange the first trip of the new Defence minister was to meet low level submariners in their dirty sub and not in some meeting room outside? There are unanswered questions. Do you know that another UK submarine was damaged about the same time? I think it was Victorious, a Trident nuclear deterrence sub which was reportedly damaged by fire onboard about the time when NS was attacked.
Was a sub used to mine offshore gas pipelines or was it just a carrier of certain equipment? The data exist, NATO MARCOM HQ has certainly enough of material for that and DK PM was flying first ti London, right? Not to NATO HQ or to meet EU colleagues.
As for the tent, I know that it is used for covering the hatch, I was more thinking about the work on the sail itself which needs certain modifications which hints that the DDS could have been used.
Big thoughts are like large boats, it takes a long time to turn. I do not say exactly how things happened, I highlight the data and show all -Hey! Have a look at this, what do you see?
To conclude: Were mines/explosives planted by the submarine or with a help of submarine? lets see what officials will tell us. My take is that the direct approach by submarine and planting directly would be too risky and some "last mile" delivery system was probably used but that you, as a RU sailor already knows, right?
Здравствуйте!
Dear Mortymer, it's me again! :-) Thank you for the answer!
DeleteI want to ask you, have you ever had to blow up Nord Streams or any other pipelines (or anything at all)?
Can you answer a couple of simple questions for me?
1) How many explosions do you think there were on Nord Streams?
2) How many pipes are damaged?
3) How much explosive, in your opinion, should be used to blow up one pipe (minimum weight);
4) How long can a charge installed on a pipe remain there and what factors influence this?
The main question: can you give me examples from life (real, not fairy tales) in which a person guilty of organizing and committing a particularly serious crime would strive to expand the circle of people involved in this attack and would do it publicly?
I think you initially took the wrong approach in your analysis. Ask yourself: how would you act if you were asked to blow up these pipelines?
Nice questions, thank you, let me comment:
DeleteI try not to speculate but use best available data. That you can find e.g. in the work of @MichaKobs and @ErkPerk who visited the place, took samples, and made quite decent analysis. How close they got to the real description of the event is up to forensic analysis which is best equipped for this job. I will not mix in their job. Lets leave that for them, yes?
You can find the report here, it would be waste of our time to comment further. And I do not feel for comment on improper wide open badly defined questions. You need to ask about type of explosives, depth, and many other parameters, anyway, here is the report:
https://anderssonerik.substack.com/p/a-trip-to-the-nord-stream-blast-sites
But I am very curious about this part "I think you initially took the wrong approach in your analysis. " Cold you please elaborate?
If you are referring to Truss UN statement, well, I highly recommend to read more posts about her. A brief out of context discussion about one example does not make it for me.
https://nordstreambymortymer.blogspot.com/2023/06/liz-truss-as-uk-pm-nordstream-affair.html
or
https://nordstreambymortymer.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-state-as-suspect-in-nordstream.html
The amount of fingerprints pointing to London and their PM who was the official head of military is well, vast.
Dear Mortymer!
DeleteI read your message with great interest and am very grateful to you for the link to the site https://anderssonerik.substack.com/.
I will honestly tell you that I am very surprised by the high quality of the material that is posted on this resource and this gives me hope for a good final result. If I ever decide to analyze this terrorist attack, I will know that I can get all the background information from you.
I quite agree with you that London is one of the main beneficiaries of the result of this act. According to my estimates, he is among the top three, but does not lead it. Could I be wrong? Yes. Could London have staged a terrorist attack? Yes. Is it difficult to do this in principle? No. The list of those who are able to pull off such an action will be very long (of course, they will all be from the beneficiary countries).
To be honest, I would love to talk to you. It's a pity that my English is close to zero. :-( The problem of investigating incidents (disasters) of this scale always lies in one moment - everyone is very fixated on small details and believes that the deeper they dive into the details, the faster they will get closer to the truth. Usually no one sees the main thing, that is, few can distinguish the main thing from the secondary.
There is a very good ancient expression, although I’m not sure I’ll translate it correctly: «There is no need to multiply existing things unnecessarily». The meaning of this statement (if it suddenly turns out to be meaningless) is that there is always some minimum set that will be enough to achieve a result.
In relation to the case under discussion, I can well imagine the composition of this set. My set does not include a submarine. She's excessive. And as I see, that excellent analysis from https://anderssonerik.substack.com/ fully corresponds to this set.
Therefore, when I talked about the concept, I meant the choice of criteria that would help consider facts taking into account their importance and weight to obtain a similar result.
In my last message I made a mistake by asking you several questions. I only had to ask you one question because each of my questions does not have an easy answer. Each of the issues requires discussion and discussion of all issues at the same time does not allow us to move logically and consistently and takes us away from the goal. I'll keep this in mind for the future.
I'm currently busy with something creative that requires time, so I apologize if I don't respond to your next message quickly.
We are social creatures and the art of communication, diplomacy, takt, manners is replaced by power games and ego play. Too few know the Aristotelean "It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.". From the composition of your sentence you speak of Slavic language and you liked to read a lot. I can deduct approximate age and more.
ReplyDelete1. My #1 instinct was the Ukraine but it has an issue. One never bites a hand that feeds him. The other problem is how to get large amount of explosives over the border. No secret security would allow transport of such undocumented cargo without proper security as it could end who knows where. The more people know the higher risk of accidental bust of the plan.
Each country has factions which fight for power, within these factions there are pro "cheap (Russian) energy" who would not hesitate to pass such information.
2. In summer and especially in mid September Ukraine was short of money. Loans payments they made started to pile up and G7 was in talks with Ukraine about postponement of such payments. Zelenski was, of course, leading such negotiations. I can not imagine that he would not know about such HUGE impact mission which COULD endanger significantly Ukrainian strategic resource - foreign money and flow of weapons.
3. The location of the crime in EEZs (exclusive economical zones of SWE, DK) - and the proximity to TZs (territorial zones).
DeleteDo recall a message Zelenski and Johnson got in spring which spells exactly this scenario (!?). Look at the screenshot from 5 May 2022:
https://nordstreambymortymer.blogspot.com/2023/02/what-happened-around-26-09-2022.html
How likely would one to pass such in-the-know information to two leaders who are just meeting in Kiev? I say almost impossible unless the whole plan was well known which is again very improbable. With more international people in the know the chance of exposure grows exponentionally.
4. Note that they mention that Nordstream has Headquarters HQ in Switzerland. Do you see? The person spells that Russia can not monitor the section of Nordstream which is in territorial zone of DK.
You can find on the same timeline several RU plane and ship incursions into DK TZ after which Danish foreign office called Russian ambassador to explain.
It is very clear that the whole area is under constant surveillance from Kaliningrad and it takes just a few minutes to send there a fast plane to check out the situation.
Nordstream is known to have an array of sensors which could detect activity but they were not for obvious Danish security reasons installed in DK territorial zone.
5. A submarine, mini-submarine, manned or unmanned sub-drone could do the job unnoticed and hide if Russian assets would approach into the DK territorial zone.
6. Look at the depth profile of the whole Baltic sea. There is an excellent rationale for using divers in the area where the depth is less shallow - e.g. near Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania but not in the DK, SWE TZs.
7. Two blasts in two TZs were deliberate. This spells political negotiations. DK is in the NATO and SWE was still a non-member but associated. Two TZs = playing for the time. The attacker just needed time for negotiations to conceal their involvement politically. Again this points to non Ukrainian attacker.
8. An other note on the location. Ukraine would choose Baltic states as it is easier to communicate (LIT, LAT, EST). E.g. Estonia could be better option as their PM is more pro Ukraine than Danish or Swedish governments.
ReplyDeleteThe location of the blast is just next main merchant ship artery VERY close to exit from the Baltic sea. The scenario that some submerged asset could sneak in and out is more pronounced, yes?
This choice of near exit from Balti sea again points to the attacker being more likely not from the pool of suspects which have ports in the Baltic sea aka non-Baltic sea state (USA, UK, NOR,...).
9. The Denmark and Sweden are both kingdoms and UK is also a kingdom. I do not know if that played any role but this is one more channel for the concealment. A soft power through background deals.
10. The location again. It is NE from Bornholm, not on the SE part where there is further distance to the exit from Baltic sea. A submarine can not go as easily undetected south of Bornholm - it is too shallow.
11. I had a long discussion with one US submariner deployed in the Pacific ocean on this blog who pointed out that it is hard to pass through Danish straights undetected due to int. law, the danger of for shipping and so on. I have spent significant time looking into this as it is a serious fundamental limitation of the Ambush involvement.
Speaking with SWE mariner who explained me some details I realized that it is not an obstacle but rather a proof that it COULD be exactly like I sketched... let me explain:
Well, it is not impossible but it would require a high sea, dark moon night and agreement with DK to pass e.g. between two friendly ships in sandwich configuration.
The DK through JEF COULD have some agreement that UK assets could sneak into Baltic sea undetected and undocumented, e.g. to install on the sea listening devices near Kaliningrad, etc. It is possible that Danish PM flew to London just because of this?
12. Note that there exists hydro-acoustic data (!) Note that from 9-15 September German „Oste“ A52 most advanced spy ship was in the area checking for threats. Why did they stop on 15th? What did it do after? Why was there in CNN a short message that a submarine was in the vicinity of Bornholm?
13. Why is USA offering on 5 October 2022 this: "US considering offering to analyse underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations" - see details and link on my timeline.
Summary:
I have mentioned here several fingerprints which point to highly probable deployment of a British submarine. I can list another perhaps 40-50 similar hints which are documented in the timeline.
Could there be another scenario? Of course!
But show me the data first!
I say it again, the set of data which I collected point very clearly to the UK as a main suspect.
The mission had to be planned months in advance and the country whose relations were constantly worsening (UK) should be seriously considered by official investigator and journalists. Note that Truss was the one threatening Russia with nukes in spring 2022, that she had a personal issue against Lavrov who humiliated her in public over had bad knowledge of geography.
IF the USA would do it I expect also South Stream would be down,
in fact ALL Russian oil/gas export facilities would be downgraded to rubble similar to how USA acted in Iraq, Libya, and other places. The USA is thorough, the UK is sloppy. And sloppy work was done. Only 3/4 pipelines destroyed - such a mission failure! Sonar fingerprint exists as well and court will ask Denmark for it sooner or later.
Your English is perfect, you can also use www.deepl.com perhaps a best translator. It also translated web pages so you can read all my research in good quality.
Dear Mortymer, I'm back. :-)
DeleteI really laughed when Lavrov trolled Truss like that. :-)
Thank you for Deep. I know this platform, but as I see it, Google does it also quite well. You are right, my native language is Russian, and you would not offend me at all by calling me directly Russian, or Ukrainian or Belarusian. I am well acquainted with all these peoples and know their specific characteristics. As for everything else (in relation to me), of course it would be interesting to hear how you see me, not in order to convict you of inaccuracy, but in order to work on the image of my own personality. :-)
I have finished my creative work. There are not many chances that it will be highly appreciated, but I did everything that depended on me.
So, you decided to repeat my mistake and presented several global issues for discussion at once. :-) I will try to combine them, since life is continuous and interconnected. My 1, 2, 3, etc. will not be identical to yours, but will indicate the sequence of parts of my answer.
Nature does not tolerate emptiness. It gives good hearing to the blind, good vision to the deaf, and allows the uneducated to discuss any topic. :-) I'm talking about myself. :-)
1) You are radically mistaken in your assumptions. Your mistake arises from the well-known thesis which says: a reasonable person thinks that in front of him is also a reasonable person. You are making the perfectly reasonable assumption that reasonable people will not harm themselves. But if this is so, how do you explain everything that is happening today? After all, wherever you look, country leaders are pursuing policies that directly negatively affect their countries. Are they being reasonable? No. Why did you suddenly decide that the Ukrainian authorities would behave more intelligently than others? If this were so, then there would be no hostilities in Ukraine now. I’ll tell you even more, something that the European authorities completely do not understand and do not take into account. If Zelensky feels a personal threat to himself (from Europe and the United States), and this happens closer to the end, then he will blame all the problems of Ukraine solely on the West and (!) call on his citizens (of which there are a lot of people in Europe now) to take revenge on the Europeans for this betrayal (for these misfortunes, deaths, hunger, devastation). In Europe, simply no one understands the Ukrainian mentality. If you suddenly thought that I was speaking in the language of Russian propagandists, then this is also a wrong idea. Ukrainians are very determined, cruel, do not understand the means and are not afraid to break the law. If they hear and become imbued with this idea of revenge (revenge for the betrayal of Ukraine), Europe will be horrified by what will begin to happen. I am sure that this hour will not have long to wait. Many things are already happening, but in Europe they are diligently hushed up so as not to frighten their own population and not add negativity towards Ukraine and its citizens. Do you know how much the number of ATM bombings in the EU has increased recently? Do you think this happens on its own? Yes, dragging explosives or weapons to Europe is such a pan-Ukrainian pastime. A huge amount of explosives, weapons and ammunition have already been imported into the EU. All this is already being used and will be used even more intensively.
2) Ukraine and Russia have a multi-billion dollar trade turnover (even now). Even now, Ukraine continues to receive money from Russia every day for the transit of Russian gas to Europe. When Zelensky calls on everyone to stop trading with Russia and not allow it to earn oil and gas dollars, he is not blocking his own transit pipelines. This is beneficial for Europe: Russia itself pays for the war against itself. The contracts end at the end of 2024 and they will easily be extended if Ukraine is still fighting Russia or they will not be extended if the fighting has already ended by that time and Ukraine will be under Russia (Europe will not allow Russia to earn money in this case). Today (and throughout the previous two years of active hostilities), the more transit from Russia goes through Ukraine, the more profitable it is for Ukraine and the West. This leads to a very reasonable conclusion: blocking transit along parallel routes is beneficial for Ukraine (and for the West too), no matter how paradoxical it may sound. Ukraine also has many unreasonable motives for undermining the Nord Streams, but we will not discuss them.
DeleteUkraine has both the motive and the ability to blow up these pipelines, although of course from the point of view of rationality it seems extremely stupid to kill the economy of Germany, its main sponsor. But there is also Poland, which, on the one hand, is extremely interested in stopping these flows (it wants to strangle Germany and become the first in the EU), and therefore in this part it can unite with Ukraine, especially since the Ukrainian authorities have equalized the rights of Polish citizens with Ukrainians. The Poles are very much interested in continuing hostilities, since they strive to kill as many Ukrainian men as possible with Russian hands. The Poles have big plans for the western lands of Ukraine and they will do everything to clear them of people they do not need. But the Poles have a problem not only with the Ukrainian population. Most of the Ukrainian lands already belong to the Americans, so they won’t be able to just take them away. Most likely, the Americans will give these lands to the Poles, but under certain conditions, the main one of which is to help strangle the industrial power of Germany (and with it the rest of Europe). In this part, the interests of three decisive and major players converge - the USA, Poland and Great Britain, which, after Brexit, also seeks to annoy the Germans (and the EU) in every possible way.
3) War is a very expensive thing and it only pays off if, as a result of victory, the winner has someone to rob. It will not be possible to rob Ukraine; it already belongs to the United States. It won’t be possible to rob Russia either, since nothing planned has been achieved and there are no signals that would indicate that the trend will change. All that remains is to plunder Europe. But first, its economic potential must be weakened and ordinary people angered. And stupid Europe, not understanding the destined ending, is doing everything to make this ending inevitable, and even quick.
DeleteAs for the situation with explosives. This question simply does not exist. I didn’t have the time or opportunity to read your entire blog, but judging by your points, I see that what you read from others regarding explosives has nothing to do with reality. In particular, depth does not affect the force of the explosion in any way if we consider the situation with the explosion of pipelines, since we are talking about an overhead charge, that is, a charge that is installed directly on the pipe. From the point of view of the pipe, what difference does it make, with what force does the water press on the outside of the pipe or the charge? There is no difference! If the power of the explosive is such that it is enough to destroy the wall of the pipeline, say on the surface, then at depth the same charge will destroy this pipe without any problems (this will be even easier to do, since water, as a dense medium, will redirect part of the explosion energy towards the pipe). Do you know the pipe parameters? Even if you know, you hardly understand how powerful an explosive charge is required to destroy it. Oh, you will be very surprised to learn the real figure. I don’t know what they write in the Western press on this issue, but the Russian press writes absolute nonsense about this (they probably take this data from the Western media). Let me assume that you live in England and that you are an analyst from a bank or brokerage / auditing company. If you have the opportunity, take a close look at the railroad tracks (steel rails). I believe that, regardless of the width of the railway track, the parameters of steel rails in both England and Russia are approximately the same (taking into account similar loads). Agree that this is a very thick and durable steel beam in the shape of an I-beam. The Russian railway steel rail in its upper part (where the train wheel rides) has a size of 75 Х 32 mm (as I see in the drawing from the Internet). To completely break a steel rail, you need as much as... 0.2 kg of TNT. Do you see where I'm going with this? You don’t need 900 kg for this! Even 100 kg is an extraordinary amount for the entire action. I’m almost sure that even 1 kg of explosives will tear this pipe, even with a concrete jacket, especially if the bomb is installed manually, that is, under the pipe (between the pipe and the sea bottom). 10 kg of explosives is a charge with a guarantee. This raises a logical question: why should I drive an entire submarine into the area because of 10 kg? There is no need.
Delete4) The concrete jacket on the pipes is used to ensure that the pipe has negative buoyancy. I’m not sure, but I read that there is concrete not along the entire length of the pipe, which, as you understand, allows you to install the explosive closer to the pipe and increases its effectiveness (you can use a more optimal charge). An empty one and one filled with gas under pressure are two different pipes (from the point of view of the stress distribution on its walls). A pipe with gas under pressure becomes much more rigid in the longitudinal direction (like a garden hose when you fill it with water) and heavier (probably under these conditions it has natural negative buoyancy). Such a stressed pipe can be torn apart either by the explosion itself (a shock wave that will destroy the walls of the pipe) or by throwing the pipe upward by a blast wave (at this moment the pipe will burst at the top in the zone of tensile stresses). If, conditionally, the amount of explosives is significant, and as a result of the explosion the pipe can be thrown relatively high, then in this case there is a chance that it will burst at some distance from the explosion site in one or even two more places (places of bending).
Again, if someone decided to blow up this route, then blowing up only three of the four pipes should be viewed not as hope or altruism, but as an unfortunate mistake. Why it arose is a separate question. However, we can say for sure that no one intended to leave the pipe intact.
What other key factors are there? Well, for example, battery life. It cannot be infinite, but the period of operation, through a certain algorithm, can be significantly increased. If we assume that these charges had external control (the command to explode was given remotely), then we should also take into account how much the sensitivity of their microphones would drop over time, due to their natural overgrowth with algae. Honestly, I see some senselessness in such a complication, since the explosives were installed with the aim of destroying pipelines, and not with the aim of scaring their owners (so that they could find them). Therefore, such explosive charges can be placed simply with a fuse with a long delay. Again, these explosives could not remain on the pipelines for an infinitely long time because pipelines are subject to periodic external inspections. I assume that the inspection schedule is well known or you can easily find out when the inspection will take place next time. In total, all this together allows you to see the weak points of this process and helps to plan the action taking them into account.
5) I believe that the place for installing the explosive charges could be anywhere, taking into account the shallow depths of the sea. Preference, of course, should be given to neutral waters, if any, since the Baltic Sea is actually an inland sea and its territory is divided between the coastal countries.
DeleteThe USA, if you remember (Trump) stopped the construction of the second stage of Nord Stream when he imposed strict sanctions on pipe-laying vessels. The project stopped for several months and the Russians had to move their ship to the Baltic and also negotiate with the Danish authorities (if I’m not mistaken) regarding its suitability for such work (the contract for the work stipulates very strict and specific requirements for the ship, which not everyone similar ship can meet). I'm not even talking about the fact that Biden directly told Scholz that he would blow up the Nord Stream to hell.
The waters of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania are not so convenient for a number of reasons, the main one of which is the inferior status of these countries in NATO structures (NATO leadership does not really trust the authorities of these countries and there are many examples of this). From the perspective of the larger NATO, the risk of disclosure of classified information in these countries is most likely. Nobody would take that risk.
In general, as I see it, the United States and Poland are most interested in undermining the Nord Streams, and any of the countries could carry out this act, since no special or complex equipment is required to prepare this action (The Polish Foreign Minister immediately after the Nord Stream explosions thanked the United States for these actions).
Today I have only limited time to answer but lets focus:
Delete1. I live in Finland. Worked with about every nationality, no prejudices. The conflict is bad for business.
2. The amount of charges is unknown and unless we know all possibilities should be included. Forensic I leave to experts.
3. Most focus on what They perceive as a crime scene - the blast locations near Bornholm. But they just did the job, crime has been done in offices and meeting-rooms by politicians, and government navy reps. I explored mainly this part leaving the blast scene to others, I do not draw conclusion from this data as it would be a mistake to omit part of data which is not accessible to me.
4. Regardless of more interesting data and since you are interested in his part.. The claim of the submarine/submersible used is actually very logical and I have collected many hints one of which is from the head of GER navy Kaack, another from US, another from DK/SWE, and so on. You can also look at the many ASW flights conducted in the area. Kaliningrad has radars, Denmark, Sweden as well. It takes just a few minutes to send there a plane to check who is there. We do not know the resolution but any surface boat would be noticed. After the blast Nefrit was sweeping the area in very thorough patterns searching for anchor signs. We go to Saimaa quite often, a boat slightly smaller than Andromeda and I tell you that if it starts to blow, to stay in place you burn fuel. Divers would need a rope, buoy to stay at the spot. To plant in 4 places you need TIME.
5. The 3/4 kills in 4 blasts is quite a giving information, isn´t it? Just think about it. Then think all other possibilities and learn that one pipe of the NS2 was blown on two separate places. Aka there was a mistake on the southern location.
6. Now, how to answer that there were 3 charges in the Northern area and one only in the southern which blew up anyway earlier? Why were there two separate blast times?
7. One at night and one much later. Russia did not go into the area after the first blast. There was also the Meeting in London to prevent misunderstanding and to keep communication channels open.
8. The mission was no-failure-allowed with almost unlimited budget. The state and it is KNOWN that one same actor has done all 4 blasts is responsible. Just one. Read the statement by the head of the SWE investigation Matts Ljugquist. He states also CLEARLY that both Russia and the USA have been EXCLUDED in several rounds.
9. There was a sub in the area the week before. There exists data. Hydro-acoustic data to be more specific. It was official announcement. SWE and DK have them.
10. It is very likely that the data originated from the SWE, DK ships which were in the area on 21-24/09. These ships were in the northern location sweeping as chasing or finding something under. Then they moved around. The data is also available.
Dear Mortymer, I am very glad that you do not have any prejudice against representatives of other nations. On this I agree with you and fully support you. I think that you should not waste your time on me to explain and prove your position to me because this will require both of us huge time resources that can be used for something more important. Of course, I agree with you in that these terrorist acts were initially planned by politicians in their offices and that there were no special restrictions on resources for their implementation. However, based on my life and professional experience, I understand that everyone (including you) is trying extremely hard to complicate the whole matter. Blowing up pipelines is much easier than everyone imagines. This requires very limited resources, both human and logistical. The extremely minimal set of means that is required to carry out terrorist acts significantly expands the circle of possible perpetrators and seriously complicates the identification of the real culprits in the future. Actually, this is what I was trying to tell you.
DeleteAs for the opinions of various experts, I can give you as an example an equally well-known case, but thirty years ago, which a crowd of experts still cannot figure out. I'm talking about the Estonia ferry disaster. This is a very simple case, but read what experts and various third-party researchers write about this. This is a nightmare! But this case was investigated openly, with the participation of several countries, and about 100 million euros were spent on the investigation of this disaster. Is there any result? No. The experts didn’t understand anything and still don’t understand. I’ll tell you a secret that it took me three whole years to explain to these expert fools from the relevant government structures involved in investigating transport accidents how the volume is calculated correctly! I’m telling you about this to show how low the level of competence professional experts have. Therefore, I urge you to rely with great caution on their opinions and their assessments.
In general, everything connected with the Nord Streams is not very interesting to me now, since a much more interesting and large-scale action is beginning to unfold: the last passengers have already boarded the Titanic and its blind captains are already looking for a larger iceberg in the deep waters. I am watching this process with interest, knowing very well how it will all end. A question to which I have not yet found an answer - maybe I should get off this “ship”.
Thank you for giving me your time! I am ready to keep in touch with you in the future, but, unfortunately, I do not have time for a detailed discussion of global topics. I am also busy with a business that will die without me. :-(
Matts :Ljungquist the Swedish investogators said very clearly that:
Delete- 1 government is behind all 4 explosions
- Russia and USA were excluded in several rounds of investigation
- A rogue groups have also been excluded as possible alternative theories.
As you may know NS1 AG filed an insurance claim in the UK, the defendant 2 insurance companies state that since the perpetrator was a government (note the lawyers lingo) therefore the insurance claim is not valid.
See Erik´s post - you ca read the case here:
https://x.com/Erkperk/status/1780295791476605061
The insurance company defendants claim - note page 4, point 17.
ReplyDeletesum... Insurance companies - Lloyd's of London and Arch Insurance - are refusing to compensate Nord Stream AG, the operator of the Nord Stream that exploded, because they believe the pipeline was damaged as a result of military operations . Such risks were not included in the contract, they believe