Friday, February 3, 2023

004 - 100 shades of Nordstream sabotage - part II

PREFACE/ISSUE

This post describes relevant thoughts about the NordStream affair.
Links = web link to news article. Check for more info!
I wrote these points in a document which I posted in October to my Twitter pined tweet
The purpose was to sort out things systematically to be able to understand what happened 

This post extrapolates on known issues and draws a possible scenario in which the UK Royal Navy submarine entered, with some "last mile delivery submersible" the Baltic Sea, planted explosives and escaped.

Based on observed actions of players there seemed to be complications in execution.


"Those other 47 knowns and unknowns" 


Previously on Mortymer´s Hyphotesis:

Following - The submarine claim of the Mortymer´s Hyphotesis:


#51  - WHO HAD A SUBMARINE IN BALTICS?

The CNN wrote about it but since it was not Russian this news was "forgotten": 

The CNN shortly reports that the week before the Nordstream sabotage there were some Russian submarines in the area, other newspapers reposted.

"Russian submarines were also observed not far from those areas last week, one of the intelligence officials said.

US officials declined to comment on the intelligence about the ships on Wednesday."


[M: How is this possible that nobody followed up on this news? How so nobody tried to use this argument that a RU submarine was in the area? Could it be that it would NOT be Russian and the news about this have been supressed since the 29/09/2000 the day CNN reported it?]


#52  - THE CIA WARNING AND REACTION TO IT (GER, SWE, DK)

June 2022: Der Spiegel was the first to report that the The C.I.A... 

...issued a vague warning in June to a number of European nations, including Germany, that the two Nord Stream gas pipelines that carry natural gas from Russia could be targeted in forthcoming attacks, three senior officials familiar with the intelligence said on Tuesday...

... what intelligence officials call “strategic warning” of a possible attack — a warning that came with no specifics about the likely time or place or manner of a potential strike... The Biden administration, which in the run-up to the war often accused Russia of planning attacks on Ukraine, was careful on Tuesday not to blame Moscow — or anyone else. 

 [M: Perhaps because the plan was still unclear? Because the threat would come in future? Note that it was warning to European nations, most likely those who are shareholders of NS: GER, FRA, NED.] 

15 June 2022 - Royal Navy divers from Portsmouth undertake ‘importance’ explosives clearance using state-of-the-art drones in Lithuania 

1,2,3 Sept 2022 - US Military Helicopters Circled Around Future Nord Stream Leaks For Hours In September 

9 - 14 Sept 2022The two German military vessels spent a total of six days...

... cruising in close proximity to the two later explosion sites. The vessels in question were equipped with sophisticated sensors for picking up signals and movements both over and under water.

15 - 19 Sept 2022 - Several warships of Germany, France and Estonia...

... are assembling in Klaipėda Seaport for international annual manoeuvres Northern Coasts 2022 in the Baltic Sea.

[M: Note that this is not  NATO exercise, GER and FRA are NS shareholders and exercise does not include UK, or US]

20 Sept 2022 - The Finnish Navy is exercising with the French

... mine countermeasures vessel Céphée in the Baltic Sea 22¬-23 September 2022 Afterwards the French vessel will moor in Turku until the 28th of September. 

[M: Note that FRA is next Nordstream shareholder.] 


21 Sep 2022 - Five days before the pipeline blasts,...

...it was a chilly and overcast day on the east coast of Sweden. 
The Intelligence Ship - HSwMS  - Swedish Corvette „K31 Visby“ (K31) was set on a southward course... The next morning, something must have happened. 

[M: It is known that SWE and DK share responsibilities and costs over guarding the Danish straights. There are several radar stations, sensors which could trigger the mission.]

The „Visby“ left Karlskrona on 22 September around 08.30 a.m. (06:30 UTC) at 18-20 knots, according to MarineTraffic data, effectively double the speed of its patrol ride on the previous day. Now it was heading southeast for Bornholm. Had it received a radio call instructing it to search for something?   

The following day, 23 September, the „Visby“ rounded the island of Bornholm, passing closely by the later explosion site #1 in the process. After leaving the area westward, the naval corvette returned for a second look at explosion site #2 the following day, 24 September, around midday at 12:13 local time.. 


The Danish Patrol Boat - On the same morning of 22 September when the „Visby“ left Karlskrona seemingly in a hurry, the Danish Navy Patrol Boat „Nymfen“ P524  had already headed to the same waters northeast of Bornholm. 

Nymfen left Rodbyhavn 21/9 ~19.50

[M: Note that DK navy does not have the ASW sonar capabilities to track submarines and so DK most likely asked SWE navy to help out to locate, track and identify what was under the surface.]                              

Focusing on a particular section of the Danish patrol boat’s movements (blue box) near site #2, a search pattern emerges. The location of the blue box is approx. 18-20 km from the later explosion site #2. 



The „Nymfen’s“ route on 22 Sept. – blue box: close-up area

The patrol boat’s movements seem to indicate a kind of search pattern. At one point, it almost came to a halt, moving at 1 knot or less (indicated by the red arrows). What information was it that brought the boat out to this location? Where did the information come from?

The fact is the „Nymfen“ was crusing in the highlighted area (blue box) between 08:17 a.m. local Swedish time (06:17 UTC) and 08:41 a.m. (06:41 UTC) — the same time that the Swedish warship „Visby“ was just leaving Karlskrona heading for the same general area. Had the Swedes received a call from the Danes? Or had the Swedish Navy intercepted a Danish radio message and decided to take a look themselves?                                          
The routes of the „Nymfen“ (left) and the „Visby“ (top, right) on 22 September.

By the time the „Visby“ arrived near explosion site #2 around 01:00 p.m. local time (11:00 UTC), the Danish patrol boat „Nymfen“ had already left for the nearby port of Nexø on the island of Bornholm.

#53 - THE SWE AND DK NAVY REACTS TO SOMETHING UNDER

22, 23 24 September - SWE newspapers Dagens Nyheter report that Swedish navy was in the area a few days before the sabotage.



[M: Look carefully and imagine there is a submarine involved. You have already eliminated other possibilities of how explosives were delivered - Not from air, Not from boat, and Not through PIG (pipeline inspection gauge). What scenario do you see? What is the Swedish news saying between the lines?]


Then there is this news about an unidentified US plane over the area by @fernandobill27, @arjanommering suggests this one. Note the time Sat 24th to Sun 25-09-2022. If this is another P8 plane then they have anti-submarine capability. 

 


#54 - THE BORNHOLM DEEP BASIN IS IDEAL FOR SUBMARINE OPS

Note that pipelines were blown as much as possible to the
                 West, closest to the Danish straits. In deep waters.

The map of the North sea and Baltic sea

 

[M: Note that Danish straights are very shallow, it is forbidden to pass submerged due to risk of blocking straights. It is possible that in a moonless night, with enough space in between other passages a submarine could pass without noticing. Very risky but possible.] 

Baltic Sea heat map of ship traffic


[M: Most of the traffic goes through the deeper passage between Sweden and Bronholm. It is also more suitable for submarines as it is deeper there. If submarine was involved or a minisubmarine, it would be safer to go through the passage between Bronholm and Sedish coast.]

Bronholm basin and Bronholm depth

[M: These places where Nordstream pipelines were blown seem to be close to the deep waters, not shallow. This hints that submarine was used, or that submarine docked at some place and minisubmarie did the last mile delivery. It is also possible that a mother submarine was docked before Danish straights then minisubmarine was sent to do the job. The minisub could be picked later? {speculation}]

#55 - Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Baltic Sea

         

[M: The attacker made sure these locations are on exact coordinates]     


#56 - Territorial waters (TZ) in the Baltic Sea


[M: Note the proximity to the North Sea - a hint that a suspect is not from Baltic Sea but outside. Three blasts in the northern part, closer to deeper escape passage from the area, one more south, looks like secondary target area] 


[M: Note that blasts were conducted outside TZ which could be considered an attack on a country]                                                        

POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Under international law, territorial waters are considered to be the sovereign territory of the coastal state, and foreign vessels, including naval vessels, are not allowed to conduct military activities or law enforcement operations within those waters without the permission of the coastal state.

If the Swedish navy frigate detected undefined submarine activity in Danish territorial waters, it would be required to contact the Danish authorities and request permission to investigate the activity. If the Danish government grants permission, the Swedish navy frigate could conduct an investigation in cooperation with Danish authorities.

 It is possible that the Danish government noticed under surface suspicious activity in its TZ and called Sweden to help with investigation because DK does not have ASW (anti submarine warfare) capable ships in the area.

 

POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

#57 - Possible Step 1 - It is Wednesday 21-09-2022 or earlier.

The submarine or minisub enters into the Bronholm East area where is the main 1st primary target - the northern Nordstream 1 twin pipelines (the NS2 still not operational).

Alt scenarios/questions: It has enough time to mine one, two or even possibly three pipelines. Thought it is plausible logical assumption that only NS1 two pipelines were mined (or 3), that the submarine (or more likely the last mile delivery submersible) was at some point disturbed. Another point is that the submarine may have been already in the Baltic sea for some time. Perhaps got in during a NATO exercise. This may not have been the first attempt to mine the pipeline. It is unclear if the mother submarine was in Baltic Sea, if it was there already waiting, or if only the mini-submarine went in.

The most likely scenario I see here on map is the mother sub entered earlier, released divers with mk11, they did 3 lines. Each charge had two parts to secure if one failed. They got disturbed and sub left to rendezvous point. Meanwhile the submersible with divers went about 6km south to another pipeline and mined there. They accidentally mixed targets and did one NS2 pipeline two times.

Some divers went to Bronholm on inflatables as per training with Ambush in Norway. 



[M: If it was a submarine I see possibility of going through the straight rather than south from Bronholm where water is very shallow for submarines.]                                                                     

 [M: Alternative scenario is that HMS Ambush delivered the MK11 to DK straights, then MK11 (could be even two minisubs) mined the northern target, got disturbed, mined the southern and went toward PL Gdansk where it sunk the minisub and retreated on land. Is this connected?]

Depth of local basins.

 


#58 - Possible Step 2 - Either SWE or DK or both get alarmed.

Alert could come from a different assets, from planes, to sensors, or from some other source like intel, etc. Possibly hydro acoustic sensors are triggered. It is unclear whether SWE and DK share data. Seems the Karlskrona naval base is the closest one.
  


#59 - Possible Step 3 - Thursday 22-09-2022 at 11 am (?)

SWE navy is called in. Two SWE assets of unknown size and type are called in. See on the pic the steps 1, 2, and 3. There may be a coordination between SWE and DK about handling calls. The SWE navy has closer a navy base Karlskrona. The page lists which assets SWE has there. Both Visby (73m long) and Stockholm (50m long) class corvettes are equipped for anti-submarine missions and are assumed to be deployed.                            
Recap, so at 11 a.m. on Thursday last week, the Swedish Navy's ships left the port in Karlskrona. Barely two hours later, the ships are in place at the very northern area where three gas leaks are found four days later. 


[M: Note that the newspapers has the time for point 2. and point 3. both at time 13:03. Then these SWE boats switch off transponders. Were they conducting cycles typical for searching for submarines? Were they following the asset which was submerged?]

#60 - 22 Sep 2022 - Norway is raising its ISPS-maritime-security level to level 2


[M: So, DK, SWE share their data and rise security because of the intrusion of unidentified submarine. What is joint NATO HQ MARCOM in UK saying about it? The UK has basically operational control and could send data to the sub about the movement of the NATO allied forces (boats, planes). This likely excludes NOR as a direct state actor.]


#61 - Possible Step 4 - Thursday 22-09-2022 after 1pm.

Note the location in the territorial waters - point 3. It is where Danish territorial waters begin. It looks like SWE navy 2 boats could have entered without permission or conducted anti submarine tasks or both which they wanted to conceal. There is a long gap between Thursday 22-09-2022 at 13:03 and the following day Friday 23-09-2022 at 11:03. Or they conducted zig-zag search which could be a sign of anti submarine operation.                     
Recap, so after that, as said, the movement data ceases at 13, probably because the AIS transmitter on board is switched off to hide the ship's movements. For the next 22 hours, Navy ships apparently do not want to reveal their exact position via AIS. 


#62 - Possible Step 5 - Thursday 22-09-2022 after 1pm...

Was the submarine able to escape toward the island or to the south? How many pipes were mined? Were SWE boats patrolling the area over the night? Did the SWE boats leave back to port and approached the next day again?  Were sensors again alarming some suspicious activity?  Did SWE boats work together or did they split?

#63 - Possible Step 6 - Friday 23-09-2022.

So at 11 o'clock on Friday morning, the navy ship is a number of kilometers west of the location of the three gas leaks. They then steer towards Simrishamn for a short stop at lunchtime. At 18:00 they stop transmitting AIS data, then the ships are at the location of the northern gas leaks.             
It looks like SWE navy is guarding the straight between the Simrishamn and the area of future explosions. See red points on the map 11:03 and 18:10.



#64 - Possible Step 7 - Friday 23-09-2022, a gap, 

the time between point 6 at 18:10 and 7. 23:56. Transponders are again off. Were sensors again alarming some suspicious activity this time more southward where future second blast would occur? Note again that it is possible that SWE navy entered DK territorial waters without permission or that they again conducted anti-submarine moves recognizable on path tracker.                                                                                                     
So at 23.56 on Friday evening, the movement data is broadcast again. Then the navy's ship surprisingly finds itself in a new position. Now they are in the southern area where the fourth gas leak will later be discovered. 


#65 - Possible Step 8 - Friday 23-09-2022

The mini/submarine was already at the secondary target place taking case of the next pipeline or pipelines. The one charge has been deposited. The timer was most likely set to 01:00 am on Monday 26-09-2022 to give time for escape. Note the northern timer went off at around 17:00 on Monday.

 

#66 - Possible Step 9 - Saturday 24-09-2022

The SWE navy is unable to find the mini/sub and goes from point 7. to point 8. Given the short distance, they had to be very slow or were doing search zig-zag which is not shown on the map, arrived 12:13 on the place of the original sighting.



#67 - Possible Step 10 - Saturday 24-09-2022 

The SWE navy moved toward Gdansk, point 8. at 12:13 to point 9. at 14:28. The distance is not really as great so why did it take for them so long? Also, note that sea is deeper here to hide, see map.                                             

#68 - Possible Step 11 - Saturday 24-09-2022 -

The SWE navy is in the small area for about 7 hours from 14:28 to 21:43. Why? Were boats sitting on sum mini/submarine? The RU Kaliningrad base is nearby. Was there the end of the mission and the minisub was ditched there?

#69 - Possible Step 12 - Saturday 24-09-2022 -

The SWE navy leaves the area on evening at 21:43. Probably ends the mission.                                                                                                    
When the explosions occur on Monday 26-09-2022 at 2:03 a.m. and at 7:04 p.m., there is no AIS data from the Swedish Navy in the two areas. A large number of commercial vessels move in the area. In addition to the Swedish defence, Danish and German naval vessels have also maneuvered east of Bornholm. 
[M: Note the very likely SWE-DK coordination]

[M: My take is that nobody has entertained the idea that the mother sub could release a minisub, like mk11, or similar which planted explosives. While surfaced vessels were chasing the mother sub the minisub was able to do its job first on the northern location, then, on the southern. The chaotic movement of SWE, GER, DK ships and many flights of Poseidon P-8 with ASW capability is quite teling.] 


THOSE USA POSEIDON P-8 FLIGHTS


#70 - 24 Sat 2022 - The P-8A Poseidon flight started Sept 24

...in Germany around 1930, descended to 5000ft and went dark over the Baltic at 2055. THEN STAYED DARK 4 HOURS close to #Nordstream explosion sites. 

[M: Note Poseidons have antisubmarine ASW capability] 


#71 - 25 Sat 2022 - On early morning the 25:th P-8A Poseidon flight:

[M: Is this another hint that there was a submarine in the area?]

#72 - 26 Set 2022 -  The US Navy carries out a number of missions with the MH 60r strike hawk helicopter, adapted to detect and destroy submarines.

[M: Moric Welt asks good questions: "What is Sedov doing near the NS2 outbreak? What was he doing close to NS1 and why had he turned off AIS for 15 hours? What was MIR doing close to NS2 and what is it doing close to Polish installations? What is the US Navy looking for in their vicinity?"] 
 
[M: After so many GER, SWE, DK boats and USA Poseidons running there frantically I suppose that two Russian sailing boats went to look at the area.]'

#73 - 26 Sept 2022 - The USA Poseidon P-8 flies from Iceland,
                                    near Bronholm 1h after explosion.

[M: Flying own special intel ASW plane shows distrust in NATO command which is in London Northwoods. The USA needed own data about what was happening in the area, what will be RU response.]

IS RUSSIA GONNA TO SIT IDLE? 

#74 - 18 Sept 2022 - RU boat Sedov leaves Kaliningrad


#75 - 22 Sept 2022 - RU boat Sedov 30 nm from the NS1 damage site.


#76 - 29 Sept 2022 - RU boat MIR


#77 - 29 Sept 2022 - RU boat MIR going southward


# 78 - 22 - 30 Sept 2022Those two Russian ships are near Polish coast

[M: Note the search pattern]

RUSSIAN ASSETS WERE CALLED IN 

#79 - On 29 Sept 2022 - A Russian submarine was spotted sailing on the surface off the Brittany coast.

The French FREMM frigate Normandie and a Caiman helicopter tracked the Russian Kilo-class submarine Novorossiysk. As per reports, the French navy escorted the Russian submarine in the Bay of Biscay. The British and Spanish warships had also been involved in monitoring the submarine’s movements. 

[M: What was this about? Why would RU submarine killer sub suddenly surface? What UK and SPA assets were there? Is it possible that the UK asset was a submarine? The HMS S120 Ambush anchored in Faslane/Clyde base in early October. Note that This particular Kilo class sub was previously seen in Mediterranean Sea.]                                                                                               
[M: Similar hunt like few years back - 2018 "ASTUTE TACTICS Royal Navy submarine locked in ‘cat and mouse’ pursuit with pair of Russian hunter-killer subs dubbed ‘the Black Hole’  = same Kilo class]

[M: Note that other Russian navy assets were called in.] 


THE CASE OF THE "SPANISH" DIVERS  

#77 - On 18 January 2023 PL news report about mysterious divers near key infrastructure. (Google translation)

Where were the services - experts and commentators ask in disbelief after the unusual intervention of rescuers in the Gulf of Gdańsk. Three - ostensibly - Spanish nationals in the middle of the night, undocumented but with specialist diving gear, were within arm's reach of key critical infrastructure. The police let them go because the men said they were just looking for amber.

From the beginning, two hypotheses came to mind: concerning smugglers who wanted to pick up, for example, a shipment of drugs, which is a form of contraband popular in Europe. And the second: about some secret operation of the special services. 


[M: Is this "Spanish" divers issue related? Could the mini-submarine be ditched  there? Were they trying to get evidence or get it out.] 

[M: Why was there just a brief news and then those divers just disappeared, were released? The diving was at night so experienced divers were used. Poland is large UK ally. Many divers speak Spanish.]


#78 - The location of divers. They got in trouble and needed rescue.
                From small boat they called Polish rescue. Three were rescued.
                

[M: It is unclear IF a mini-submarine was taken away or not.]
#79 - 
[M: The assumption they were Spanish was due to one of them speaking Spanish. No other info was provided. They were released. ]
#80 - 
[M: The perfect weather for a covert operation. Experienced divers.]

#81 - One thing is certain: diving in the bay for six hours, at night,...                    
... in winter, in stormy weather requires solid qualifications. The Spaniards rented a "wing" diving vest, which is for experienced divers - adds Niemczyk.

[M: Location near industrial area so not many people would see frogmen using lights in sea.]

 #82 - The men traveled around Poland by car with a Spanish registration...    

 - so they did not come by plane, which also makes it difficult to identify them. One of them showed Spanish ID (not passport) to rent cylinders. On Friday, the Spaniards also appeared in the dive shop 


[M: Someone got them Spanish registration car to get a cover. Spells they are not from Spain but another state, my bet is UK.
What size/type of the car?]
#83 - They returned the rented diving equipment through an intermediary. -

 He wasn't Polish. I got the impression that he helps them, but he doesn't know them, says Piórewicz.

[M: The Polish PM had to interfere to stop investigation. Said the issue is not a problem for Polish national security. Case closed - unsolved.]

#84 - The behavior of the police, who let the "amber fishers" free without even verifying their identity, is puzzling.


[M: As said, these divers were released. Question remains whether there were more divers or not. What car did they use?]

 #85 - The divers did not have a license to drive a boat, a diving permit or even lighting, but they had high-class equipment - including sea ​​drone.

[M: Note that they used the drone to locate something, like minisub. The undersea light was reported to be in the boat. It is unclear if they used it.]


#86 - This is the place:


[M: Location, Location, Location!
The Gdansk is near Russian Kaliningrad - to frame RU (?).                      There were online attempts to frame RU sail boats.
The location is in territorial waters of UK most friendly European ally - Poland - easy to get the minisub back. The Polish Territorial waters prevent SWE and DK navies which were following and tracking the minisub the follow and enter.]                                                          

#87 - Here is a recap of what could of happened several months ago:  

[M: The mother sub released a minisub for the "last mile delivery" to be in safe distance:
then they were chased by SWE, DK, GER navies and US helicopters/ planes,
while the sub took all the attention the minisub safely deposited explosives.
there is a possibility that some divers went to Bornholm
and the minisub toward Kaliningrad to frame the RU,
or it could be just an escape to UK friendly PL.]


Is there something sank? - a tweet by Digital Adam (19-12-2022)

USN P8-A Poseidon over Bay of Gdańsk at altitude of approximately 6800ft (2000m). Nothing of particular interest on AIS, apart from Swedish nuclear fuel carrier SIGRID and Swedish Coast Guard AMFITRITE north west of it. 

 

SOME ADDITIONAL UNKNOWNS

#88 - 26 Sept 2022 - UK, Russian defence officials meet in London;

        26 Sep 2022 - 19:01 (19:01 GMT)

The UK’s chief of defence staff has held talks with the Russian defence attaché at the Ministry of Defence in London.

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin and Colonel Maxim Elovik met as part of ongoing efforts to “strengthen military to military channels of communication” with Russia.



#89 - 26 Sept 2022 - According to the article, a phone hack revealed Truss sent a text to U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken a few minutes before the explosion saying “It’s done.” 

#90 - Some time between 26 - 30 Sept 2022 DK requests an urgent meeting with UK, NATO and EU officials on highest level. Official DK request:


#91 - 27 Sept 2022 - NATO Secretary General convenes top Alliance procurement officials

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg convened an extraordinary meeting of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) on Tuesday (27 September 2022) at NATO Headquarters.

#92 - 28 Sept 2022 - Where is Liz Truss? Our prime minister has gone missing

We haven’t heard from Truss since she spoke in the graveyard slot at the United Nations, overnight, a week ago. It was Kwasi Kwarteng’s who announced his emergency Budget on Friday

[M: 28th is Wednesday, 26h was Monday - the day NS was blown, but it seems Liz Truss has disappeared already on Wed 21st, last posted after submitting the minibudget. No trace, no message to nation. Was she hiding or was she cleared out because the mission was not going well? Note that Swedish navy was tracking some submarine. Was Liz Truss as a key person hidden in some bunker? Note that Boris Johnson also was not in London, supposedly left UK for 3 consecutive holidays with family - Slovenia, Greece, Caribbean]


NORWAY STATES - I DO NOT WANT TO BE A COLLATERAL DAMAGE

#93 - 28 Sept 2022 - Norway to deploy military to protect its oil and gas installations
Norway is the third largest exporter of natural gas in the world, behind Russia and Qatar. About 95 per cent of Norwegian gas production is exported via pipelines directly to the EU and UK. Norway primarily pipes its gas to receiving terminals in Britain, Germany, France and Belgium and late in 2022 also opened a new pipeline to Poland via Denmark.

Norway is typically the UK's largest gas supplier. In 2021, the UK imported £14.5 billion of gas from Norway, which accounted for 77% of all gas imports.

[M: It looks like the Norway was worried about becoming a target for Russian retaliation in kind. About Russian possible strike against Norwegian piped gas deliveries to UK] 


INVESTIGATIONS

#94 - Here's a follow-up the the observation that Russian ship Nefrit only investigated Nordstream 1 and not Nordstream 2 - by Erik Andersson (long Twitter chain).

#95 - Oct 27 - 9 Nov 2022 - Russia investigation - Nefrit track


#96 - Normand Frontier investigation


#97 - Glomar Worker investigation


#98 - Research by Erik Andersson - here

In summary, three large well equipped off-shore vessels have investigated the Nordstream damage.

1. Nefrit -NS1, hired by NS1
2. Normand Frontier, NS1+NS2, likely hired by investigators (end of linked thread)
3. Glomar Worker, NS2, Likely hired by NS2.

"In light of Seymour Hersh statement that "noone in the industry thinks Russia did it",  and all these ships with large crews are involved with pipeline industry,  I don't see how the national investigations could come up with different conclusion." 


The last three #98 & #99 #100 Knowns and Unknowns could be found here!

 
So many questions and so many things which looks like is connected.
Nobody is looking into it.


OTHER UK RELATED POSTS

most of the research about UK´s role, motives has been conducted in 2023
The summary is here:




***

***
Uncovering the truth took over two years of self-funded, tireless investigation.
I decided to open it for free, no paywall, despite huge investment.
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.

Every bit helps keep this mission alive!

(retweet and follow)

Wednesday, February 1, 2023

003 - Historical ROOTS of Nordstream affair

PREFACE/ISSUE

Since the launch of Nordstream AG Boris Johnson has expressed serious concerns about both pipelines.

He has heavily criticized these projects, which are largely supported by Germany, due to concerns about its impact on European energy security and geopolitical tensions with Russia.


SUMMARY:

This blog post briefly looks at pre summer 2021 statements and articles reflecting the long-standing concerns and criticisms from UK government officials regarding the Nord Stream pipelines. 
It is a continuation of the previous post which focuses on the second half on 2021 and mainly on the year 2022. 
It examines and consolidates the trend and inflection points in UK´s own security vs Russia. 
The UK government officials perceived Nordstream as a critical threats to European energy security and geopolitical stability, culminating in the pipelines' eventual destruction.

KEY TAKEAWAYS:

UK government officials, including Boris Johnson who was the Prime minister, Liz Truss as a Foreign minister, have consistently voiced strong opposition to the Nord Stream pipelines, highlighting fears over European energy security and Russia's influence.

Major concerns revolve around increased EU dependence on Russian gas, the sidelining of Ukraine as a transit country, and potential security risks, such as sabotage or terrorist attacks.

The UK's stance often aligned with that of the US and other nations opposed to the pipelines, fostering divisions within Europe.

This blog post delves into the historical context of UK resistance to Nord Stream, tracing back to at least 2012.

The post discusses various economic and geopolitical repercussions of Nord Stream 2, including information how he UK studied how Nordstream 2 pipeline, if put into commission would effect Ukraine's economy independence and EU energy dependence and relationship with Russia.



"So how deep is the average rabbit burrow Alice? " 


The Nordstream affair could be part of a wider campaign to undermine the Nordstream project and weaken Russia's influence in Europe. The role of the UK is explored through newspaper articles and statement of UK government officials.

Previously: UK government does not like Nordstream 
(from summer 2021 onward)

DATA:

23 January 2012 - Charles Hendry speech to Wilton Park conference: The role of gas in the UK energy mix

Introduction Thank Wilton Park for opportunity to speak. Natural gas is a critical part of the UK energy mix today and will continue to have…

However, a well-functioning single market, with gas moving between Member States in response to market signals without regulatory or physical barriers, is a necessary, but still not sufficient, condition for energy security.

Increasing EU dependence on gas imports means we need new pipelines bringing gas into the EU.

While individual pipelines are of course commercial matters, the UK and EU partners particularly welcome projects to bring gas from new sources. That explains our support for the Southern Corridor pipeline to bring gas from the Caspian to Europe. Recent completion of the first Nord Stream pipe, bringing gas into the EU from the Russian system directly to Germany, is an impressive achievement; but it will not increase the EU’s diversity of supply, even if it provides a new route to market.

In this context, we hope that Nord Stream will increase overall gas supply into the EU rather than, as some fear, merely displace existing supply through Ukraine.

Similarly, Russia’s proposed South Stream project would diversify gas routes into the EU but not supply sources.

So while Russia, Algeria and Norway will remain major suppliers of piped gas to the EU, fuller European gas security requires projects bringing gas directly to the EU from other third countries - notably the Caspian region, initially Azerbaijan and later Turkmenistan via the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline, and, in time, the Middle East.

We therefore welcome last year’s intergovernmental agreements between Turkey and Azerbaijan that will facilitate gas transit through Turkey and pave the way for further investment towards the development of a Southern Gas Corridor...

2 July 2012 - BP Steers Clear of Nord Stream Pipeline Extension to UK


2018

15 March 2018 Britain needs its allies to stand with us against Russia: article by Boris Johnson

Writing in the Washington Post following the Salisbury attack, the Foreign Secretary sets out Russia's threat to the architecture of global security.

22 May 2018 - Boris Johnson joins US in criticising Russia to Germany gas pipeline

The UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, has joined the US in condemning “divisive” German plans to press ahead with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, arguing it could leave European energy consumers heavily dependent on “a malign Russian state”.

22 May 2018 - Boris Johnson joins US in criticising Russia to Germany gas pipeline / Foreign secretary says Nord Stream 2 could leave Europe reliant on ‘malign’ Russia

The UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, has joined the US in condemning “divisive” German plans...

Commentators in Russian newspapers such as Pravda this week confidently claimed that UK energy needs would become the anvil on which British opposition to Russia collapses. Reliant on the evaporating reserves of the Norwegians and Dutch for liquid gas, the UK will be forced to turn to Russian gas, and “beg Russia for forgiveness, Pravda claimed.

In a letter released to pro-Polish British MPs, Johnson says it is right to highlight the “divisiveness of this pipeline across Europe”, adding that “Euro-Atlantic unity remains our strongest tool in standing up to malign Russian activity”. 

Daniel Kawczynski, the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Poland, said: “The letter is not as forthright as it could be, and in some way obfuscates, but importantly it accepts there are implications to the pipeline that extend well beyond what is in Germany’s economic self-interest.”  

2018 - Atlantic Council - The Damage That Will Flow From Nord Stream 2
         Creating a Straits of Hormuz Risk for Europe

The security threat here is not about Russian cutoffs, but the less politically dramatic—though still very serious—risk of putting all energy supply-security eggs in one basket. Risks could include: a collision at sea near the pipelines; munitions being set off by local fishing vessels (Nord Stream 1 does, and Nord Stream 2 will, run through two munitions dumps from World War II); or a terrorist attack.

...once Nord Stream 2 becomes operational, these interconnectors will be utilized by Gazprom on such a scale that it will be much more difficult for competing gas supplies to reach CEE customers...

...One alternative to actually blocking Nord Stream 2 entirely would be to insist that it at least take a different route from Nord Stream 1...

[M: Blowing in two parts shows that the Baltic Sea flow is unsafe for energy transit from RU, ate attacker explitated the legal vulnerability of privately owned key infrastructure]  

  

26 June 2018 - Tom Tugendhat 

I welcome the Minister’s statement. He is more than aware from his many trips around Europe, and indeed his expert understanding of the energy business and the United States, of the potential impact on not only eastern Europe, but our forward defences because of that. Does he agree that working together with allies around the Baltic, where this pipeline seems to be going to flow, would be very much in our national interest and that the UK very definitely has an interest in making sure that Russia does not complete this project?

17th July 2018 - Nord Stream 2 - Debate between John Whittingdale and James Heappey

As my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin pointed out, Nord Stream 2 is essentially a political tool. The Polish Prime Minister has described it as a new hybrid weapon. If it replaces the Ukrainian gas pipeline—I think all of us believe that is the long-term objective—the consequence will be for Ukraine to lose up to 4% of its GDP, with an effect on government spending of a cut of about $2.3 billion.

This is an economy that is already suffering, with Ukraine having part of its territory under occupation, notably its manufacturing heart in the east. The loss of the pipeline would be a further economic blow to a country that is already finding things difficult.

The consequences for Ukraine, however, are not only economic. The building of Nord Stream 2 and Europe no longer having to rely on Ukraine as a transit country for its supply of gas would remove one of the critical obstacles that stands in the way of further Russian aggression against Ukraine. The need to preserve the existing pipeline has to some extent acted as a disincentive to Russia; removing that disincentive could allow it to increase its military aggression against Ukraine.

17 July 2018 - Boris Johnson wrote that he feels that Nord Stream 2 is divisive and could leave the EU’s supply reliant on “a malign Russian state”.

If it comes on stream, Nord Stream 2 will provide 12% of the EU’s energy demand. On the face of it, that sounds like good news, but it will remove about $1.8 billion of transit fees that currently benefit the Ukrainian economy, from the Progress and Trans-Siberian pipeline systems.

Yes, Russia may have its stockpile of nuclear weapons and its exports of oil and gas, but its economy is not in good shape and is no larger than that of Spain, despite Russia’s geographical mass. Moscow is therefore all too aware of its reliance on an uninterrupted revenue stream from its gas exports.  

Set against the 2019 completion date for the Nord Stream 2 project, the time for German platitudes and, dare I say it, the UK’s apparent unwillingness to come to a firm and fixed view on Nord Stream 2, has to end.                                                                                                                                                     
I know that several EU countries have a financial stake in the pipeline—or, at least, companies from countries including France, Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany. I also acknowledge that British interests are at stake.

 However, there is always a political risk with international and large-scale energy projects. My primary concern is not the potential commercial losses for those private companies, or even the success—or lack of success—of former German Chancellors in their deal makingbut the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and our friends and allies. That is why I welcome Chancellor Merkel’s recent comments at the EU-Ukraine summit, at which she said “it is not just an economic issue…there are also political considerations”.          

The EU could also do more to ensure the diversification of its energy supplies. For example, it could get on with building liquefied natural gas storage areas in Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia and other EU countries. Europe is perhaps also over-reliant on gas from the middle east. Perhaps it is time to look westwards across the Atlantic for a more secure and reliable energy partner.                                                                                                                                                 
“Nord Stream-2 and Turkish Stream are all deeply value-destructive projects that will eat up almost half of Gazprom’s investments over the next five years. They are commonly perceived as being foisted on the company by the government pursuing a geopolitical agenda.” 

16 Oct 2018 - Ukraine Looks to Novichok Poisoning in Bid to Stop Nord Stream 2

Ukraine, which seeks to remain a key route for Russian gas supplies to Europe, hopes that western allies will help block the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as they look to punish Russia for a deadly nerve-agent attack in the U.K.

Russia’s Gazprom PJSC has already started construction of the controversial pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which would allow gas to be supplied directly to Germany and avoid nations such as Ukraine that risk being cut off and stand to lose billions of dollars in transit fees if it is opened.


2019 

21 May 2019 - Nord Stream 2 explained: What it is and why it’s proving controversial

Germany, Europe’s biggest natural gas consumer, has made efforts to downplay the relevance of Russian energy on the nation’s security. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen has previously told CNBC that the country is not too concerned over security risks, arguing that it will sufficiently diversify their imports.

29 July 2019 - Johnson visits Faslane in first Scottish trip as Prime Minister

Britain's Prime Minister Boris Johnson visits HMS Vengeance at HM Naval Base Clyde


2020 

April 2020 - Explaining Nord Stream 2 – the controversial gas pipeline linking Germany and Russia

Then-UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson joined the US, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states in condemning Germany and Russia’s plans to press ahead with the construction of the huge gas pipeline between the two countries.

Johnson said “it is right to highlight the divisiveness of this pipeline across Europe”, adding that “Euro-Atlantic unity remains our strongest tool in standing up to malign Russian activity.” 

April 2020 - Navalny, Novichok, and Nord Stream II

UK pressures Germany to halt Nordstream 2 in light of Novichok attacks

On September 3, demands for a much tougher response came from Tom Tugendhat, a former British army officer who is now the chairman of the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs committee.                                                
Echoing calls by his German counterpart, and also holding Russian President Vladimir Putin responsible for the Navalny poisoning, Tugendhat said it was not only possible, but essential to scrap Nord Stream II.                                
The West needs to stand together to confront Putin, Tugendhat said. To date, he argued, “Germany’s acceptance of Nord Stream II has been one of the weak links in the West’s arguments. We have effectively been giving privileges to Russian energy companies that they should not have.” He termed Nord Stream II, “a project by the Russian Government to undermine the alliance and eastern European states.”                                                    
Terminating Nord Stream II is “exactly what the German government should do in its own interest and in the interests of the wider alliance,” he stressed. 

The timing of this crisis actually works in favor of outright cancellation            
The first line of the Eugal system has already been laid. But even if Nord Stream II gets scrapped, and Gascade decides to forgo completion of the second pipe for Eugal, the new infrastructure from Eugal could still be used to pipe either gas from the existing 55 billion cubic meters per year Nord Stream I pipeline, or from Norway, or even liquefied natural gas delivered to planned German terminals from US suppliers.                                                
Now that would be an irony, a Gazprom company having to carry, under European Union rules, American gas. 

11 August 2020 - Uniper may have to write down Nord Stream 2 loan if pipeline fails 

German utility Uniper UN01.DE on Tuesday said it may have to impair a loan provided to the planned Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline if the project collapses in the face of U.S. sanctions.                                                                            
The German and Russian foreign ministers, holding talks in Moscow, lent backing to his view, with Germany’s Heiko Maas insisting it was Germany’s “sovereign decision” to choose where to get its energy from.

4 September 2020 - Calls grow for Germany to halt Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Putin opponent poisoned

German chancellor Angela Merkel ruled out halting work on the North Stream 2 over the poisoning. "Our opinion is that Nord Stream 2 should be completed,” Merkel said. “I don't think it is appropriate to link this business-operated project with the Navalny question."

[M: There is a clear division in Germany political spectrum on who is for and who against] 

7 September 2020 - Germany Uses Novichok as Leverage With Kremlin Over Gas Pipeline

A growing number of leading politicians in Germany are calling into question the Russian-led Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 

24 September 2020 - UK can be 'Saudi Arabia of wind power' - PM Boris Johnson

3 October 2020 - Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning

The project is currently 95% finished and will bring in natural gas to meet Germany and Europe's energy needs... 

16 Nov 2020 - Nord Stream 2 Sanctions Now Part of US Defense Policy Bill Before Congress


II. Boris Johnson's energy security strategy

14 Dec 2020 - Boris Johnson's energy security strategy aims to reduce the UK's dependence on imported fossil fuels and transition to cleaner, more sustainable energy sources.

The UK Energy White Paper, published in December 2020, sets out the government's long-term energy strategy, including plans for net-zero emissions by 2050. The Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution, announced in November 2020, outlines further policy initiatives for energy security and sustainability.

The key elements of Boris Johnson's energy security strategy include:

  • Increasing domestic production of oil and gas: The UK government plans to increase domestic oil and gas production, particularly in the North Sea, to reduce the country's reliance on imported fossil fuels.

  • Investing in renewable energy: The government aims to increase investment in renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and hydro power, and to accelerate the deployment of new technologies such as carbon capture and storage.

  • Supporting nuclear energy: The government plans to invest in new nuclear power plants to help meet the country's energy needs while reducing carbon emissions.

  • Promoting energy efficiency: The government aims to improve energy efficiency in buildings, transport, and industry to reduce energy consumption and lower carbon emissions.

  • Developing new technologies: The government plans to invest in research and development of new energy technologies, such as hydrogen fuel cells and electric vehicles.

 

2021

1 January 2021 - The UK left the EU's internal energy market.

Energy trading through electricity interconnectors between the EU and Great Britain is no longer managed through existing single market tools, such as EU market coupling, as these are reserved for EU countries. Only Northern Ireland will maintain part of the single electricity market with Ireland, as provided by the Withdrawal Agreement.

Before Brexit, the UK participated in the EU's energy market coupling initiative, which facilitated the trading of electricity with other member states. However, after Brexit, the UK ceased to be a part of this initiative, and the energy market coupling with the EU was discontinued.

This has led to a number of consequences for the UK's energy market, including:

  • Increased energy prices: The end of energy market coupling has resulted in higher energy prices for consumers in the UK. This is because the UK is no longer able to benefit from the cheaper electricity prices available in other EU countries.
  • Reduced energy security: The end of energy market coupling has also reduced the UK's energy security, as the country is now more reliant on its own energy resources and less able to import electricity from other countries.
  • Increased regulatory costs: The UK has had to establish its own regulatory framework for the energy market, which has resulted in additional costs for energy companies.
  • Investment uncertainty: The end of energy market coupling has also created uncertainty for investors in the UK's energy sector, as they are no longer able to rely on the stable and integrated EU energy market.

Overall, the end of energy market coupling has had significant implications for the UK's energy market 

[M: Without Energy Market Coupling and with Russian cheap hydrocarbons the UK wind and solar energy is not competitive and UK can not sell to EU market excess energy. Development of UK alternative energy, like offshore wind, is impossible.] 

24 Feb 2021 - 15 Insurers Stop Doing Business with Nord Stream 2 Pipeline to Avoid Sanctions: Reuters 

***************************************************************

10 March 2021 - Adjournment: Nord Stream 2 Pipeline VIDEO

*************************************************************** 

16 March 2021 Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

...In this context, the Integrated Review sets out four overarching objectives:

Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology, incorporating it as an integral element of national security and international policy to firmly establish the UK as a global S&T and responsible cyber power. This will be essential in gaining economic, political and security advantages.

Shaping the open international order of the future, working with partners to reinvigorate the international institutions, laws and norms that enable open societies and economies such as the UK to flourish. This will help our citizens and others around the world realise the full benefits of democracy, free trade and international cooperation – not least in the future frontiers of cyberspace and space.

Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas, working with allies and partners to help us to maximise the benefits of openness and protect our people, in the physical world and online, against a range of growing threats. These include state threats, radicalisation and terrorism, serious and organised crime, and weapons proliferation.

Building resilience at home and overseas, improving our ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for and respond to risks ranging from extreme weather to cyber-attacks. This will also involve tackling risks at source – in particular climate change and biodiversity loss.

The Integrated Review sets out the government’s overarching national security and international policy objectives to 2025

21 March 2021 - Boris Johnson transforms ‘Global Britain’ slogan into an inspiring strategic plan
Johnson’s paper also comes as a belated effort to answer former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s stinging West Point speech in 1962, where he argued, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.

At the time, the legendary US diplomat was praising the “vast importance” of the United Kingdom’s application to become part of the then-six-country European Common Market, which it would only join eleven years later in 1973.

His words humiliated then-British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and electrified the Fleet Street media.

The attempt to play a separate power role,” said Acheson, “that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, a role based in being head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political structure, or unity, or strength–this role is about played out.

One wonders what Acheson would say today, more than a year after the United Kingdom left the European Union (EU)—forty-seven years after it joined—and with its current prime minister searching yet again now for that elusive role

23 March 2021 - The Delusions of Global Britain, London Will Have to Get Used to Life as a Middle Power

At midnight on December 31, 2020, the United Kingdom completed its withdrawal from the European Union. Having finally signed a trade deal governing the relationship between the two sides, London was “unshackled from the corpse that is the EU,” as Brexiteers dramatically put it. The United Kingdom was now free to seek its destiny as “Global Britain.”

9 May 2021 - French Le Monde publishes article "How to sabotage a pipeline"

Pipelines create ties of mutual dependence, but also tensions. Which is why the almost-complete Nord Stream 2 between Russia and Germany has left Berlin at loggerheads with its closest allies. Pipeline diplomacy isn’t what it used to be. In the 1970s governments were enthusiastic about the Soviet Union supplying gas to Western Europe: pipelines were stable and lasting bridges between the Old World’s two rival blocs. And even when the US rocked the boat, it wasn’t for long. In 1982 Ronald Reagan imposed sanctions on European companies helping to build a Euro-Siberian gas pipeline that he believed would make Europe dependent on the Soviets. But the European Economic Community refused to enforce the embargo, and France even requisitioned one company to force it to deliver equipment to the Soviet Union. A few months later the US backed down.

2 April 2021 - Poland Denies "Provocative" Naval Maneuvers Near Nord Stream 2

14 April 2021 - Nord Stream 2 requires military protection

[M: translated from RU, brought up by Billy Bostickson, @BillyBostickson)]

The West continues to put pressure on Russia to stop the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline - and the most important event in this chain was the Polish military provocations. Can opponents of the gas pipeline resort to real military operations against Nord Stream 2 - and if so, what should Russia counter this with?

 

[M: This news rises question of what security systems active/passive the pipeline had and whether they were knocked out before the attack. I remember interview with Nowak, Gazprom CEO from times when the NS1 was inaugurated, he told that NS will have active and passive protection. I could not find the video.]

 ...the need to undergo decompression requires the presence of a vessel with a pressure chamber somewhere nearby, which in itself is a strong unmasking factorIn addition, such an operation takes time. The use of depth charges will unequivocally indicate that the military of some country was working

In addition, the stealth factor again arises - a ship with this weapon will not have time to leave after using it. 

 The attack must be completely invisible...

 

The risk of launching such a uninhabited underwater vehicle (UUV) from a submarine is low. No one in the Baltic has powerful enough NLAs that could be launched through a 53 cm torpedo tube (standard for NATO), intelligence can uncover their development, and such a loss of surprise is unacceptable. The modernization of the submarine to carry the NPA from the outside, perhaps, will also be opened - and is also unacceptable. And this means that the main threat will be the threat from surface carriers. 

[M: The author did not mention the usage of a submarine with a decompression chamber like this one I noticed returned to the submarine base in early October just a few days after the attack, it does look like a Chalfont bay used for deep divers may have been used - blog post. Main navies do have such capability.] 

9 June 2021 - Nord Stream 2: A Threat to Transatlantic Security

The Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline would undermine transatlantic security, increase Russia’s influence in Europe, and calcify divisions in Europe over energy sources.

10 June 2021 - New Submarine Training Facility Taking Shape At HMNB Clyde

The facility already hosts Chalfont training team.

14 June 2021 - Volodymyr Zelensky tells Boris Johnson Nord Stream 2 commissioning by Russia "unacceptable"

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky says the Nord Stream 2 project is a challenge to Ukraine in the field of security, noting that the commissioning of the new pipeline bypassing Ukraine would be "unacceptable."

During the call, Zelensky raised the issue of counteracting the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project, which he said is "a security challenge for Ukraine," according to the President's Office.

The president stressed the importance of further cooperation with the United Kingdom in the field of developing Ukraine's defense capabilities and strengthening the Ukrainian fleet. 

July 2021 - European Parliament: The Nord Stream 2 pipeline - Economic, environmental and geopolitical issues  

Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, but (as the Soviet Union) it only became a major producer and exporter in the 1970s, after the development of its Siberian gas fields and pipelines connecting them to European Russia and beyond. Large-scale exports to Western Europe began with the Urengoy–Uzhhorod pipeline built in 1984. The Yamal pipeline via Belarus and Poland became operational in 1996. The first Nord Stream pipeline, which connects Russia and Germany directly under the Baltic Sea, became operational in 2011.

The EU has made efforts to diversify away from Russian gas supplies, and Russia is also looking for new export markets. However, the two sides are likely to remain mutually dependent, due to the lack of viable alternatives in the near term...

For the EU, there are few countries apart from Russia that have large enough gas reserves and are close enough to be connected by pipeline; Russia faces similar difficulties in finding significant export markets in its neighbourhoodAlthugh usually referred to as a single pipeline, the first Nord Stream route actually consists of two parallel pipelines running directly from western Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea (see Fig. 1). Operational since 2011, it has a capacity of 55 bcm, equivalent to one-third of the EU's gas imports from Russia...

Objections were already raised in 2016 by the leaders of eight EU countries warning of the geopolitical and energy security risks, and by UOKiK, Poland's competition authority, on the grounds that the new pipeline would increase Gazprom's dominance of the country's gas market. To avoid the risk of a UOKiK fine, the five EU energy companies decided to participate in the project as lenders rather than shareholders; thus, instead of being set up as a joint venture, Nord Stream 2 AG, the company building the pipeline, is a fully owned subsidiary of Gazprom...

In October 2020, Poland's UOKiK again joined battle with the pipeline, imposing a record-breaking  €6.5 billion fine on Gazprom, and penalties ranging from €6-€20 million on the five project partners. Gazprom has appealed the ruling, and the outcome will probably take years to settle. The fine is unlikely to stop the pipeline, but if upheld, it will be a major blow to its future profitability...

Compliance with EU energy law was a problem from early on in the project, with the prospect of it meeting the same fate as the aborted South Stream pipeline. Among other things, the EU's 2009 Gas Directive requires unbundling of network ownership in other words, in the EU internal market, gas producers may not simultaneously control the pipelines that deliver their gas to purchasers. Furthermore, other producers must also have non-discriminatory access to those pipelines.

In September 2017, the European Commission's legal service concluded that Nord Stream 2 was outside the scope of EU law (the legal service of the Council reached a similar conclusion). To fill the legal void, it recommended international negotiations with Russia. However, the mandate for such negotiations – which would have required the unanimous approval of all then 28 Member States – was never agreed. Instead, the EU opted to amend the Gas Directive so that it could after all apply to Nord Stream 2 – or at least the 22 km of it within German territorial waters. Under a trilogue compromise reached in February 2019 between representatives of the Commission, Council and Parliament, it was agreed that the new provisions of the amended Gas Directive would apply to Nord Stream 2 and other similar future pipelines, but not to pre-existing ones such as the first Nord Stream pipeline. Under these provisions, Germany's national energy regulator is responsible for applying EU energy law to the pipeline; in May 2020, it rejected Nord Stream 2 AG's application for an exemption from the Gas Directive. The regulator argued that the pipeline was not complete in May 2019, at the time when the amendments came into force.

Nord Stream 2 has launched three separate legal challenges to the application of the Gas Directive's new provisions, namely: in the German courts, contesting the German regulator's decision not to exempt the pipeline; in the EU court system – in July 2020 it filed an appeal with the Court of Justice after the General Court ruled its complaint was inadmissible; and with a panel of independent arbitrators, under the Energy Charter Treaty (Russia withdrew from the treaty in 2009, but Nord Stream 2 AG is headquartered in Switzerland, which is a party).

Unless one of these challenges succeeds, Gazprom will have to find a legal arrangement to bring the pipeline into compliance once it becomes operational – for example, by selling it off (in full or in part), or more likely by relinquishing control to a fully owned but organisationally independent subsidiary. 


Gazprom is committed to paying Ukraine US$7 billion in transit fees over the 2000-2024 period for a total volume of 225 bcm; the Nord Stream pipelines, which do not pass through the land territory of any countries other than Russia and Germany, are not subject to such fees. 

Furthermore, the route is much shorter, and for this reason alone, cheaper to operate than even a fully modernised Ukrainian pipeline would be.

Economic benefits and costs for EU companies and consumers

...with more Russian gas flowing to neighbouring countries via Germany rather than Ukraine, the country's network operators will earn more from transit fees, and if Germany becomes the EU's main gas hub, traders will be able to generate profits by selling to importers in downstream countries. Conversely, if the pipeline does not go ahead, Germany could be liable for billions of euros in compensation to investors who have sunk money into the project.

Looking at the bigger picture, the economic benefits for Germany need to be offset against the corresponding losses to countries on the Ukrainian transit route – especially Ukraine itself, which currently earns up to US$2 billion per year in transit fees. 

 According to most forecasts, Nord Stream 2 will mean cheaper gas prices for consumers – both due to the pipeline's lower operating costs and the tendency of additional supply to depress prices. For example, energy consultancy company Wood Mackenzie estimates that EU gas prices could drop by 25 %, while a study commissioned by Nord Stream 2 posits a 13-32 % drop in wholesale gas prices. However, the benefits of lower gas prices will be felt very unevenly across Europe; in one analysis, Germany and France come out as clear winners, whereas Czechia, Slovakia and Ukraine will lose, especially if supplies via the Ukrainian route are halted...

A low risk of Russia restricting gas supplies to EU countries

Despite this, a Russian gas embargo against EU countries seems unlikely. The only major disruption in 2009 was apparently targeted against Ukraine and not downstream EU markets, which were briefly caught in the crossfire between the two countries. Russia is arguably more dependent on the EU for its gas exports than vice-versa; as already mentioned, in 2019 the EU accounted for 73 % of Russia's pipeline exports, with only limited scope for diversification...

Geopolitical implications of Nord Stream 2 for EU strategic autonomy

The goal of achieving strategic autonomy has become central to the EU's external policy. However, lacking energy resources of their own, EU countries depend on imports to meet over half their energy needs. According to the European Parliament's Normandy Index, energy insecurity is the EU's main external vulnerability. Insofar as it affects EU energy supplies, Nord Stream 2 therefore has major geopolitical implications for Europe. 

29 July 2021 - Chairpersons of foreign affairs committees issue statement voicing concern over Nord Stream 2

We, the chairs of foreign affairs committees of our respective national parliaments, are deeply disturbed by the decision of the United States and Germany on Nord Stream 2, which entails resuming completion of works on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

We consider Nord Stream 2 a geopolitical project geared towards expanding Russia’s geostrategic influence on Europe by dominating the energy market. The completion of the pipeline will strengthen the impact of Russian gas in the European energy mix, endanger the national security of the EU and the United States, and threaten the already precarious security and sovereignty of Ukraine. Moreover, the completion of NS2 will give Russia yet another tool to pressure and blackmail Ukraine. It continues to face Russia’s brutal aggression and military occupation of its territories because of its pro-European choice. As a result, over 14,000 Ukrainians have died, and every week, more Ukrainian soldiers give their lives to protect their homeland and entire Europe.

The likely repercussion of the completion and operation of Nord Stream 2 is to undermine the development of a single, liberalized and open European market by consolidating sources of supply in the Nord Stream 2 system and deterring investment in alternatives.

September 2021 - Installation of Nordstream II is finished.

September 2021 - the United Kingdom's energy policy...

 ...was set by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), which is responsible for developing and delivering a comprehensive energy policy for the country. Kwasi Kwarteng had been appointed to head BEIS role in January 2021.

 

...could we find some footprints in historical documents and statements by politicians? Who is the "saboteur", who is the "terrorist state" behind the Nordstream destruction?

NEXT:

The investigation requires creation of the Timeline which could help to understand sequence of events leading to Nordstream attacks.



OTHER UK RELATED POSTS

most of the research about UK´s role, motives has been conducted in 2023
The summary is here:



***

***
Uncovering the truth took over two years of self-funded, tireless investigation.
I decided to open it for free, no paywall, despite huge investment.
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.

Every bit helps keep this mission alive!

(retweet and follow)