PREFACE/ISSUE
This post explores a post about security of subsea key infrastructure which was written in 2017 by Rishi Sunak.
- Is there any connection to the Nordstream affair?
- The report discusses internet cables but from legal point of view the topic is very similar to the gas pipelines.
[MRT: Note also this post here]
Whether from terrorist activity or an increasingly bellicose Russian naval presence, the threat of these vulnerabilities being exploited is growing. A successful attack would deal a crippling blow to Britain’s security and prosperity. The threat is nothing short of existential.
[M: The same could be said about other countries including Russia]
[M: How interesting that the key UK official representative
is so well versed in legal aspects of attacks
on the key undersea infrastructure.]
[M: Interesting points - location, choke points, ease of use]
Admiral James Stavridis, US Navy (Ret) foreword
[M: US, UK are aware that the aggressor enjoys plausible deniability]
[M: Internet cables and gas pipelines are both classified
as "critical infrastructure"]
as "critical infrastructure"]
"...Even accidental damage far from home can have significant consequences..."
as "critical infrastructure"]
Some mistakes were made
Rishi Sunak says in his first speech as Prime Minister that he has been elected as party leader to "correct the mistakes" of predecessor Liz Truss.
21 October 2022 - Rishi’s right: Britain needs to rule beneath the waves
The Tory MP warned years ago about Britain's underwater vulnerabilities
Back in 2017, the little-known backbench MP Rishi Sunak wrote an interesting paper for Policy Exchange, warning of the vulnerability to Russian sabotage of Britain’s vital undersea infrastructure, from communications data cable to oil and gas pipelines.
As he cautioned:
"A successful large-scale attack upon UK undersea cable infrastructure, whether at sea or on land, is an existential threat to our security. The next Strategic Defence Review should specifically consider the risks to Britain’s security from attacks on its undersea cable infrastructure and ensure steps are being taken to mitigate this risk and that our maritime assets are sufficient to the task."
Thursday’s communications outage in the Shetlands Islands, apparently the accidental handiwork of a British fishing trawler, has a wider significance. Such events highlight an important point at a time when awareness of the vulnerability of our infrastructure is at an all-time high. It shows quite how much of our day-to-day existence depends on the security of a very few, fragile physical objects in places where we have limited oversight. The increasing penetration of British and Irish waters by Russian spy ships, carrying submarine vehicles explicitly designed to monitor and sever undersea cables, is rightly a cause for alarm.
CONCLUSION:
- THE GOVERMENT BEHIND NORDSTREAM HAD TO THINK ABOUT LEGAL ASPECTS OF BLOWING KEY ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
- THE REPORT IS WELL KNOWN AND COULD HAVE BEEN USED BY UK, USA OR ANY OTHER STATE ACTOR WHO EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTACKING NORDSTREAM
UPDATE 05 March 2025
Hypothetical Application by the UK Navy
1. Exploiting Geographical VulnerabilitySunak’s report notes that undersea cable locations are publicly known and concentrated in specific areas, making them easy targets. The Nord Stream pipelines, running from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, follow fixed, documented routes—available through public records and maritime charts. The UK Navy could have studied these precise coordinates, identifying choke points like the waters near Bornholm Island, where the pipelines converge in a relatively deep and isolated area. The report’s emphasis on the difficulty of monitoring such remote ocean zones would inform a strategy to operate undetected, using the Baltic’s isolation to minimize exposure to Russian or NATO surveillance.
2. Leveraging Low Barriers to Attack
The study highlights that attacks on undersea infrastructure require minimal technical expertise and resources, accessible even to non-state actors. For a state actor like the UK Navy, this lowers the operational threshold further. The Navy could have opted for a simple yet effective method—deploying divers or remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) equipped with explosives, as suggested in the report. With its advanced naval capabilities, including submarines like the Astute-class, the UK could execute a pinpoint strike on Nord Stream, severing key pipeline sections with precision. The report’s insight into low-effort, high-impact tactics would encourage a lean, covert approach over a large-scale assault. The Nordstream attack is no-failure-allowed type hence the low non-state actor approach is less likely but could be used for a covert operation.
3. Utilizing State Actor Capabilities
Sunak’s analysis of state actors using ROVs with sonar and explosives aligns with the UK Navy’s technological strengths. The Navy could have adapted its existing fleet of submersibles or drones—already used for reconnaissance—to carry out a sabotage mission. The report’s mention of attacking multiple points simultaneously could inspire a plan to hit both Nord Stream 1 and 2 in a coordinated strike, maximizing disruption to Russian gas flows. By operating from a submarine or a disguised civilian vessel, the Navy could maintain deniability, avoiding direct confrontation while exploiting the report’s noted vulnerabilities.
4. Assessing Economic and Security Implications
The study warns of severe economic and security consequences from undersea disruptions, such as impacts on global commerce and military logistics. Applied offensively, the UK Navy might have calculated that destroying Nord Stream would cripple Russia’s energy exports to Europe, weakening its economy and geopolitical leverage amid tensions like the Ukraine conflict. The cascading effects—energy shortages in Germany and beyond—could pressure NATO allies to align more closely with UK strategic goals, such as reducing European reliance on Russian gas. The Navy could have weighed these outcomes as a strategic win, using the report’s framework to anticipate and justify the operation’s broader impact.
5. Navigating Legal Vulnerabilities
Sunak’s critique of the legal framework, particularly UNCLOS’s deficiencies, would be a critical asset for planning a covert attack. The lack of clear jurisdiction over sabotage in international waters and the inability to board suspect vessels could embolden the UK Navy to act with impunity, knowing legal repercussions would be difficult to enforce. The report’s note on inadequate response frameworks suggests that any Russian retaliation would face hurdles in proving UK involvement, especially if the operation used unmarked assets or proxies. The Navy might have designed the mission to exploit these gaps, ensuring no traceable evidence linked back to Britain.
6. Masking the Operation
The public accessibility of cable (and pipeline) locations, as flagged in the report, would allow the UK Navy to study Nord Stream’s layout openly without arousing suspicion—disguising preparations as routine maritime research. The concentration of assets in choke points, like the Baltic narrows, would simplify targeting, while the report’s mention of cybersecurity risks could inspire a hybrid approach: pairing a physical explosion with a cyber diversion, such as hacking Nord Stream’s monitoring systems to delay detection. This dual tactic would align with the UK’s sophisticated intelligence capabilities, including GCHQ, to obscure the operation’s origins.
Hypothetical Operational Outline
Based on Sunak’s findings, the UK Navy might have devised a plan like this:
Reconnaissance: Deploy submarines or ROVs to map Nord Stream’s vulnerable segments near Bornholm, exploiting public data and the Baltic’s isolation.
Execution: Use a small team of SBS (Special Boat Service) divers or an ROV from a submerged Astute-class submarine to plant timed explosives on the pipelines, targeting multiple points for maximum disruption.
Cover: Launch a simultaneous cyberattack on Nord Stream’s operational network to mask the physical breach, buying time for withdrawal.
Deniability: Operate from a civilian-flagged vessel or rely on NATO exercises as a distraction, leveraging UNCLOS’s enforcement gaps to avoid legal fallout.
Sunak’s observation about private ownership leading to a lack of oversight and security directly applies to Nord Stream’s structure. The hybrid ownership—Gazprom’s dominance paired with Western private investment—and Swiss incorporation create a legal and security gray zone. A perpetrator could calculate that this, combined with Russia’s sanctioned paralysis in 2022, would minimize legal consequences.
Perpetrator’s Calculations to Attack Without Consequences
A state actor (e.g., the UK, as speculated earlier) could exploit these factors to launch a covert attack on Nord Stream with minimal legal risk:Exploit Legal Gaps: UNCLOS’s weak enforcement mechanisms mean no state could easily apprehend or prosecute a perpetrator operating from international waters or a disguised vessel. The private status of Nord Stream AG and NS2 AG further muddies jurisdiction, as no government is directly accountable for pursuing justice.Neutralize Russia’s Response: Russia’s sanctioned status in 2022 ensured it could not leverage international law or finance to retaliate. Gazprom’s isolation from Western systems—combined with its inability to access courts or insurance—would leave it powerless to seek redress, aligning with Sunak’s note on limited governmental oversight.Deter Western Stakeholders: The Western companies with stakes in NS1 and loans in NS2 might refrain from legal action if the attack aligned with their governments’ geopolitical goals (e.g., weakening Russia). Political pressure could silence their objections, leaving the private entities to absorb the loss quietly.Deniability: By using covert methods (e.g., ROVs, unmarked divers), the perpetrator could avoid attribution, exploiting the "lack of oversight" Sunak describes. Russia’s inability to investigate effectively due to sanctions and Baltic Sea access restrictions would further shield the attacker.
The attack would leave Nord Stream AG and NS2 AG stranded—unable to enforce rights, collect insurance, or rally state support—while UNCLOS’s weaknesses ensure the perpetrator faces little risk of prosecution. This scenario underscores how Sunak’s findings, intended to warn of vulnerabilities, could be weaponized to justify and execute such an operation with impunity.
Reference to actual observation:
RELATED POSTS:
OTHER UK RELATED POSTS
most of the research about UK´s role, motives has been conducted in 2023
The summary is here:
***
***
Uncovering the truth took over two years of self-funded, tireless investigation.
I decided to open it for free, no paywall, despite huge investment.
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.
Every bit helps keep this mission alive!
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.
Every bit helps keep this mission alive!
(retweet and follow)
No comments:
Post a Comment