UK government officials, including Boris Johnson who was the Prime minister, Liz Truss as a Foreign minister, have consistently voiced strong opposition to the Nord Stream pipelines, highlighting fears over European energy security and Russia's influence.Major concerns revolve around increased EU dependence on Russian gas, the sidelining of Ukraine as a transit country, and potential security risks, such as sabotage or terrorist attacks.The UK's stance often aligned with that of the US and other nations opposed to the pipelines, fostering divisions within Europe.This blog post delves into the historical context of UK resistance to Nord Stream, tracing back to at least 2012.The post discusses various economic and geopolitical repercussions of Nord Stream 2, including information how he UK studied how Nordstream 2 pipeline, if put into commission would effect Ukraine's economy independence and EU energy dependence and relationship with Russia.
Previously: UK government does not like Nordstream
(from summer 2021 onward)
DATA:
23 January 2012 - Charles Hendry speech to Wilton Park conference: The role of gas in the UK energy mixIntroduction Thank Wilton Park for opportunity to speak. Natural gas is a critical part of the UK energy mix today and will continue to have…However, a well-functioning single market, with gas moving between Member States in response to market signals without regulatory or physical barriers, is a necessary, but still not sufficient, condition for energy security.
Increasing EU dependence on gas imports means we need new pipelines bringing gas into the EU.
While individual pipelines are of course commercial matters, the UK and EU partners particularly welcome projects to bring gas from new sources. That explains our support for the Southern Corridor pipeline to bring gas from the Caspian to Europe. Recent completion of the first Nord Stream pipe, bringing gas into the EU from the Russian system directly to Germany, is an impressive achievement; but it will not increase the EU’s diversity of supply, even if it provides a new route to market.In this context, we hope that Nord Stream will increase overall gas supply into the EU rather than, as some fear, merely displace existing supply through Ukraine.
Similarly, Russia’s proposed South Stream project would diversify gas routes into the EU but not supply sources.
So while Russia, Algeria and Norway will remain major suppliers of piped gas to the EU, fuller European gas security requires projects bringing gas directly to the EU from other third countries - notably the Caspian region, initially Azerbaijan and later Turkmenistan via the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline, and, in time, the Middle East.
We therefore welcome last year’s intergovernmental agreements between Turkey and Azerbaijan that will facilitate gas transit through Turkey and pave the way for further investment towards the development of a Southern Gas Corridor...
2 July 2012 - BP Steers Clear of Nord Stream Pipeline Extension to UK
Writing in the Washington Post following the Salisbury attack, the Foreign Secretary sets out Russia's threat to the architecture of global security.
22 May 2018 - Boris Johnson joins US in criticising Russia to Germany gas pipeline
The UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, has joined the US in condemning “divisive” German plans to press ahead with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, arguing it could leave European energy consumers heavily dependent on “a malign Russian state”.
22 May 2018 - Boris Johnson joins US in criticising Russia to Germany gas pipeline / Foreign secretary says Nord Stream 2 could leave Europe reliant on ‘malign’ Russia
The UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, has joined the US in condemning “divisive” German plans...
Commentators in Russian newspapers such as Pravda this week confidently claimed that UK energy needs would become the anvil on which British opposition to Russia collapses. Reliant on the evaporating reserves of the Norwegians and Dutch for liquid gas, the UK will be forced to turn to Russian gas, and “beg Russia for forgiveness”, Pravda claimed.
In a letter released to pro-Polish British MPs, Johnson says it is right to highlight the “divisiveness of this pipeline across Europe”, adding that “Euro-Atlantic unity remains our strongest tool in standing up to malign Russian activity”.
Daniel Kawczynski, the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Poland, said: “The letter is not as forthright as it could be, and in some way obfuscates, but importantly it accepts there are implications to the pipeline that extend well beyond what is in Germany’s economic self-interest.”
Creating a Straits of Hormuz Risk for Europe
The security threat here is not about Russian cutoffs, but the less politically dramatic—though still very serious—risk of putting all energy supply-security eggs in one basket. Risks could include: a collision at sea near the pipelines; munitions being set off by local fishing vessels (Nord Stream 1 does, and Nord Stream 2 will, run through two munitions dumps from World War II); or a terrorist attack.
...once Nord Stream 2 becomes operational, these interconnectors will be utilized by Gazprom on such a scale that it will be much more difficult for competing gas supplies to reach CEE customers...
...One alternative to actually blocking Nord Stream 2 entirely would be to insist that it at least take a different route from Nord Stream 1...
[M: Blowing in two parts shows that the Baltic Sea flow is unsafe for energy transit from RU, ate attacker explitated the legal vulnerability of privately owned key infrastructure]
26 June 2018 - Tom Tugendhat
I welcome the Minister’s statement. He is more than aware from his many trips around Europe, and indeed his expert understanding of the energy business and the United States, of the potential impact on not only eastern Europe, but our forward defences because of that. Does he agree that working together with allies around the Baltic, where this pipeline seems to be going to flow, would be very much in our national interest and that the UK very definitely has an interest in making sure that Russia does not complete this project?
17th July 2018 - Nord Stream 2 - Debate between John Whittingdale and James Heappey
As my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin pointed out, Nord Stream 2 is essentially a political tool. The Polish Prime Minister has described it as a new hybrid weapon. If it replaces the Ukrainian gas pipeline—I think all of us believe that is the long-term objective—the consequence will be for Ukraine to lose up to 4% of its GDP, with an effect on government spending of a cut of about $2.3 billion.
This is an economy that is already suffering, with Ukraine having part of its territory under occupation, notably its manufacturing heart in the east. The loss of the pipeline would be a further economic blow to a country that is already finding things difficult.
The consequences for Ukraine, however, are not only economic. The building of Nord Stream 2 and Europe no longer having to rely on Ukraine as a transit country for its supply of gas would remove one of the critical obstacles that stands in the way of further Russian aggression against Ukraine. The need to preserve the existing pipeline has to some extent acted as a disincentive to Russia; removing that disincentive could allow it to increase its military aggression against Ukraine.
If it comes on stream, Nord Stream 2 will provide 12% of the EU’s energy demand. On the face of it, that sounds like good news, but it will remove about $1.8 billion of transit fees that currently benefit the Ukrainian economy, from the Progress and Trans-Siberian pipeline systems.
Yes, Russia may have its stockpile of nuclear weapons and its exports of oil and gas, but its economy is not in good shape and is no larger than that of Spain, despite Russia’s geographical mass. Moscow is therefore all too aware of its reliance on an uninterrupted revenue stream from its gas exports.
Set against the 2019 completion date for the Nord Stream 2 project, the time for German platitudes and, dare I say it, the UK’s apparent unwillingness to come to a firm and fixed view on Nord Stream 2, has to end.
I know that several EU countries have a financial stake in the pipeline—or, at least, companies from countries including France, Austria, the Netherlands, and Germany. I also acknowledge that British interests are at stake.
However, there is always a political risk with international and large-scale energy projects. My primary concern is not the potential commercial losses for those private companies, or even the success—or lack of success—of former German Chancellors in their deal making, but the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and our friends and allies. That is why I welcome Chancellor Merkel’s recent comments at the EU-Ukraine summit, at which she said “it is not just an economic issue…there are also political considerations”.
The EU could also do more to ensure the diversification of its energy supplies. For example, it could get on with building liquefied natural gas storage areas in Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia and other EU countries. Europe is perhaps also over-reliant on gas from the middle east. Perhaps it is time to look westwards across the Atlantic for a more secure and reliable energy partner.
“Nord Stream-2 and Turkish Stream are all deeply value-destructive projects that will eat up almost half of Gazprom’s investments over the next five years. They are commonly perceived as being foisted on the company by the government pursuing a geopolitical agenda.”
16 Oct 2018 - Ukraine Looks to Novichok Poisoning in Bid to Stop Nord Stream 2
Ukraine, which seeks to remain a key route for Russian gas supplies to Europe, hopes that western allies will help block the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as they look to punish Russia for a deadly nerve-agent attack in the U.K.
Russia’s Gazprom PJSC has already started construction of the controversial pipeline under the Baltic Sea, which would allow gas to be supplied directly to Germany and avoid nations such as Ukraine that risk being cut off and stand to lose billions of dollars in transit fees if it is opened.
21 May 2019 - Nord Stream 2 explained: What it is and why it’s proving controversial
Germany, Europe’s biggest natural gas consumer, has made efforts to downplay the relevance of Russian energy on the nation’s security. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen has previously told CNBC that the country is not too concerned over security risks, arguing that it will sufficiently diversify their imports.
29 July 2019 - Johnson visits Faslane in first Scottish trip as Prime Minister
Britain's Prime Minister Boris Johnson visits HMS Vengeance at HM Naval Base Clyde
2020
April 2020 - Explaining Nord Stream 2 – the controversial gas pipeline linking Germany and Russia
Then-UK foreign secretary, Boris Johnson joined the US, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states in condemning Germany and Russia’s plans to press ahead with the construction of the huge gas pipeline between the two countries.
Johnson said “it is right to highlight the divisiveness of this pipeline across Europe”, adding that “Euro-Atlantic unity remains our strongest tool in standing up to malign Russian activity.”
April 2020 - Navalny, Novichok, and Nord Stream II
UK pressures Germany to halt Nordstream 2 in light of Novichok attacks
On September 3, demands for a much tougher response came from Tom Tugendhat, a former British army officer who is now the chairman of the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs committee.Echoing calls by his German counterpart, and also holding Russian President Vladimir Putin responsible for the Navalny poisoning, Tugendhat said it was not only possible, but essential to scrap Nord Stream II.
The West needs to stand together to confront Putin, Tugendhat said. To date, he argued, “Germany’s acceptance of Nord Stream II has been one of the weak links in the West’s arguments. We have effectively been giving privileges to Russian energy companies that they should not have.” He termed Nord Stream II, “a project by the Russian Government to undermine the alliance and eastern European states.”Terminating Nord Stream II is “exactly what the German government should do in its own interest and in the interests of the wider alliance,” he stressed.
The timing of this crisis actually works in favor of outright cancellation.The first line of the Eugal system has already been laid. But even if Nord Stream II gets scrapped, and Gascade decides to forgo completion of the second pipe for Eugal, the new infrastructure from Eugal could still be used to pipe either gas from the existing 55 billion cubic meters per year Nord Stream I pipeline, or from Norway, or even liquefied natural gas delivered to planned German terminals from US suppliers.Now that would be an irony, a Gazprom company having to carry, under European Union rules, American gas.
11 August 2020 - Uniper may have to write down Nord Stream 2 loan if pipeline fails
German utility Uniper UN01.DE on Tuesday said it may have to impair a loan provided to the planned Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline if the project collapses in the face of U.S. sanctions.The German and Russian foreign ministers, holding talks in Moscow, lent backing to his view, with Germany’s Heiko Maas insisting it was Germany’s “sovereign decision” to choose where to get its energy from.
4 September 2020 - Calls grow for Germany to halt Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Putin opponent poisoned
German chancellor Angela Merkel ruled out halting work on the North Stream 2 over the poisoning. "Our opinion is that Nord Stream 2 should be completed,” Merkel said. “I don't think it is appropriate to link this business-operated project with the Navalny question."
[M: There is a clear division in Germany political spectrum on who is for and who against]
7 September 2020 - Germany Uses Novichok as Leverage With Kremlin Over Gas Pipeline
A growing number of leading politicians in Germany are calling into question the Russian-led Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
24 September 2020 - UK can be 'Saudi Arabia of wind power' - PM Boris Johnson
3 October 2020 - Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning
The project is currently 95% finished and will bring in natural gas to meet Germany and Europe's energy needs...
16 Nov 2020 - Nord Stream 2 Sanctions Now Part of US Defense Policy Bill Before Congress
II. Boris Johnson's energy security strategy
14 Dec 2020 - Boris Johnson's energy security strategy aims to reduce the UK's dependence on imported fossil fuels and transition to cleaner, more sustainable energy sources.
The UK Energy White Paper, published in December 2020, sets out the government's long-term energy strategy, including plans for net-zero emissions by 2050. The Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution, announced in November 2020, outlines further policy initiatives for energy security and sustainability.
The key elements of Boris Johnson's energy security strategy include:
- Increasing domestic production of oil and gas: The UK government plans to increase domestic oil and gas production, particularly in the North Sea, to reduce the country's reliance on imported fossil fuels.
- Investing in renewable energy: The government aims to increase investment in renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and hydro power, and to accelerate the deployment of new technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
- Supporting nuclear energy: The government plans to invest in new nuclear power plants to help meet the country's energy needs while reducing carbon emissions.
- Promoting energy efficiency: The government aims to improve energy efficiency in buildings, transport, and industry to reduce energy consumption and lower carbon emissions.
- Developing new technologies: The government plans to invest in research and development of new energy technologies, such as hydrogen fuel cells and electric vehicles.
2021
Energy trading through electricity interconnectors between the EU and Great Britain is no longer managed through existing single market tools, such as EU market coupling, as these are reserved for EU countries. Only Northern Ireland will maintain part of the single electricity market with Ireland, as provided by the Withdrawal Agreement.
Before Brexit, the UK participated in the EU's energy market coupling initiative, which facilitated the trading of electricity with other member states. However, after Brexit, the UK ceased to be a part of this initiative, and the energy market coupling with the EU was discontinued.
This has led to a number of consequences for the UK's energy market, including:
- Increased energy prices: The end of energy market coupling has resulted in higher energy prices for consumers in the UK. This is because the UK is no longer able to benefit from the cheaper electricity prices available in other EU countries.
- Reduced energy security: The end of energy market coupling has also reduced the UK's energy security, as the country is now more reliant on its own energy resources and less able to import electricity from other countries.
- Increased regulatory costs: The UK has had to establish its own regulatory framework for the energy market, which has resulted in additional costs for energy companies.
- Investment uncertainty: The end of energy market coupling has also created uncertainty for investors in the UK's energy sector, as they are no longer able to rely on the stable and integrated EU energy market.
Overall, the end of energy market coupling has had significant implications for the UK's energy market
[M: Without Energy Market Coupling and with Russian cheap hydrocarbons the UK wind and solar energy is not competitive and UK can not sell to EU market excess energy. Development of UK alternative energy, like offshore wind, is impossible.]
24 Feb 2021 - 15 Insurers Stop Doing Business with Nord Stream 2 Pipeline to Avoid Sanctions: Reuters
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...In this context, the Integrated Review sets out four overarching objectives:
Sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology, incorporating it as an integral element of national security and international policy to firmly establish the UK as a global S&T and responsible cyber power. This will be essential in gaining economic, political and security advantages.
Shaping the open international order of the future, working with partners to reinvigorate the international institutions, laws and norms that enable open societies and economies such as the UK to flourish. This will help our citizens and others around the world realise the full benefits of democracy, free trade and international cooperation – not least in the future frontiers of cyberspace and space.
Strengthening security and defence at home and overseas, working with allies and partners to help us to maximise the benefits of openness and protect our people, in the physical world and online, against a range of growing threats. These include state threats, radicalisation and terrorism, serious and organised crime, and weapons proliferation.
Building resilience at home and overseas, improving our ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for and respond to risks ranging from extreme weather to cyber-attacks. This will also involve tackling risks at source – in particular climate change and biodiversity loss.
The Integrated Review sets out the government’s overarching national security and international policy objectives to 2025.
Johnson’s paper also comes as a belated effort to answer former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s stinging West Point speech in 1962, where he argued, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.”At the time, the legendary US diplomat was praising the “vast importance” of the United Kingdom’s application to become part of the then-six-country European Common Market, which it would only join eleven years later in 1973.
His words humiliated then-British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and electrified the Fleet Street media.“The attempt to play a separate power role,” said Acheson, “that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, a role based in being head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political structure, or unity, or strength–this role is about played out.”
One wonders what Acheson would say today, more than a year after the United Kingdom left the European Union (EU)—forty-seven years after it joined—and with its current prime minister searching yet again now for that elusive role.
23 March 2021 - The Delusions of Global Britain, London Will Have to Get Used to Life as a Middle Power
At midnight on December 31, 2020, the United Kingdom completed its withdrawal from the European Union. Having finally signed a trade deal governing the relationship between the two sides, London was “unshackled from the corpse that is the EU,” as Brexiteers dramatically put it. The United Kingdom was now free to seek its destiny as “Global Britain.”
9 May 2021 - French Le Monde publishes article "How to sabotage a pipeline"
Pipelines create ties of mutual dependence, but also tensions. Which is why the almost-complete Nord Stream 2 between Russia and Germany has left Berlin at loggerheads with its closest allies. Pipeline diplomacy isn’t what it used to be. In the 1970s governments were enthusiastic about the Soviet Union supplying gas to Western Europe: pipelines were stable and lasting bridges between the Old World’s two rival blocs. And even when the US rocked the boat, it wasn’t for long. In 1982 Ronald Reagan imposed sanctions on European companies helping to build a Euro-Siberian gas pipeline that he believed would make Europe dependent on the Soviets. But the European Economic Community refused to enforce the embargo, and France even requisitioned one company to force it to deliver equipment to the Soviet Union. A few months later the US backed down.
2 April 2021 - Poland Denies "Provocative" Naval Maneuvers Near Nord Stream 2
14 April 2021 - Nord Stream 2 requires military protection
[M: translated from RU, brought up by Billy Bostickson, @BillyBostickson)]
The West continues to put pressure on Russia to stop the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline - and the most important event in this chain was the Polish military provocations. Can opponents of the gas pipeline resort to real military operations against Nord Stream 2 - and if so, what should Russia counter this with?
[M: This news rises question of what security systems active/passive the pipeline had and whether they were knocked out before the attack. I remember interview with Nowak, Gazprom CEO from times when the NS1 was inaugurated, he told that NS will have active and passive protection. I could not find the video.]
...the need to undergo decompression requires the presence of a vessel with a pressure chamber somewhere nearby, which in itself is a strong unmasking factor. In addition, such an operation takes time. The use of depth charges will unequivocally indicate that the military of some country was working.
In addition, the stealth factor again arises - a ship with this weapon will not have time to leave after using it.
The attack must be completely invisible...
The risk of launching such a uninhabited underwater vehicle (UUV) from a submarine is low. No one in the Baltic has powerful enough NLAs that could be launched through a 53 cm torpedo tube (standard for NATO), intelligence can uncover their development, and such a loss of surprise is unacceptable. The modernization of the submarine to carry the NPA from the outside, perhaps, will also be opened - and is also unacceptable. And this means that the main threat will be the threat from surface carriers.
[M: The author did not mention the usage of a submarine with a decompression chamber like this one I noticed returned to the submarine base in early October just a few days after the attack, it does look like a Chalfont bay used for deep divers may have been used - blog post. Main navies do have such capability.]
9 June 2021 - Nord Stream 2: A Threat to Transatlantic Security
The Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline would undermine transatlantic security, increase Russia’s influence in Europe, and calcify divisions in Europe over energy sources.
10 June 2021 - New Submarine Training Facility Taking Shape At HMNB Clyde.
The facility already hosts Chalfont training team.
14 June 2021 - Volodymyr Zelensky tells Boris Johnson Nord Stream 2 commissioning by Russia "unacceptable"
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky says the Nord Stream 2 project is a challenge to Ukraine in the field of security, noting that the commissioning of the new pipeline bypassing Ukraine would be "unacceptable."
During the call, Zelensky raised the issue of counteracting the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project, which he said is "a security challenge for Ukraine," according to the President's Office.
The president stressed the importance of further cooperation with the United Kingdom in the field of developing Ukraine's defense capabilities and strengthening the Ukrainian fleet.
July 2021 - European Parliament: The Nord Stream 2 pipeline - Economic, environmental and geopolitical issues
Russia has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, but (as the Soviet Union) it only became a major producer and exporter in the 1970s, after the development of its Siberian gas fields and pipelines connecting them to European Russia and beyond. Large-scale exports to Western Europe began with the Urengoy–Uzhhorod pipeline built in 1984. The Yamal pipeline via Belarus and Poland became operational in 1996. The first Nord Stream pipeline, which connects Russia and Germany directly under the Baltic Sea, became operational in 2011.
The EU has made efforts to diversify away from Russian gas supplies, and Russia is also looking for new export markets. However, the two sides are likely to remain mutually dependent, due to the lack of viable alternatives in the near term...
For the EU, there are few countries apart from Russia that have large enough gas reserves and are close enough to be connected by pipeline; Russia faces similar difficulties in finding significant export markets in its neighbourhood. Althugh usually referred to as a single pipeline, the first Nord Stream route actually consists of two parallel pipelines running directly from western Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea (see Fig. 1). Operational since 2011, it has a capacity of 55 bcm, equivalent to one-third of the EU's gas imports from Russia...
Objections were already raised in 2016 by the leaders of eight EU countries warning of the geopolitical and energy security risks, and by UOKiK, Poland's competition authority, on the grounds that the new pipeline would increase Gazprom's dominance of the country's gas market. To avoid the risk of a UOKiK fine, the five EU energy companies decided to participate in the project as lenders rather than shareholders; thus, instead of being set up as a joint venture, Nord Stream 2 AG, the company building the pipeline, is a fully owned subsidiary of Gazprom...
In October 2020, Poland's UOKiK again joined battle with the pipeline, imposing a record-breaking €6.5 billion fine on Gazprom, and penalties ranging from €6-€20 million on the five project partners. Gazprom has appealed the ruling, and the outcome will probably take years to settle. The fine is unlikely to stop the pipeline, but if upheld, it will be a major blow to its future profitability...
Compliance with EU energy law was a problem from early on in the project, with the prospect of it meeting the same fate as the aborted South Stream pipeline. Among other things, the EU's 2009 Gas Directive requires unbundling of network ownership – in other words, in the EU internal market, gas producers may not simultaneously control the pipelines that deliver their gas to purchasers. Furthermore, other producers must also have non-discriminatory access to those pipelines.
In September 2017, the European Commission's legal service concluded that Nord Stream 2 was outside the scope of EU law (the legal service of the Council reached a similar conclusion). To fill the legal void, it recommended international negotiations with Russia. However, the mandate for such negotiations – which would have required the unanimous approval of all then 28 Member States – was never agreed. Instead, the EU opted to amend the Gas Directive so that it could after all apply to Nord Stream 2 – or at least the 22 km of it within German territorial waters. Under a trilogue compromise reached in February 2019 between representatives of the Commission, Council and Parliament, it was agreed that the new provisions of the amended Gas Directive would apply to Nord Stream 2 and other similar future pipelines, but not to pre-existing ones such as the first Nord Stream pipeline. Under these provisions, Germany's national energy regulator is responsible for applying EU energy law to the pipeline; in May 2020, it rejected Nord Stream 2 AG's application for an exemption from the Gas Directive. The regulator argued that the pipeline was not complete in May 2019, at the time when the amendments came into force.
Nord Stream 2 has launched three separate legal challenges to the application of the Gas Directive's new provisions, namely: in the German courts, contesting the German regulator's decision not to exempt the pipeline; in the EU court system – in July 2020 it filed an appeal with the Court of Justice after the General Court ruled its complaint was inadmissible; and with a panel of independent arbitrators, under the Energy Charter Treaty (Russia withdrew from the treaty in 2009, but Nord Stream 2 AG is headquartered in Switzerland, which is a party).
Unless one of these challenges succeeds, Gazprom will have to find a legal arrangement to bring the pipeline into compliance once it becomes operational – for example, by selling it off (in full or in part), or more likely by relinquishing control to a fully owned but organisationally independent subsidiary.
Gazprom is committed to paying Ukraine US$7 billion in transit fees over the 2000-2024 period for a total volume of 225 bcm; the Nord Stream pipelines, which do not pass through the land territory of any countries other than Russia and Germany, are not subject to such fees.
Furthermore, the route is much shorter, and for this reason alone, cheaper to operate than even a fully modernised Ukrainian pipeline would be.
Economic benefits and costs for EU companies and consumers
...with more Russian gas flowing to neighbouring countries via Germany rather than Ukraine, the country's network operators will earn more from transit fees, and if Germany becomes the EU's main gas hub, traders will be able to generate profits by selling to importers in downstream countries. Conversely, if the pipeline does not go ahead, Germany could be liable for billions of euros in compensation to investors who have sunk money into the project.
Looking at the bigger picture, the economic benefits for Germany need to be offset against the corresponding losses to countries on the Ukrainian transit route – especially Ukraine itself, which currently earns up to US$2 billion per year in transit fees.
According to most forecasts, Nord Stream 2 will mean cheaper gas prices for consumers – both due to the pipeline's lower operating costs and the tendency of additional supply to depress prices. For example, energy consultancy company Wood Mackenzie estimates that EU gas prices could drop by 25 %, while a study commissioned by Nord Stream 2 posits a 13-32 % drop in wholesale gas prices. However, the benefits of lower gas prices will be felt very unevenly across Europe; in one analysis, Germany and France come out as clear winners, whereas Czechia, Slovakia and Ukraine will lose, especially if supplies via the Ukrainian route are halted...
A low risk of Russia restricting gas supplies to EU countries
Despite this, a Russian gas embargo against EU countries seems unlikely. The only major disruption in 2009 was apparently targeted against Ukraine and not downstream EU markets, which were briefly caught in the crossfire between the two countries. Russia is arguably more dependent on the EU for its gas exports than vice-versa; as already mentioned, in 2019 the EU accounted for 73 % of Russia's pipeline exports, with only limited scope for diversification...
Geopolitical implications of Nord Stream 2 for EU strategic autonomy
The goal of achieving strategic autonomy has become central to the EU's external policy. However, lacking energy resources of their own, EU countries depend on imports to meet over half their energy needs. According to the European Parliament's Normandy Index, energy insecurity is the EU's main external vulnerability. Insofar as it affects EU energy supplies, Nord Stream 2 therefore has major geopolitical implications for Europe.
29 July 2021 - Chairpersons of foreign affairs committees issue statement voicing concern over Nord Stream 2
We, the chairs of foreign affairs committees of our respective national parliaments, are deeply disturbed by the decision of the United States and Germany on Nord Stream 2, which entails resuming completion of works on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.
We consider Nord Stream 2 a geopolitical project geared towards expanding Russia’s geostrategic influence on Europe by dominating the energy market. The completion of the pipeline will strengthen the impact of Russian gas in the European energy mix, endanger the national security of the EU and the United States, and threaten the already precarious security and sovereignty of Ukraine. Moreover, the completion of NS2 will give Russia yet another tool to pressure and blackmail Ukraine. It continues to face Russia’s brutal aggression and military occupation of its territories because of its pro-European choice. As a result, over 14,000 Ukrainians have died, and every week, more Ukrainian soldiers give their lives to protect their homeland and entire Europe.
The likely repercussion of the completion and operation of Nord Stream 2 is to undermine the development of a single, liberalized and open European market by consolidating sources of supply in the Nord Stream 2 system and deterring investment in alternatives.
September 2021 - Installation of Nordstream II is finished.
September 2021 - the United Kingdom's energy policy...
...was set by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), which is responsible for developing and delivering a comprehensive energy policy for the country. Kwasi Kwarteng had been appointed to head BEIS role in January 2021.
...could we find some footprints in historical documents and statements by politicians? Who is the "saboteur", who is the "terrorist state" behind the Nordstream destruction?
NEXT:
The investigation requires creation of the Timeline which could help to understand sequence of events leading to Nordstream attacks.
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