- THE INVESTIGATION BEGINS -
Since the destruction I have collected vast data & evidence
My first deduction based on collected data is very simple:
My first deduction based on collected data is very simple:
There will be no public investigation or released of data.
Now it is time to publish and document it.
GENERAL NOTE:
I wrote these points in a document which I posted in October to my Twitter pined tweet at that time (Oct 2, 2022).
The purpose was to sort out things systematically to be able to understand what happened.
I GUESS THAT IS THE OFFICIAL START OF THE INVESTIGATION
Date = Links = web link to news article for verification. Check for more info!
The blue text in brackets is my own comments.
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Let´s uncover the details of the incident as accurately as possible
It is often necessary to extend the scope beyond the basis formed by the initial information,
since the information is often incomplete and of unknown validity.
***
"Those 50 knowns and unknowns"
#1 - NATO has not conducted any official investigation into the responsible parties. The organization has not openly blamed Russia. There are only three entries on their webpages regarding this issue - here. This suggests that they intend to keep their data—such as ship movements and monitoring—concealed. This is the first clue.
#2 - The USA, UK have NOT conducted any official investigations into who is responsible. The USA has satelitte all over. The UK is the largest European naval power with many capabilities. Therefore it is very surprising that such country as US with largest spy network, best technology, including satellites does not know who is behind the pipelines destruction. Same goes to UK with Northwood Headquarters. Also where is Swiss investigation? NS1 and NS2 were incorporated there.
#3 - Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Russia, and Nordstream AB have conducted their own official separate investigations. Sweden and Denmark did their due to Jurisdiction of blasts in their EEZ waters. So, five different investigations and no results of who is responsible have been shared with public except Russia blaming UK/AngloSaxons. It did made sense not to share speculations shortly after but now investigations have been supposedly concluded, results are non public until the investigation concludes. Why do they not conduct a joint investigation?
#4 - There was a big distrust among EU countries. They did not initially share intelligence - report here. Later the Swedish and Danish officials started to cooperate - here. This hints that from the early on that NATO have distrusted each other as one may have been involved. This is enhanced with SWE not being yet a full member. What does this mean?
#5 - It is in each European country interest to learn who has been the saboteur. It was the largest Europen infrastructure project and NS1 was a Key Energy artery despite not delivering at that moment. Each state had to make a working theory upon which a foreign policy continued. The lack of joint investigation team (JIT) is a sign that an ally is a suspect, and nobody knows whom to trust. Each state which investigates tries to protect its own interests, coordinates to some degree. The saboteur was most likely capable to effect the investigation. Aka, next clue that it was less likely Russia.
#6 - Leading Danish international practice lawyers, who noted that there are no norms in international law that allow a removal of Russia, as the owner of the gas pipelines, from the investigation - source. The company is listed in SUI so Switzerland could be part of investigation if it wants to as mentioned. Next clue which hints that it was not Russia since they were prohibited from getting close.
#7 - Top leaders of EU, NATO had to be informed who is behind the sabotage yet there is a silence about who was it. If the saboteur is not Russia then it is a plain cover up for political purposes. Uncomfortable truth. This is bordering or is a direct criminal cover up. Politicians became captive. The information has been classified as top secret and EU official could be prosecuted if they disclose who was it on some national security clause or similar. This saboteur had to think what next, had to have prepared a way out and it seems it worked so far. In other posts I elaborate on this and name names of possible suspects and their roles (my private investigation, my suspects).
#8 - Satellites have a capability to see under water, notice magnetic anomaly differences (MAD). Both NATO and Russia have the capability. No information about this has been shared with public. More about ASW detection here. Investigation teams of Sweden, Denmark and Germany had to ask for data. The data is therefore existing but it now classified. This is a "direct undeniable evidence" which public is not allowed to see.
#9 - It is unclear what were the main and secondary objectives of the sabotage. They would differ if it was Russia, Germany, Poland, Ukraine, USA, UK, Norway or any other suspect. It is unclear if main and secondary objectives were even reached. Searching the suspect by trying to pick first the possible objective is unworkable. It is easier to go forward by eliminating who it is most likely NOT the saboteur ("If you exclude all impossible what is left, even improbable, must be the truth")
#10 - It is also unclear who are victims of the crime. Is it Europe, Russia, or EU citizens? From this point of view it is also better to start with a set of potential suspects rather than trying to pick who profits the most. From legal point of view this also makes a big difference. I elaborate on one possible driver.
#11 - There is only a limited amount of suspects. The Russia, EU states, Non-EU NATO states (US, UK, Norway), plus others (Ukraine, Turkey, Israel, China). EU states could be divided between these who are bordering Baltic Sea and those which do not have ports in Baltic Sea.
#12 - All non-NATO states could be safely excluded. Very low probability. They would not risk confrontation with the most powerful alliance. E.g. Turkey, Israel, China and other states could be safely excluded. Also, NATO would be furious if a non-NATO state has shown they are vulnerable and anyone could enter their sphere of influence and cause havoc.
#13 - Ukraine has a very good alibi. It, would be proclaimed to be a terrorist state not worrying to bomb it´s allies infrastructure to get fees (about €1B/y) for transporting Russian gas. Both Germany and Russia would be seriously upset. Also Ukraine would certainly want to target the South Stream as well at the same time to avoid the risk of exposure.
#14 - Poland has also a very good alibi. It is sandwiched between Russia (Belarus) and Germany. Two strong countries who had interest and investment for the pipeline to continue in some unspecified time in future. Both would be very angry at Poland who has just opened its pipeline from Norway. Besides, Poland is EU member state who had its say during the building permits process and could and did interfere through EU channels.
#15 - For Germany the Nordstream could bring huge advantages. The cheap energy has been a driver for its economical success. The Nordstream 1 & 2 at full transition would make German products and the economy in whole more competitive even against their EU allies. The Nordstream would give Germany, which would become key entry point, certain economical/political leverage to arm-twist other EU states to follow their leadership. But then once in EU the gas is based on directive on equal basis so to speak. German self-sabotage is unimaginable.
#16 - The silence from Germany hints that the saboteur was of the same political weight or larger. Size-wise it could then mean and this parameter qualifies only the UK, and the USA. France and Italy could be excluded. France is a Nordstream shareholder and Italy is less likely, it gets it´s Russian gas also but would unlikely try to upset GER and FRA. All EU members had a chance to stop the project from within the EU by political process. Non EU states, UK and USA, did not have this opportunity which increases the probability it was one of them or both.
#17 - The attack against key EU energy infrastructure is defined differently by different actors. Russia has stated it is act of international terrorism. West has jointly stated it is an act of sabotage. These do have different legal definitions and implications and would lead to different outcome for claims would the case go to international court. See current issues of qualification and difference between the act of terrorism and sabotage (details). Odds of terrorist attacks are very difficult to predict but the potential liabilities can be enormous. Governments are often providing backstop for the terrorism insurance market (details).
#18 - The West is trying to frame Russia as a sponsor of terrorism to confiscate its frozen assets. If Russia blew Nordstream it would be easy easy to blame and frame it for blowing key EU energy infrastructure. Western countries are not doing this. They are not using frozen assets which could be done would Russia be blamed as the attacker who caused harm to EU civilians. So again, less likely that it was Russia. Actually this is rather strong argument.
#19 - From the legal point there is no insurance claim payment if it would be found that it was an act of Russian or one of Nordstream shareholder´s self-sabotage, see here. There would also be no payments would the act be part of a war - Ukraine did it. If Russia is found to be involved in the Nord Stream 1 damages, it could be considered an act of war, something that is typically excluded by insurance, here. Russian state assets could be used for damages.
Terrorism insurance is generally included in policies. To reduce the vulnerability of insurers in 2002, a specialist company covering terror-related property damage called EXTREMUS was created by the Government and the Association of German Insurers. The primary objective of EXTREMUS is to protect medium-sized companies against property and business interruption losses caused by terrorism. The first € 2 billion is covered by primary insurers and domestic and foreign reinsurers. Losses between € 2 and 10 billion are covered by state guarantee.
#20 - All insurers and reinsurers, underwriters of Nordstream 1 and 2 are unknown. According to industry sources familiar with the matter, Munich Re and syndicates within the Lloyd's of London market are among the major underwriters for Nord Stream 1. The Swiss insurer Zurich, also had exposure to Nord Stream 1. Russian Nobility, Constanta were sanctioned in 2022.
#21 - The fact is that destruction of the Nordstream was an unprovoked purposeful criminal act by a state actor. It was calculated, well planed and was aimed to reach certain for now unknown objectives. It does seem very unlikely that this was an issue between Russia and Ukraine only. There was no retaliation afterward to other state infrastructure, damages can not be net out.
#22 - About 778 million cubic meters of gas leaked from Nordstream explosions yet there are no environmental damage claims by Sweden and Denmark against the saboteur. Natural gas in high concentrations is toxic to fish. No environmental organization, fishers association has filed a legal claim against unknown saboteur. No public body representing European public has filed a legal claim to unknown saboteur for damages by high energy prices. The west has frozen Russian assets yet there is no legal case against it concerning environmental damages.
#23 - About 95 per cent of Norwegian gas production is exported via pipelines directly to the EU and UK. For NOR the UK is #1 export market. Norway accounts for the majority of the UK gas imports at around 1,440,000 metric tons.
#24 - Would UK blow the pipeline they would be worrying that Russia could retaliate in kind (eye for eye, pipeline for pipeline). It looks like this scenario was expected. NOR-UK started immediately protect their pipelines - here.
#25 - The NATO as an alliance has not immediately started to guard these pipelines but was ready to deploy The JEF – made up of the U.K., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - a multi-national force on short notice to the North Atlantic.
#26 - The pipelines pass through the territorial waters and/or Exclusive Economic Zones of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Would Russia sabotage pipelines environmental permits would be revoked. See permits on NS homepage. Neither one state revoked permits.
#27 - See also here the carefully selected location of 3 blasts compared to territorial waters of DK and SWE. Looks like blast locations were carefully selected so they would be not in international waters. It is unclear why 4th blow is in different place.
#28 - Neither one of these five countries had withdrawn any permits. Neither one of these countries has asked Russia or Nordstream AB for Mitigating Environmental Impacts. Most affected countries were Sweden and Denmark. See Nordstream EIA. This is a next hint that the saboteur is know.
#29 - About 60% of the total cargo movement on the international scale for Russia takes place through the sea. Here is more about Russian main ports. Main trade ports are in Baltic sea and Black sea - map.
#30 - Three major trade ports of Russia in Baltic Sea are: Port of Saint Petersburg (nr2),Port of Ust-Luga (nr3), and Port of Primorsk (nr5). Since 1720, the Baltic Sea has frozen over entirely 20 times, most recently in early 1987. For Russian trade it is crucial that sea trade lines are open.
#31 - These 3 ports are located in the Baltic sea. Damaging marine life of two states in their territorial waters could result in closing Baltic straights for Russian trade of these 3 ports. EU would not hesitate to impose Naval blockade to punish Russia and lower its ability to wage a war.
#32 - There are many classes and forms of evidence, they affect the case differently. For example: Presumptive, Demonstrative, Documentary, Impression, Testimonial, Character, Habit, Hearsay, Forensic, Trace, Expert witness, Exculpatory, Digital, Corroborating,... Is this sufficient to make conclusion with certainty?
#33 - The direct evidence is available to investigators, it is classified. NATO members share data, satellite data, deployment of assets. If a Western state actor was found responsible, Reuters highlighted, the damage might be designated as an act of terror, which one broking source said might be covered by insurance. If Russia is implicated, insurance companies could argue it was “self-sabotage”, given Gazprom is state owned. If this is the case, as it was a deliberate act by the policyholder, they would not be allowed to file an insurance claim.
#34 - The saboteur of the Nordstream pipelines limited timeframe to install explosives. It would make sense to lay charges as close to the explosion day as possible to minimize exposure and possible removal but letting some time for safe escape.
#35 - The Nordstream has a official check-ups in mid June - link. It is unclear if these checks include a visual underwater monitoring. It would make sense that explosives had to be delivered after this date. A window of opportunity is between Mid June to 25 September. The next day the sabotage happened.
#36 - Can Sweden, who wants to join a NATO, be objective in its investigation? Would it be possible to disclose a result of the investigation in case a NATO member is the saboteur? They seem to be the last known boats at the crime scene.
#37 - Swedish warships from Karlskrona naval base moved for four days, from 22nd to 26th, exactly in the area where the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up before the explosions on the night of Monday - news and map. It is unclear which boats were used. The base hosts Stockholm-class corvette, 2 ships and Visby-class corvette, 2 ships. Both are well equipped for patrol and anti-submarine warfare.
#38 - It looks like the Swedish navy was tracking unidentified asset from Tuesday 22.09 to Friday 26/09. It is several days before the sabotage which happened on Monday 28/09 as SWE newspapers map, map, full map of movement here.
#39 - Questions: Why were they in the area? Were they on regular patrol or were they called due to possible unidentified threat? Was this operation Swedish or was it a cooperation between Sweden and Denmark? Were Swedish navy boats called due to joint protection of DK-SWE waters because the port is closest? Who initiated the mission and what was its objective? Are those Swedish sonar recordings from this event?
#40 - The depth in which pipelines were blown is around 80m - 110m (265-360 feet) below sea level. Bronholm basin is deepest 105m, mean depth is 46m. Is this enough for a submarine to operate? Normally, an SSN (a nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarine) must have at least 15-18m (50-60 feet) of water under its keel for navigational safety; the corresponding depth for an SSK (a diesel-electric submarine specialized for anti-submarine duties) is 9m - 12m (30-40 feet).
#41 - What kind of delivery system was used when two areas are about 50km from each other? Explosives were heavy, some underwater delivery vehicle had to be used. The buoyancy of such vehicle had to be top notch as no margin of error was allowed. Only experienced divers used to work with explosives were most likely deployed. The complexity and chance of discovery is increased if 2 places were reached. Was the delivery possible from surface? Why was that explosives are on two places? Is the 2nd place a secondary targeted area as the first was no more available? Were saboteurs disturbed?
#42 - The Nordstream 1 and 2 were blown the same day on Monday 26th of September 2022. The southern first at 03:00, and the northern NS1 at 17:00. Could this may mean that the southern pipeline was set later but timer of charges were set to go earlier off to allow escape in case it was submarine?
#43 - The location of both blasts are as far West as possible. It is also closest to Danish straights. This again hints the attacker tried to minimize exposure and time spent in Baltic Sea. Seems the more to the west the better.
#43 - Locations where pipelines were blown are on deeper waters hinting that submarine was involved (82m deep). There are places where pipelines are closer to surface which would be better for divers descending from boat. If a submarine
#44 - Nord Stream’s has minimum operational lifespan of 50 years - source.
#45 - EU states are less likely to be suspects. No EU member state would attack without prior note to others the joint EU critical/key energy infrastructure. No state is strong enough to face France and Germany, two main #NS shareholders.
#46 - Only a naval power with nuclear deterrence could of sabotaged pipelines. There is high complexity of response, high risk for retaliation. Limited suspects: FRA, RF, UK, and USA. It is very unlikely that a non-nuclear state would sabotage a key infrastructure of Russia without responses from its allies.
#47 - Danish straights are very tightly monitored. Denmark has hydro-acoustic sensors. No Russian asset would pass undetected. So Denmark must also have records of past suspicious activities. They had to look at their database of submarine sound recordings and potentially ask NATO allies for their recordings. NATO had to be informed about results of their findings due to information sharing.
#48 - The Denmark has hydro-acoustic records of #UK submarine operating in the area before the sabotage ("Sweden and Denmark have the audio recordings"). Russia has also some sensors on the seabed as stated here. Sweden has those recordings because Sweden had in the area boats with anti-submarine capability.
#49 - US considering offering to analyze underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations, here. But then A Navy spokesperson declined to confirm to CNN that the US had offered to look into the audio recordings here... Perhaps because it does not want to blow the cover of its ally?
#50 - Sweden, Denmark say Nord Stream leaks caused by ‘several hundred kilos of explosives’ - link. This again hints that there was a submarine in the area, or some mini-submarine or submersible delivery vehicle which could bring such large amount of explosives precisely to the delivery point. It also hints that Swedish National Forensic Centre has a key forensic direct evidence - “residues of explosives have been identified on several of the foreign objects seized,” - here.
These first 50 points make a great starting point!
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Underlined and summarized:
"who, what, where, why, how and when"
In graphical form:
Additional note from 28/03/2023:
Russia should get -1 point due to demands for independent investigation
Conclusion:
Based on these factors the UK looks like the prime suspect with 10 pointsThe next suspect in line is USA with just 6 points, Norway got 5 points.
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FIRST SUMMARY:
A comprehensive pre-investigation summary of the Nord Stream pipeline attacks has been completed. This summary analyzes various factors, weighs them, and assigns qualifiers, ultimately identifying a ranked list of prime suspects along with their probabilities.
The lack of transparency in the official investigations raises concerns about the potential motives for withholding data from the public. The reluctance of states to even discuss an international inquiry is alarming.
The initial analysis is primarily based on circumstantial evidence and interpretation, while acknowledging the absence of definitive proof. The case will need vast data to understand what actually happened.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
The absence of a joint international investigation raises suspicions of a likely Western perpetrator.
Several potential suspects (Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Germany) are dismissed due to their alibis and motives but included for the sake of alternative hypothesis creation.
The lack of claims regarding environmental damage, along with a notable absence of public outrage from the EU, adds to the suspicion.
Swedish naval movements near the sabotage site are highlighted as potentially significant.
There is considerable amount of classified information which nobody talks about.
Concluding arguments point to the UK as the most likely suspect, followed by the US, based on evidential first 50 points which were looked at.
