Wednesday, August 28, 2024

170 - Former Bulgarian Minister of Economy Rumen Gechev - comment




28 August 2022 - The Nord Stream bombing was a tragedy for all of Europe,

as Russian gas was a significant contributor to the development of the European economy.

This act of sabotage could not have been committed without the involvement of the US and its allies, says former Bulgarian Minister of Economy Rumen Gechev.

[MRT: The statement is consistent with this investigation - overview here

[Similar statement was said by Hungary:  Viktor Orbán on Nordstream affair: "under American direction"

Monday, August 26, 2024

169 - German Government: Blowing up Nord Stream is a crime

 


25 August 2024 - Germany dismisses Polish, Czech claims about Nord Streams being 'legitimate target'

"The chancellor stated this explicitly during his talks with the Polish and Czech sides, as well as with many other international partners," Spokesperson Steffen Hebestreit went on to say.

The German government does not share the position of the Czech president that the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines were a legitimate target and considers their undermining a crime, German government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit said.

He stressed that this crime must be investigated and recalled that the German Prosecutor General's Office continues to investigate the blowing up of Nord Stream

... 


The German government does not share the position of the Polish and Czech leadership that Nord Stream could have been a "legitimate target"

 

Previous posts related to the definition of the act:

168 - Hungary: The sabotage on Nord Streams is an Act of State Terrorism

24 August 2024 - Hungarian Foreign Minister: sabotage on Nord Streams is an act of state terrorism


Sabotage on the Nord Streams is an Act of state terrorism.

After all, if the authorities of any state are involved in organizing or committing a gas pipeline explosion, then such an action should be qualified as such.


As Zoltan Kovacs, Secretary of State for International Communications under the Hungarian government, reported on his social network page, this was stated by Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó.

The official also criticized the EU leadership's response to the sabotage.

According to Szijjártó, it took the incident too lightly.

"Any response must be proportionate to the severity of such an attack"

- Kovacs quotes the opinion of the Hungarian Foreign Minister.

25 August 2024 - HUN, Zoltan Kovacs, SecState for International Communication, International spokesman, Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister; Govt. Commissioner for the #HU24EU presidency 

FM Péter Szijjártó has criticised the European Union's response to the terrorist attack on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, accusing the EU of either applauding or ignoring the incident.

"For years, the European Union has been rejoicing over the fact that a large part of the infrastructure that guarantees the security of Europe's energy supply was blown up in a terrorist attack," he said, pointing out the lack of a serious investigation into the case.

Minister Szijjártó expressed disbelief at the explanations given for the attack, rejecting the idea that "two diving instructors and three enthusiastic students" could have carried out the attack. 

He called it "state terrorism" when a state was involved, stressing that the response must be appropriate to such a serious act.

26 August 2024 - Szijjártó: Hungary must be ready for serious attacks against sovereign foreign policy

Hungary has to prepare for serious attacks against its sovereign foreign policy in the coming years, Péter Szijjártó, the foreign minister, said at the Tranzit Festival in Tihany, at Lake Balaton, on Saturday. Protecting Hungary’s sovereignty is not a “question of political ideology”, but a “matter of life and death”, Szijjártó said. He said Hungary’s insistence on protecting its sovereignty


-------

Previous posts related to the definition of the act:

Security Law: Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents: Distinguishing between the Rules of Armed Conflict and Law Enforcement 

167 - About the NATO statement: "deliberate, reckless, and irresponsible acts of sabotage"

What does it mean to be reckless?

"Careless act in a way which shows that they do not care 
about danger or the effect their behavior will have on others"

What does it mean to be deliberate?

"Planned act, decided beforehand on purpose rather than by a chance" 

What does it mean to execute an irresponsible act?

"The actor was not showing a proper sense of responsibility,
The actor was careless about the consequences of its actions."


29 Sept 2022 - Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the damage to gas pipelines

The NATO Invitees associate themselves with this Statement.

  1. The damage to the Nordstream 1 and Nordstream 2 pipelines in international waters in the Baltic Sea is of deep concern. All currently available information indicates that this is the result of deliberate, reckless, and irresponsible acts of sabotage. These leaks are causing risks to shipping and substantial environmental damage. We support the investigations underway to determine the origin of the damage.
     
  2. We, as Allies, have committed to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors.  Any deliberate attack against Allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response.
30 September 2022 - UK: We will continue to work alongside our partners to protect Europe’s energy security

[MRT: Why even such a statement? Has there been any doubts why not?]

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki at the UN Security Council meeting on the Nord Stream gas pipeline.

I’d like to thank our briefers for setting out what we know so far about this case, which is still clearly very limited.

Once again in this chamber, we have heard some absurd Russian claims and conspiracy theories this afternoon.

Russia’s request for this meeting was a cynical attempt to distract from President Putin’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory today.

The damage to the Nordstream 1 and Nordstream 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea is of deep concern.

These leaks are not only causing risks to shipping but also substantial environmental damage in the Baltic Sea. They are releasing enormous amounts of methane into the earth’s atmosphere.

We agree with the assessment that all currently available information indicates this damage is the result of sabotage. We strongly support the investigations by Denmark, Sweden and Germany.

Intentional damage to civilian infrastructure is reckless and irresponsible, wherever it takes place. We must establish clear international norms that such damage is utterly unacceptable.

[MRT: The UK acknowledges that there are no proper norms - see here Sunak´s 2017 work on the issue.] 


For NATO’s part, as set out in yesterday’s statement of the North Atlantic Council, Allies remain committed to prepare for, deter and defend against any hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors including coercive approaches to energy.

We are clear that any deliberate attack against Allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response.

The UK will continue to work alongside our partners to protect Europe’s energy security.

[MRT: Is the UK committing to no more attacking developing clear rules?]


See previous posts:

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Channel One’s The Great Game political talk show, Moscow, March 10, 2023


"...As you may be aware, in Western states, in their basic laws, an attack targeting critical infrastructure is equated to a declaration of war.

In this particular case, if it’s established that a terrorist attack against a NATO country’s critical infrastructure was perpetrated by another NATO country it will bring up the question about the rationale for NATOwhich declares as its goal protecting member countries from outside attacks, but at the same time makes possible attacks on one of its members from within the bloc. This is a rather interesting question..."

Who said it is a "Sabotage" first?


 



R-E-C-K-L-E-S-S 

Friday, August 23, 2024

166 - Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Channel One’s The Great Game political talk show, Moscow, March 10, 2023

Source: Statements and speeches by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov


Question: 

There is a hybrid war, there is also a war, as you (if I understood correctly) said had almost become a real war, and there is a real war.

[MRT: See connected post: 081 - The United Kingdom's secret war against Russia?

I’m not talking about what is happening on the battlefields in Ukraine, but terrorist attacks as well. The most recent attack which, for obvious reasons, drew the greatest attention is the explosion on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2.

An article by Seymour Hersh was published which was covered much wider outside the United States than in America itself where it was mostly ignored. We are now seeing reports in high-profile US publications, such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and Germany’s Die Zeit to the effect that this explosion was carried out by a strange anonymous group of either Ukrainians, or Russian oppositionists, or both.

The company behind it was allegedly registered in Poland and carried out the attack from Germany. For the first time, it is admitted that the US intelligence services knew about this operation, if not in advance, then for many months.

Someone even tried to point the finger at Russia as a party responsible for these explosions. They are still unwilling to say what is known about this operation, the perpetrators and the masterminds behind it. This raises questions about the role of the United States.

[MRT: The role of the USA is explored in several posts here 

Do you believe the Biden administration is responsible for what happened with Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2?


Sergey Lavrov: 

In order for me to give you a clear answer, we need an objective investigation. That is what we are pushing for. Soon after Seymour Hersh published his investigation, we had questions to ask about it. Or rather, we asked questions immediately after the terrorist attack took place. Publicly and in writing on behalf of Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, we sent inquiries to his counterparts in Germany, Denmark and Sweden.

We have sent multiple official diplomatic notes to these countries asking them to give us answers and allow us to participate in inspecting the section of gas pipelines that had been targeted by the terrorists.

No clear reaction followed, except them saying they will figure it out themselves. “This investigation is off-limits to the public and you will know everything in due time” is all we heard from them. The inquiries that Prime Minister Mishustin sent in September 2022 have remained without an official answer so far.

This is a matter of manners and more. I think that in addition to manners, there is also the fact that these countries are confused. They aren’t sure what to say, especially after Mr Hersh published his findings and vowed to continue to publish additional estimates and findings. For us, this came as an extra factor that forced us to submit a UN Security Council resolution, which is now being discussed, and which we will definitely put to a vote. We want investigations.

 [MRT: "...extra factor..." -> looks like USA has not been considered until Hersh put his claim up as a suspect by Russia, interesting.]

Question: What if they turn down your request for an investigation?


Sergey Lavrov: 

When Seymour Hersh published his piece, a gentleman by the name of Ned Price, who is nearing the end of his career with the press service of the US State Department and going to work directly for Antony Blinken, called it nonsense.

As always, everything related to the facts pointing to the possible role of the United States (I would even say the highly likely role of the US government) is called nonsense, fiction, or the like. And no investigation is needed, they say, since national investigations are underway, which is enough.

[MRT: "...possible role..." -> again, looks like USA has not been considered until Hersh put his claim up as a suspect by Russia, interesting.] 

Suddenly, these very days (they don’t do a good job coordinating their public plans and projects), the press secretary of the US President, Karine Jean-Pierre, demanded at a briefing an international investigation into the reports about poisonings at schools in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nothing less than an international investigation, although no one was badly hurt there.

However, a direct attack on critical energy infrastructure does not need an investigation, because the Swedes, Danes and Germans will figure it out themselves.

As you may be aware, in Western states, in their basic laws, an attack targeting critical infrastructure is equated to a declaration of war.

In this particular case, if it’s established that a terrorist attack against a NATO country’s critical infrastructure was perpetrated by another NATO country it will bring up the question about the rationale for NATO, which declares as its goal protecting member countries from outside attacks, but at the same time makes possible attacks on one of its members from within the bloc. This is a rather interesting question.

You mentioned the latest wave of stories in the US and some in the German press about new leads: a Ukrainian oligarch who had better come clean himself; they did not want to talk about a Ukrainian “trace” because it could spoil German-Ukrainian relations, and all that kind of stuff. First, this is “baby talk.” Second, even if one accepts the logic they are now putting forward, that they wanted to secure the strategy between Germany and Ukraine, it would mean by and large to “cook their goose.” If they wanted to attribute everything to a Ukrainian or a pro-Ukrainian trained diver who was no longer in the service, all the same; if they wanted to throw in a Ukrainian “trace,” the average German, like probably any other country’s citizen, would wonder: is this Ukraine again? The Ukrainian “trace?” They blew up Nord Stream, which, as President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said (not just because of Nord Stream, of course), and the energy commodity problem, caused the European Union to pay 300 percent more for energy.

Fatih Birol, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, recently said that this is now permanent, that there will be no return to past prices that ensured the economic well-being of Europe, including Germany.

Now German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has boasted that they survived the winter and that Russia’s plan “did not work.” We didn't have any “plans.” It was their plan to give up Russian gas. They survived the winter. However, they are not very keen to tell us how much it cost the budgets and consequently the taxpayers.

The burghers will have a question: why do they need Ukraine at all? If they are blowing them up (whoever he is – an agent of Kiev, paid off by someone from abroad, or just a loner), why do they need to send Leopards there, to admit this country to NATO? I think there are a lot more questions here because of this attempt to literally make it hide the ends in the water” – both literally and figuratively.

You mentioned that there was advance warning from the intelligence community. There was a Wall Street Journal article that in June and July of 2022 the CIA warned the intelligence services of Germany and other European countries about a Ukrainian trace, about this forthcoming action.

And the Times, in September 2022, after the attack took place, reported that a week after the explosion it was established that the traces led in the direction of Ukraine. That is, they warned in June that it would happen, and in September it was established that it did. You know, somehow, it's not serious, it's not a mature way of looking at things.

[MRT: The original oxymoron article from 27-08-2022 did mention that it  was a "VAGUE warning" and non-specific" but "strategic" warning without a date and place. The additional data that it was warning against Ukrainians was added only in 2023. Note that the German head of Navy Kaack said that Germany had another warning from September 2022 which was about possible actions against undersea cables and/or pipelines. See my data.]  



Question: 

A few months ago, when I was in Washington, I spoke with a prominent Republican member of Congress. He asked me a question which I would like to pose to you. He asked me what Russia could do in response. Can there be any negative consequences for the United States from Russia?

You don’t need me to tell you (you know America and the Washington political scene very well) that they often wonder less about the quality of Russian arguments and more about specific consequences for the United States. If there’s no objective investigation which you mentioned earlier (which is quite likely), and if Russia’s requests go unanswered, is it fair to assume that one way or another Russia will find a way to respond to this act of terror that impacts our fundamental interests?

Sergey Lavrov: 

You have no idea how badly I’m itching to...


Question: 

Of course, I do. That is why I am asking you this question. I had to try.

Sergey Lavrov: 

I serve as head of the Foreign Ministry. We have our own methods. I’m not going to make predictions or speculate.


********

WebPage: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation


Keyword: "Nord Stream"


 

Thursday, August 22, 2024

165 - Security Law: Did an Alleged Ukrainian Attack against the Nord Stream Pipelines Violate the Law of Armed Conflict?


Were the Nord Stream Pipelines a Legitimate Military Objective?

"This post demonstrates that the legality of the Nord Stream explosions can be assessed from the perspective of the law of armed conflict." 


By: Alexander Lott (Marie Curie research fellow at the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea).

PDF: https://site.uit.no/nclos/wp-content/uploads/sites/179/2023/11/Alexander-Lott-NCLOS-Blog_Nord-Stream-Jus-in-Bello-Case-Study_-Final.pdf

Introduction:

Preliminary Western intelligence reports have emerged about a purportedly pro-Ukrainian group of six divers conducting the sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines in September last year. The Ukrainian Government denies any involvement in such an alleged operation. Nonetheless, recently, the Washington Post and Der Spiegel published a joint report which reached the unequivocal conclusion that:

“A senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country’s intelligence services played a central role in the bombing of the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines last year, according to officials in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, as well as other people knowledgeable about the details of the covert operation. /…/ Chervinsky did not act alone, and he did not plan the operation, according to the people familiar with his role, which has not been previously reported. The officer took orders from more senior Ukrainian officials, who ultimately reported to Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s highest-ranking military officer, said people familiar with how the operation was carried out.”

...

Conclusion:

In the context of an armed conflict, the attribution standards are more flexible than in peace time. It would suffice that a belligerent State exercises overall control over a group of persons by way of financing and provision of training, logistics, and weapons for invoking that State’s responsibility for the relevant acts. In case Ukraine as a belligerent State exercised overall control over the group of divers that allegedly conducted the Nord Stream explosions, it would prima facie imply Ukraine’s responsibility for the sabotage against the Nord Stream pipelines. 

During an international armed conflict, the protection standards of offshore critical infrastructure differ depending on whether the object is located within or outside the limits of a neutral State’s territorial sea. Conducting military operations within a neutral State’s territorial sea is prohibited. By contrast, even such pipelines (as well as cables) that do not exclusively serve belligerent States might, in situations of military necessity, serve as lawful military targets in areas where the high seas freedoms apply even if the pipelines (or cables) land in a neutral State. However, belligerent States must meet the requirement of due regard for the rights and duties of the coastal State, inter alia, for the exploration and exploitation of the economic resources of the EEZ and the continental shelf and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

It is doubtful that the Nord Stream pipelines could have served as a military objective even in the context of the armed conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The Nord Stream pipelines likely did not serve as a civilian object that contributed to a belligerent State’s war-sustaining effort from the perspective of the ongoing international armed conflict in Europe, given that the flow of natural gas from the Russian Federation to Germany had stopped by the time the attacks were launched against the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022. Nor did the perpetrators of the attack give due regard for the protection and preservation of the Baltic Sea marine environment. Based on these reasons, it appears that an attack allegedly attributable to Ukraine against the Nord Stream pipelines was not in conformity with the law of armed conflict. 

Latest News - here

In an interview with Novinky, Petr Pavel (Czech president) said: “Nord Stream is legitimate target in war, since pipelines are a strategic target. If the attack was aimed at cutting off gas and oil supplies to Europe and returning money back to Russia, then - and I'm speaking conditionally - it would be a legitimate target. At the time, we already had a number of alternatives, so Nord Stream was not a critical pipeline on which Europe's energy security depended. Of course, it caused some complications, but not ones that we could not handle”

The Answer - here

Maria Zakharova’s TG Channel -

*I read this delusional statement and thought that even for such a provocative fringe figure, this is over the top. Previously, only representatives of banned international terrorist organizations would express such "thoughts." Judge for yourself:

* *"We call on you to carry out attacks on American citizens and military personnel both inside the U.S. and outside the country" (Ibrahim al-Asiri, chief bomb-maker of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [an organization banned in the Russian Federation]).

* *"We must punish those who violate borders and desecrate sanctities. The operation of Muhammad Abdulaziz (the Muhammad Yusuf Abdulaziz terrorist attack in Tennessee), which took place in the very heart of American soil, is a vivid example of this. He infiltrated the base during a blessed jihadist operation. We ask Allah to accept him and elevate him among the martyrs" (Khalid Batarfi, head of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).

* *"Attack the bases of the Egyptian army on the Sinai Peninsula, capture and blow up their homes, behead them, ambush them. Turn their lives into hell. Do not let them breathe easily or feel safe" (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, spokesperson for ISIS [an organization banned in the Russian Federation]).* *"You all must direct your arrows and swords against the USA" (Qasim al-Raymi, head of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).

* *"The coalition that Saudi Arabia has decided to form today is nothing more than a new group of watchdogs. Therefore, we advise the mujahideen in Syria to target anyone who joins or intends to join this army" (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, spokesperson for ISIS).*




Tuesday, August 20, 2024

164 - Security Law: Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents

Security Law:  
Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents: 
Distinguishing between the Rules of Armed Conflict and Law Enforcement


Source - link

By: Alexander Lott

PDF Version: Alexander Lott_Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents_NCLOSblog_290422

Matter commented on: Hybrid naval warfare; Distinction between naval warfare and maritime law enforcement


1. Introduction...

This short blog post aims to provide guidance for parties to hybrid naval warfare for determining whether the rules of armed conflict or law enforcement are applicable to various situations where force has been used against ships. 

2. Use of Force by State Vessels against Attacks Launched from Commercial Ships

Force may be used to defend a government ship or warship against an attack that has been launched by private persons on-board a commercial ship or structure (e.g., a platform).

For example, the use of force may be necessary to counter a terrorist attack launched by explosive-laden boats or in response to irregulars who use a commercial oil platform as their base. Notably, if the government ship or warship was attacked by such private persons that were not acting on behalf of a foreign State and nor was a foreign State substantially involved in such attack by non-State actors, then the victim State cannot invoke the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter (1986 Judgment of the ICJ ... 

[MRT: Note that Russia has not retaliated] 

Definition of Aggression, Art 3(g)).

The ICJ has found that: “Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.”

[MRT: Note that USA has tried to de-escalate before the event happened and NATO put straight message that any retaliation will be met with a joint response.]  

... 

Nonetheless, the victim State may invoke the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter if it can prove another State’s substantial involvement in the attack that was carried out by non-State actors.

[MRT: Can the Russia prove the approach by a UK submarine? Of the Ukrainian involvement?] 

For this, the victim State needs to show that:

    • The State suspected of sponsoring non-State actors meets the characteristics of “sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state” (Definition of Aggression, Art 3(g)).

[MRT: Note that top West officials started straight from the beginning claim it was a "Sabotage" and not an "Armed attack".] 

    • “Such an operation [of non-State actors], because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces” (1986 Judgment of the ICJ in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, para. 195).

If the victim State is successful in claiming that it has the right of self-defence against attacks launched by non-State actors, then its use of force under jus in bello must still comply with the limitations of necessity and proportionality

3. Use of Force against a Commercial Ship in a Law Enforcement Operation

Law enforcement officials, particularly Navy’s high-ranking military officers in cases where they are performing law enforcement in geopolitically sensitive situations, e.g., in disputed areas, must take caution that they issue clear orders to private persons against whom they are enforcing the coastal State’s law...

Where force is used for stopping a ship, it needs to follow the principle of proportionality. Law enforcement officials or Navy servicemen onboard State-owned ships need to exercise self-restraint when they are using force against commercial ships; use of force “must be avoided as far as possible”...

[MRT: Imagine a scenario in which Germany, France, USA learn about the active mission by the UK against the Nordstream system. Would it be possible to stop it without causing international crisis? ]  

Thus, in maritime enforcement, for the use of force to be lawful, it needs to be employed as a last resort. This means that it needs to be clearly shown that other, less-intrusive options for stopping a commercial ship had been exhausted.

[MRT: This investigation opens the possibility, which vast data support, that Norway warned USA and allies against an active attempt for destruction of the Nordstream system. In this case the USA, Allies should be checked for possible contacts the week before the event.]

4. State vs. State Scenario

Determining whether the rules of armed conflict or law enforcement apply in situations where one State has used force against ships of another flag State can be difficult. On this question, there are contradictory views and considerable amount of ambiguity in the relevant case law and legal literature. The following sections are based on a differentiation between so-called tanker war scenario and clashes between warships or government ships of conflicting States...

[MRT: Is the presence of Danish and Swedish navies in the area near Bornholm the week before the event. Were they unsuccessfully trying to stop the perpetrator? The issue is, neither Danish not Swedish ship has any relationship toward the pipeline which is co-owned by Germany/Austria, Netherland, France and Russia. Were these informed about what kind of activities were happening there?] 

4.1. ‘Tanker war’ Scenario 

For invoking the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter in response to attacks against commercial ships, it is necessary for a State to show, inter alia, that:

    • There is persuasive evidence that the suspected State bears responsibility for carrying out such attacks

    • The State responsible for the attack intentionally and systemically targeted ships flying the flag of the State that invokes the right of self-defence and that the attacks were not indiscriminate, e.g., a mine or missile was simply aimed to hit some target 

    • The attack caused significant damage, either to ships, their crew, or goods.

    • The attacked commercial ships, whatever their ownership, were flying the flag of the State that claims the right of self-defence so that the attacks on the commercial ships can be equated with an attack on that State  
4.2. Warship/Government Ship vs. Warship/Government Ship Scenario

Under the LOSC, both warships and government ships (e.g., Coast Guard vessels) are entitled to perform law enforcement operations and may use force in that capacity

 [MRT: What kind of naval activities  were Danish and Swedish navies executing near Bornholm the week before the event?] 

5. Conclusion

The ICJ’s ‘gravity threshold’ for triggering the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter leaves a significant room of manoeuvre for States to employ low-intensity use of force against adversaries. Legally speaking, this facilitates the ambiguous domain of hybrid naval warfare that exceeds the level of maritime law enforcement but falls below the threshold of an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The victim State will likely be seen as falling under the de minimis threshold and needs to comply with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter when employing law enforcement or criminal law-based measures to counter such attacks that fall below the ‘gravity threshold’ of an armed attack, as set by the ICJ.

Consequently, the victim State’s use of arms needs to strictly stay within the confines of the limits of proportionality that are narrower in the law enforcement and criminal law paradigms as compared to the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In border-line cases, even international judicial bodies may be unable to definitely classify certain maritime incidents in their ex post assessments as either falling to the law enforcement or military operations category.

The different approach adopted by the ICJ in the Oil Platforms case entails that a victim State in a low-intensity hybrid naval warfare risks the possibility of being eventually dubbed as an aggressor State if it has subjectively deemed itself entitled to the right of self-defence. Whereas the objective ex post assessment (as made by, e.g., international courts and tribunals) reaches the opposite conclusion that the initial aggression did not meet the threshold of most grave form of the use of force.


Note that this is not my post but a repost of most important and relevant parts from this article:

Source - link

By: Alexander Lott

PDF Version: Alexander Lott_Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents_NCLOSblog_290422

Matter commented on: Hybrid naval warfare; Distinction between naval warfare and maritime law enforcement


This post tries to highlight the difficulty of the legal case which I stated a year ago...

In no way experts could judge that the case has been a "sabotage", an "armed attack", "terrorist act" or else without prior knowledge of the perpetrator, knowledge how the act has been done and if directly or via proxy. Last, the definition was proposed by certain leaders just a day AFTER the event which speaks volumes about the exact knowledge of the rogue actor.

POST: Who said it is a "Sabotage" first?



[MRT: See? I have said this exactly over a year ago!]
 

Conclussion:

The whole EU leadership is COMPROMISED.

 

Friday, August 9, 2024

163 - Nordstream affair - The planning begins

  Truss About cutting off Russian oil and gas exports Once and for all


There are many statements by UK politicians, 
even from before 2022, 
listing some 2022 onward here:  

27 February 2022 - British foreign minister Liz Truss said on Sunday she would press for further measures against Russia, particularly in cutting off their oil and gas supplies, at a meeting with her counterparts in the G7 group of rich nations.

27 Feb 2022 - First Truss revealed her fears about western reliance on Russian energy supplies, saying: ‘Some European countries have 85% of their gas coming from Russia.

‘What we need to do is agree with our G7 counterparts to reduce that percentage over time.

‘I would support the idea of having ceilings on how much oil and gas is imported from Russia, so that over time we cut the dependency right across Europe. That is what we are working towards with our G7 partners.’

She went on: ‘The real objective is to degrade the Russian economy because what we know is Putin’s war machine is funded by revenues from oil and gas. So what we have to do is reduce dependency on oil and gas.’

2 March 2022 - UK gov study "Geopolitical implications of Nord Stream 2

The UK government position - part 4

Implications for Ukraine - Nord Stream 2 has implications for Ukraine. Although not a huge importer of Russian gas, Ukraine is a major transit country of current Russian gas pipelines into Europe. Transit fees are thought to account for almost 3% of Ukraine’s GDP, which will bring an expected revenue of $2-3 billion annually over the next five years.

2 March 2022 - Royal Navy divers create elite mission teams to meet evolving needs

3 March 2022 - We need to make sure the Russian economy is crippled - UK's Truss

The West needs to ensure the Russian economy is crippled so that President Vladimir Putin it is unable to continue his invasion of Ukraine, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said on Thursday.

"We need to ... degrade the Russian economy," Truss said during a news conference in Lithuania. "We need to make sure ... that the Russian economy is crippled so it is unable to continue to fund Putin and the war machine."

4 March 2022 - Cutting the Cord: Ending Europe’s Energy Dependency on Russia 
                                   TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE

As long as Europe remains heavily reliant on Russian energy, we have an Achilles heel.

With 40 per cent of the continent’s gas imports and 25 per cent of its oil imports coming from Russia, European countries urgently need a long-term plan to curb this dependency – especially if Putin remains on his current trajectory.

Such a plan requires urgent coordination between the EU and its partners to lay out both short-term measures and a longer strategic vision for greater energy security.

Our paper shows how this can be accomplished...

9 March 2022 - Truss: The Ukraine crisis is a wake-up call for free democracies.

I am in the US to take forward support for Ukraine, degrading the economy funding Putin’s war machine, and isolating Russia internationally: Putin must be held to account. Putin must fail in Ukraine. 
9 March 2022 - Truss: Met @SecBlinken and agreed more action is needed to hold Putin to account for his barbaric invasion of Ukraine. 

We must reduce dependency on Russian oil & gas, isolate Russia internationally, and keep supporting Ukraine  

10 March 2022 - UK foreign minister: Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is a ‘paradigm shift on the scale of 9/11’

"If we are to persuade Putin and future Putins that we are serious, we need to do things differently."

First of all, we must end the strategic dependence which puts our economies and security at the risk and mercy of malign actors. 

Europe remains deeply reliant on Russian energy. This provides a vital source of revenue for Putin, and it must end.

...The fundamental driver of the Russian economy is oil and gas, and the absolute key has to be reducing dependency on oil and gas. And I recognize many European countries are very dependent.... 

24 March 2022 - Spoke to @WBHoekstra

...about further coordinated sanctions against Putin and those who support him. The Netherlands and UK will continue to firmly and swiftly impose crippling economic measures on Russia’s war machine. 

2 April 2022 - Truss: We cannot rest till Ukraine prevails and Vladimir Putin fails

AS the horror in Ukraine enters its seventh week, Britain is leading global efforts to ensure Vladimir Putin loses.

We have stepped up with our allies and partners to strengthen our Ukrainian friends in their fightback and to hit his regime where it hurts with sanctions. But we are not stopping there...

This is post-Brexit Global Britain in action — muscular, assertive and decisive at a time of global peril.  

4 April 2022 - Foreign Secretary to visit Poland to call for tougher action to tackle Russian aggression

Britain has helped lead the way with sanctions to cripple the Putin war machine. We will do more to ramp up the pressure on Russia and we will keep pushing others to do more. 

6 April 2022 - Truss: We're going further to cripple Putin’s war machine.

Today I have announced our toughest sanctions yet - targeting Russia's energy industry, as well as hitting more banks, businesses and oligarchs who are financing Russia's abhorrent crimes in Ukraine. 

6 April 2022 - Truss: The West must show Putin its collective strength: article by Liz Truss 

7 April 2022 - UK updates its energy security strategy 

7 April 2022 - Russia has brought barbarity and devastation to Ukraine.

I told @HouseofCommons that the UK must do everything we can to ensure Putin loses.

14 April 2022 -  Truss: NEW - UK sanctions Eugene Tenenbaum & David Davidovich, two key oligarchs and long-standing associates of Roman Abramovich.

Alongside #G7 and our partners, we will keep going with sanctions until Putin fails in Ukraine. Nothing and no one is off the table

15 April 2022 - The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)

Admiral Sir Antony David Radakin, KCB, ADC, Chief of the Defence Staff
JEF recognises that the character of warfare has evolved, and the distinction between peace and war is not as clear as it once was.

The grey area this creates has allowed our adversaries to develop new ways of threatening us, and we recognise the need to counter this by protecting, engaging and constraining the threat.

We therefore see advantage in the JEF being able to take collective action below the traditional threshold of conflict, if necessary, before NATO declares Article V, in a complementary capacity to NATO. 

26 April 2022 - Liz Truss is ready to try and beat global aggressors at their own game 

27 April 2022 - Truss: The return of geopolitics: Foreign Secretary's Mansion House speech at the Lord Mayor's 2022 Easter Banquet

We now need a new approach, one that melds hard security and economic security, one that builds stronger global alliances and where free nations are more assertive and self-confident, one that recognises geopolitics is back.

Britain has always stood up to bullies. We have always been risk takers. So we are prepared be bold, using our strength in security and diplomacy, our economic heft, and our will and agility to lead the way...

Our sanctions have already seen Russia facing its first external debt default for a century. We need to go further. There must be nowhere for Putin to fund this appalling war. That means cutting off oil and gas imports once and for all.

27 June 2022 - We must ignore the defeatist voices who propose to sell out Ukraine: joint article by Liz Truss and Dmytro Kuleba

UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba wrote a joint article in The Telegraph about how to stop Putin's war in Ukraine.

It is therefore imperative that the G7 and NATO this week demonstrate that their commitment to Ukraine will never be surpassed by Putin’s determination to seize it. That means increasing and speeding up their supply of heavy weapons, continuing to sanction all those colluding in Putin’s war, and cutting off imports of Russian energy completely.

The UK is increasing its sanctions, with further legislation this week on a range of trade bans, and more to come over the next month. The free world, collectively, needs to bear down harder to cut Russia off from its key sources of foreign income: energy and other exports such as gold.

20 Sept 2022 - President @EmmanuelMacron and I are committed to working together to end reliance on Russian energy, deepening 🇬🇧🇫🇷 cooperation to reduce volatility in the market and cut costs for households.

Putin’s economic blackmail cannot and will not succeed. 

21 Sept 2022 - UK Prime Minister Truss addresses the United Nations General Assembly (transcript here)

01:00 min: "...Geopolitics is entering a new era.."

06:00 min: "We are cutting off the toxic power and pipelines from authoritarian regimes and strengthening our energy resilience."

"We will ensure we cannot be coerced or harmed by the reckless actions of rogue actors abroad."

"The free world needs this economic strength and resilience to push back against authoritarian aggression and win this new era of strategic competition.

We must do this together."

We are fortifying our deep security alliances in Europe and beyond through NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force.


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The planning phase started after Brexit 
and continued gradually

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The main driver for UK is the Energy in/Security

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On 26 September 2022, 
a series of underwater explosions and consequent gas leaks 
occurred on the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) 
and Nord Stream 2 (NS2) natural gas pipelines

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