Thursday, May 30, 2024

152 - Did USA specify how they will End the Nordstream 2 project in February 2022?

Biden, after negotiations with Scholz,
said that if Russia invades Ukraine,
there will be no Nord Stream 2

Biden said THIS: 

"There will no longer be a Nord Stream 2.

We will bring an end to it.

I promise you we'll be able to do that."


BUT HOW?

 Yes, they did say how exactly

It was a commitment between Germany (Scholz) and USA (Biden).

(source)


See another post describing the event in wider perspective:

Data show Biden has not ordered Nordstream destruction


Just check the January, February politics to learn who said what.

Germans voluntarily agreed that it is not good to support Russia

by approving NS2 with certification so a condition was agreed:

"IF Russia enters Ukraine, the Nordstream 2 will be stalled"

NOTE: This was NEVER about the Nordstream 1 pipeline.

***

IF you remove the Biden´s statement what evidence there is that the USA 

has planned to physically destroy pipelines?

***

Someone else was against ALL RUSSIAN ENERGY EXPORTS

The UK government does not like Nordstream

Wednesday, May 29, 2024

151 - Nord Stream 2 AG insurers deny policies covered war risks in UK lawsuit


18 April 2024 - Nord Stream 2 AG insurers deny policies covered war risks in UK lawsuit

In their written defence, dated April 8 and first reported by Kommersant daily on Thursday, the insurers said Nord Stream's policy did not cover damage "directly or indirectly" resulting from war, military actions or the detonation of explosives.

The insurers also stated that the policy does not cover any damage which happened "under the order of any government".

"The defendants will rely on ... the fact that the explosion damage could only have – or, at least, was more likely than not to have – been inflicted by or under the order of a government," the insurers' lawyer said.

[MRT: The conclusion that it was a government who was behind was confirmed by the by the Swedish main investigator here. It was also stated that Russian, US and pro-Ukrainian group have been excluded as suspects in several rounds. The amount of suspects has therefore shrank. See the original post of identifying suspects here and here.] 

[MRT: Note that statements are in sync with Mats Ljungqvuist the head of the SWE investigation team - collection of statements here

Tuesday, May 21, 2024

150 - The USS Gerald R. Ford and multi-national #NATO Strike Group after Nordstream affair



Exploring its role in preventing the Russian rightful retaliation
against the NATO member perpetrator

29 Sept 2022: USS Gerald R. Ford safely received more than 100,000 tons of ordnance over three days in preparation for the ship’s deployment this fall.

[MRT: The fast resupply has been done in a haste on the sea and with helicopters]

29 Sept 2022: The US Navy aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford @Warship_78, will deploy next week and operate throughout the North Atlantic during a short deployment surrounded by a multi-national #NATO Strike Group.
🇨🇦🇩🇰🇫🇷🇩🇪🇳🇱🇪🇸🇺🇸+🇫🇮🇸🇪

[MRT: One important flag is missing - the UK. The deployment is for unspecified time. It includes unnamed port call.]

29 Sept 2022 Comment by Paul Mc Leary:

"FIVE years after its commission, the Navy's $13.3 billion, much-delayed new aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford will head for Europe next month, but the Navy won't call it a deployment...

The term of art is a “service-retained deployment,” which no one can fully explain, but basically means it's going out with part of an air wing, and will practice with NATO allies in the Atlantic...

The Navy won't say how long it'll be at sea, but does say the ship will remain under 2nd Fleet control, instead of  under a combatant commander...

The Ford will exercise w/ ships from Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden in the N. Atlantic.

It'll make a port call, but the Navy won't say where...

Keep an eye on Norway however, as the Norwegian defense minister just visited the ship at its home port in Virginia last week

The Ford will go on its first actual deployment, where it is under the operational control of a combatant commander, some time in 2023, 14 years after construction began and a decade after it was put in the water."

[MRT: Again not UK flag in the group.]  

19 Oct 2022 - NATO: NATO Partnerships in Action: Allied Officers Serve Aboard Ford

Two officers belonging to NATO nations, Germany and Spain are walking the deck plates of the first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) to enhance integration with allies and partners during Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group’s (GRFCSG) deployment. 

23 October 2022 - CARRIER STRIKE GROUP 4 EXERCISE ENHANCES BEGINNING OF GERALD R. FORD INAUGURAL DEPLOYMENT WITH NATO ALLIES

NORFOLK, Va. -- The Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group and ships from three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries completed a three-week exercise orchestrated by Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 called Task Force Exercise (TFEX) 23-2 from Oct. 5 to 23.

24 October 2022 - USA/SPA/GER: GRFCSG and three Nato allied nations conclude Task Force Exercise 23-2

The exercise coincided with GRFCSG’s inaugural deployment with Nato allied nations in the Atlantic.

One ship each from the three Nato countries, including Spain, Canada and Germany, participated in the exercise.

Participating vessels included the Royal Canadian Navy’s Halifax-class frigate HMCS Fredericton (FFH 337), Spanish Navy’s Alvaro De Bazan-class ship ESPS Alvaro De Bazan (F 101) and German Navy’s Sachsen-class ship FGS Hessen (F 221).

[MRT: Again not UK flag in the group.]  

8 Nov 2022 - USA/CAN/GER/FRA/NED/SPA/DK: Navy’s newest aircraft carrier joins allies for exercise Silent Wolverine

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the U.S. Navy’s newest and most advanced aircraft carrier, joined six NATO allies for exercise Silent Wolverine in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean, Nov. 8, 2022. Exercise participants include Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. 

[MRT: Again not UK flag in the group.] 

Monday, May 20, 2024

149 - Comments by Polish State Secretary Stanislaw Zaryn



26 Sept 2023: Denying All Involvement

Polish State Secretary Stanislaw Zaryn, who is responsible for the coordination of his country’s intelligence agencies, told the reporting team from ARD, SZ and "Die Zeit": "We have no evidence for this yacht’s participation in the events." The crew, he said, was apparently made up of people "who were looking for fun.

"The voyage had a "purely touristic character." Nobody appeared "to have anything close to military or sabotage-related training."

He did not provide any evidence to back his statements. Zaryn and the Polish government believe it is more likely that Russia was behind the attack. The Russian government has repeatedly denied any involvement.


26 Sept 2023: On the Ukrainian trail of the Nord Stream saboteurs

Polish investigators' persistence in contradicting the main thesis of the other countries investigating the attack (i.e. that the Andromeda is involved) now seems astonishing. Poland's deputy minister coordinator of special services, Stanislaw Zaryn, gave an interview to our German media partners in which he stated with conviction that the Andromeda was not suitable for such an attack.

It has emerged that during its September 2022 journey across the maritime zone that hosts the pipeline, the crew stopped off at a small Polish port, Kolobrzeg, where they were checked by the local authorities. Zaryn claims that no explosives were found, that the yacht's trip was purely recreational, and that any other version merely served Russian propaganda. But this ignores the evidence gleaned from the other investigations carried out by neighbouring European states, which are now openly complaining about Poland's reluctance 

11 June 2023 - Poland slams Nord Stream sabotage claims as 'baseless'

Poland had no connection with the blowing up of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2,” Zaryn tweeted.

        

[MRT: Note that the September 2022 was a very busy times in Baltic sea and many naval exercises happened in the area]

 

Monday, May 13, 2024

148 - "NATO's Article 5 dog that didn't bark




  • The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

  • Collective defence means that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies.

  • NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States.

Article 5

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

This article is complemented by Article 6, which stipulates:

Article 6

“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

    • on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
    • on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”
Invocation of Article 5

The 9/11 terrorist attacks

On the evening of 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the attacks, the Allies invoked the principle of Article 5. Then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson subsequently informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the Alliance's decision.

Ownership and jurisdiction:

  • Based on maritime law pipelines are under the flag of the state who owns them. In case of Nordstream AG it is 51% Gazprom and 49% EU companies fro Germany, Austria, France and Netherlands. The ownership of Nordstream 2 AG is fully under Gazprom which is a publicly listed company in which the Russian state has majority stake of 51%.

Political and strategic motives - the definition of the event:
  • The determination of whether the action constitutes sabotage, a terrorist act, or an armed attack would depend on legal analysis and interpretation, as well as diplomatic negotiations between the affected parties.

    • Sabotage: Sabotage generally refers to the deliberate destruction or disruption of property, machinery, or equipment to hinder or damage operations. If the attack on Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG involves damaging infrastructure, facilities, or equipment with the intent to disrupt their operations, it could be classified as sabotage.

    • Terrorist Act: A terrorist act typically involves violence or intimidation carried out with political or ideological motives to instill fear or achieve certain objectives. While the term "terrorism" often connotes non-state actors, state-sponsored terrorism is also recognized. If the covert operation is conducted with the aim of causing fear or intimidating the population or the government of the target country (Russia or Germany, in this case), it could potentially be classified as a terrorist act.

    • Armed Attack: Under international law, an armed attack typically refers to the use of force by one state against another state, which may trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations CharterWhether the covert operation against Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG would rise to the level of an armed attack would depend on the scale, nature, and consequences of the operation. If the attack results in significant damage or casualties and is conducted with military force, it could be considered an armed attack.

An attack against whom?

1. Attack on a Swiss Company:
  • Both Nordstream AG and Nordstream 2 AG are enlisted in Switzerland hence attack against these is de jure an attack against two of its companies.  An attack on the company itself could be viewed as an attack on a Swiss entity. In this scenario, Swiss laws and international conventions related to the protection of businesses and property could apply.
2. Attack on Shareholder Companies:
  • If the attack were specifically targeting the interests of the shareholder companies (such as Gazprom, Wintershall Dea, Uniper SE, OMV, Engie, or Royal Dutch Shell), the legal implications would involve the laws and jurisdictions of those respective countries. It could potentially be considered an attack on the economic interests of those countries.
3. Attack on the State:
  • Whether an attack on Nord Stream AG or its shareholder companies would be considered an attack on a state would depend on the circumstances and the interpretation of international law.
    If the attack were deemed to have political or geopolitical motives, it could be perceived as an attack on the interests of the states where the shareholder companies are based. However, determining whether it constitutes an attack on the state itself would likely involve complex legal and diplomatic considerations.

The NATO dog that did not bark
  • IF the attack would have been done by Russia then the NATO Article 5 could have been theoretically triggered despite legal the ownership under assumption that the attack was against EU citizens to worsen their economical well-being in order to press their politicians from supporting Ukraine and making a deal with Russia. 

  • IF Russia attacked its own pipeline then the insurance payment is void (No payment occurs in two instances: self-sabotage clause and a war clause). IF Russia attacked its own pipelines with the intent and motive to impose economical burden against European countries and its citizens, then Russia could be framed as a state supporting terrorism and its frozen sovereign assets could be used for healing damages of EU citizens and states.

  • IF the attack would have been done by Ukraine then the NATO Article 5 could have been theoretically also triggered as an attack on member states by a non-nato state.

  • IF the attack was done by a non-state entity it would be very likely defined as a terrorist act.

Inverse considerations
  • When the 9/11 happened the NATO had immediately a meeting and the very next day the Article 5 was invoked.
NATO meetings in news from 26 September 2022 when Nordstream pipelines were attacked onward:

NATO statement about Nordstream

NATO said on 29th Sept 2022 that a series of leaks on the Nord Stream pipelines between Russia and Europe were the result of sabotage and that attacks on its members’ infrastructure would be met with a collective response from the military alliance.

Here is a list of known official statements by Prime ministers, Presidents, Foreign ministers and other high level politicians from the time of the event. It is important to look at who was pushing forward the claim that it was a sabotage and who was hesitant.

Conclusion:

Article 5 has NOT been triggered, which means that Russian involvement has been ruled out from day one. This also means that Ukrainian involvement was ruled out from the outset. The definition of the event as a "sabotage" by NATO and other politicians means that a terrorist act by a non-state entity has been also excluded.

It is safe to conclude that the identity, motives and purpose of the event were known to top level officials from early on. 

The joint statement by NATO members on 29 September that any (retaliatory, further) attack by Russia on its infrastructure would be met with the triggering of Article 5. This is in direct contradiction to the definition of the event as "sabotage". Would sabotage of another European pipeline with similar ownership be met with a different response?


Additional info added on 27-08-2024

1 Oct 2022 - Nord Stream Sabotage: The “Hybrid War” Has Well and Truly Begun,

"... The North Atlantic Council issued a statement on September 29 stating that any deliberate attack on the alliance's critical infrastructure will require a united and determined response. But NATO faces a major problem: the burden of proof. If we want to respond to a deliberate attack, we must demonstrate who is behind it..."

SUMMARY: 

The NATO basically publicly states that one of their member has attacked Nordstream pipelines and is warning against retaliatory actions.

Tuesday, May 7, 2024

147 - The UK´s helps Ukraine to purchase more gas before the Nordstream is blown-up


20 Sept 2022 - Denys Shmyhal and Liz Truss discussed strengthening the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Great Britain

Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal and Prime Minister of Great Britain Liz Truss during the meeting on September 20 in New York (USA) discussed the development of bilateral cooperation, preparation for the heating season and the recovery of Ukraine.

Denys Shmyhal thanked Great Britain for comprehensive political support and practical help: "First of all, we are grateful for the weapons. This is our absolute priority today."

The parties touched on the issue of intensifying the supply of weapons for the defense of Ukraine and strengthening sanctions against Russian oil and gas. In the context of diversification of energy supply sources and preparation for the heating season, the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Great Britain discussed the need to increase their own gas production, in particular in Ukraine.

"We appreciate Great Britain's willingness to provide our state with the next tranche of $500 million through the World Bank for gas purchases. We are also interested in involving British business in the development of gas production in Ukraine. We expect that the Government of Great Britain will make the necessary decisions to insure British business in Ukraine against military risks," said Denys Shmyhal.


Summary:

There are no coincidences. The UK was preparing itself for the increase price of energy - see post here. Surprisingly the UK became after 44 years a new energy exporter on 29th of September, mere  days after Nordstream was destroyed - post here. The UK warned about an energy storm coming - post here and was actively preparing for increased energy prices. The UK was lagging after Brexit, its participation in an EU joint energy market ended but then suddenly the EU needed more energy and UK´s idling LNG import facilities were utilized - post here. the UK also aggressively pushed its companies to withdrew from Russian markets - post here. Liz Truss as a PM - post here

 


 

Monday, May 6, 2024

146 - German fleet tracker wk37 and wk38 in Baltic sea



wk37 - 12 ships in Baltic sea

FGS Alster
FGS Bad Bevensen
FGS Baltrum
FGS Baumholder
FGS Fulda
FGS Juist
FGS Mittelgrund
FGS Munster
FGS Pultos
FGS Rottweil
FGS Sachsen
FGS Sleswig-Holstein



wk38 - 17 ships in Baltic sea

FGS Alster
FGS Bad Bevensen
FGS Baltrum
FGS Baumholder
FGS Fulda
FGS Juist
FGS Mittelgrund
FGS Munster
FGS Pultos
FGS Rottweil
FGS Sachsen
FGS Sleswig-Holstein
+
FGS Seehund 01
FGS Dillingen
FGS Gorch Fock
FGS Oldenburg
FGS Oste





Was something there already earlier?


14 Sept 2022 - two German ships near Bornholm



14 Sept 2022 - German navy ships are still hanging around there too
• M1063 Bad Bevensen - minehunter
• FGS F216 Schleswig-Holstein - frigate
• A52 Oste - ELINT

15 Sept 2022 FGS Alster in Stockholm’s port

16 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) leaving Kiel, Germany  

21 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) coming into Kiel, Germany




22 Sept 2022 - FGS Oldenburg inbound to Devonport this morning

24 Sept 2022 - German Navy Baden-Wurttemberg-class frigate FGS Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) southbound under the Storebaelt Bridge in Denmark - September 24, 2022 #fgssachsenanhalt #f224

26 Sept 2022 - FGS Gork Fock, FGS Spessart (#A1442), FGS Sachsen(#F219) at Kiel at dawn.

26 Sept 2022 - German Navy Frankenthal-class minehunters FGS Bad Bevensen (M1063) and FGS Fulda (M 1058) leaving Kiel, Germany

26 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) leaving Kiel, Germany

 

29 Sept 2022 - German Navy Frankenthal-class minehunter FGS Rottweil (M1061) in the Kiel Canal at the Kiel Locks

1 Oct 2022 - German Navy Oste-class electronic surveillance vessel FGS Alster (A50) coming into Helsinki


Summary:

It does not look like the 13-14/09 was the time when divers from Andromeda planted explosives. 



22, 23, 24, 25 September - SWE newspapers Dagens Nyheter report that Swedish navy was in the area a few days before the sabotage.






145 - FGS Sachsen conducts ASW search near Rügen - Germany KNEW II.


German frigate FGS Sachsen (F219)
 
appears to have conducted a search off the island of Rügen,
 
where Nord Stream  lands. 

From 0600 to 0830 UTC (gmt).
27-09-2022

26 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) leaving Kiel, Germany

27 Sept 2022 - German frigate FGS Sachsen near Nordstream exit to land

30 Sept 2022 - FGS Sachsen arriving in Tallinn 


OTHER Sachsen-class frigate MOVEMENTS the time around blast:

21 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Sachsen (F219) coming into Kiel, Germany

22 Sept 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Hessen (F221) coming into Norfolk, Virginia

24 Sept 2022 - German Navy Baden-Wurttemberg-class frigate FGS Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) southbound under the Storebaelt Bridge in Denmark

30 Sept 2022 - German Navy Baden-Wurttemberg-class frigate FGS Sachsen-Anhalt (F224) coming into Kiel, Germany

3 Oct 2022 - German Navy Sachsen-class frigate FGS Hessen (F221) still pierside at Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia



Andromeda yacht movements:



Summary: The Andromeda yacht was already back n the port yet GER navy ship Sachsen conducted search for a submarine/minisub/drone.

[MRT: Related post: 179 - NOR - FIN - SWE - GER - RU - LIT - USA were simultaneously preparing for a hybrid attacks from a hidden actor. Note that a submarine threat to infrastructure and some sabotage threat were well known to most Baltic and Nordic states.]





144 - German Navy Commander: Russia's capabilities at the bottom of the sea


FGS Sachsen arriving in Tallinn on September 30, 2022

Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack, Commander of the German Navy in an interview on 3 Nov 2022.

[MRT: J.Ch. Kaack knew that the UK was threatening Nordstream pipelines. German, French and allied ships were protecting pipelines, searching for the undersea asset but in the wrong area, closer to the Lithuania. There is a strong case to believe that Norway warned not just the USA but also France and Germany about the UK plans to take down Nordstream.]  

"One of these challenges arose. One day before the Nord Stream 1 and 2 incident, I gave an interview to an influential German newspaper, where I gave a strong recommendation to thoroughly assess Russia's capabilities at the bottom of the sea," he said.

[MRT: When the challenge arose? Why would he do that? To start to blame Russia or to show that Russia has all its submarines out of the area so Russia would not be blamed which could ease the tense situation? Was there a "false intelligence" which was to prepare for an incident which could be blamed on Russia with possible fast escalation ladder which would make investigation later who did what impossible? Was he trying to prove that Russia actually does not have capability at the moment in the area?] 

"The basis for seeing possible events is a clear picture of the sea, or observation. If there is a clear picture of the air, surface or subsurface — almost clear, because you cannot always be completely sure — then you can look at anomalies in the system and then you can bring a special unit to the area where the anomaly was detected," Kaack said.

[MRT: stress should be in the word "...anomalies..." which hints to subsurface approach. It would be important to know what orders got German ad allied ships in the week before the event. Especially AFTER the USS Kaersarge left the Baltic sea as described here and Europeans were no more sheltered by US nuclear umbrella as said here. The next day was a chaos.]

 Was this German ship checking some magnetic anomaly?

 

...also note this post here.


Summary: 

The head of German Navy J. Ch. Kaack seemed to be aware of the subsurface danger to Nordstream pipelines. 

Kaack tells that the surface and air were under surveillance.

Kaack tells that there is an evidence in data anomalies about what happened.

It is unclear why German ship FGS Sachsen was in NE part of the Baltic sea in 30th of September when it was on 27th of September near the other end of Nordstream, neear its exit to Germany - here. Note that French naval ship Céphée was also in the same time operating in the NE part of the Baltic sea. Why? Was Germany expecting the attack in a wrong area?

 

 


 

143 - Euro Asian Trade bottleneck countries in Mackinder Roadblocks hypothesis

In a ´theoretical´ geopolitical exercise aimed at slowing down or stalling Euro-Asian development and integration by imposing roadblocks to trade, development and intra-state economic activities, several key countries and regions could be targeted.

Is such hypothetical scenario purely speculative or grounded in real-world policies and intentions? Nonetheless, here are some potential targets that could disrupt Euro-Asian development and overview of major export countries in the region.

These are major surplus countries on Euro-Asia and weakened states. Lines represent what I call since 2014 "Mackinder roadblocks":


How can Euro-Asian development and integration be slowed/stopped?

Six Belt and Road Initiative corridotrs (BRI)
known also as One Belt One Road (OBOR) trade corridors

Trade and development is stopped or slowed down by imposing roadblocks on these following International Trade corridors and by weakening security in the region:


International transport corridors in Ukraine

  1. Ukraine: Control over Ukraine's territory, particularly its eastern regions and ports such as Odessa, could disrupt trade routes between Europe and Asia, particularly maritime trade in the Black Sea region and train corridor. As a transit country between Russia and the European Union, Ukraine plays a significant role in facilitating trade flows between Eastern and Western Europe. New Eurasian Land Bridge corridor also called the Second or New Eurasian Continental Bridge was derailed and investment shifted from Russian-Ukrainian route into

    Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.


  2. Turkey: Control over the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) could allow for the blocking or regulation of maritime traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, impacting trade between Europe and Asia. Disruption of this trade would be impossible at the moment as Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey are NATO states and Turkey holds the key to this trade bottleneck in form of 1936 The Montreux Treaty.
  3. Caucasus
    Azerbaijan: Located on the western shores of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan serves as a transit country for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. The country's ports, such as Baku, are important hubs for maritime trade in the Caspian region.
    Georgia: Situated in the Caucasus region, Georgia serves as a key transit route for goods moving between Europe and Asia, particularly via the Caucasus corridor. The country's ports, such as Batumi and Poti, are important hubs for maritime trade in the Black Sea region. Control over Georgia's territory and its ports on the Black Sea could disrupt maritime trade routes in the Caucasus region, impacting trade between Europe and Asia.
    Armenia
    : Despite its small size, Armenia occupies a strategic position in the South Caucasus and serves as a transit country for goods moving between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.
  4. Syria:

    Syria's geographic location historically played a significant role in trade along the ancient Silk Road routes, particularly as a connecting point between the Mediterranean Sea and the rest of the Eurasian landmass. T

    he ongoing conflict and political instability in Syria have severely disrupted trade and economic activity in the region. Overland trade between the Middle East and Europe through this route is more or less stalled.

  5. Iraq: Situated at the crossroads of the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, Iraq has long been a vital link for trade between these regions. This Iraq's geographic location has historically positioned it as a crucial trade hub along the ancient Silk Road routes. However, due to various factors such as conflict, political instability, and infrastructure challenges, Iraq's role as a trade bottleneck on the old Silk Road has been diminished in recent times. Instability on land routes connecting to Turkey and Syria has disrupt trade flows between the Middle East and Europe.
  6. Iran: Positioned at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, Iran plays a crucial role in trade between Europe and Asia, particularly for goods moving by land or sea. Disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, controlled by Iran, could impact trade flows between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, affecting global energy markets and trade routes between Europe and Asia.

  7. Afghanistan: Control over Afghanistan's territory and its major transportation routes, such as the Khyber Pass and other border crossings, could disrupt overland trade between South Asia and Central Asia, as well as between Central Asia and the Middle East.

  8. Pakistan: Control over Pakistan's territory, particularly its ports on the Arabian Sea and land routes connecting to Central Asia and China, could impact trade flows between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

  9. Russia:

    With its vast landmass spanning both Europe and Asia, Russia plays a pivotal role in transcontinental trade. Key transportation routes, such as the Trans-Siberian Railway and various highways, pass through Russia, making it a critical bottleneck for goods moving between Asia and Europe. Important Northern corridor, North-South transport corridor.
  10. Kazakhstan: As the largest landlocked country in the world, Kazakhstan occupies a strategic position in Eurasia. It serves as a transit country for goods moving between China and Europe, with key transportation routes like the Eurasian Land Bridge passing through its territory. CCAWEC provides an alternative land route route between China and Europe which avoids Russian territory

  11. North Korea: Disruptions to maritime traffic and trade flows in Northeast Asia, particularly through control over ports and coastlines, is impacting trade between East Asia and the rest of the world, including Europe. The frozen conflict is a roadblock for NE Asian progress and development in the region.

  12. Taiwan: Control over Taiwan's territory and its ports could disrupt maritime trade routes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, impacting trade flows between East Asia and the rest of the world, including Europe.

SUMMARY:

Large countries on Euro-Asia: Russia, China, Iran and India are impossible to control. These sovereign countries pursuit their own sovereign interests and can not be controlled in medium to long term directly.

Several countries in Eurasia serve as significant trade route bottlenecks due to their strategic geographic location and due to the level of their transportation infrastructure.

These countries act as crucial nodes in the Eurasian trade network, and any disruptions or congestion in their transportation infrastructure can have significant implications for regional and global trade flows.

Several smaller states were lately purposefully destabilized, weakened. The maintenance of infrastructure was neglected, investments were prevented.

These ARTIFICIALLY created bottlenecks impact the flow of goods and commerce between Europe and Asia. They prevent or limit trade between surplus regions:



MACKINDER ROADBLOCKS (Artificially wakened states on old Silk Roads)

Ukraine: Ukrainian-Russian conflict

Russia: Economical and political sanctions

Caucasus: Azerbaijan-Armenian issue

Syria: Civil war

Iraq: Weak fragmented state'

Iran: Sanctioned

Afghanistan: Weakened state


Artificially induced migration as a weapon



More about this topic in this post:

Part I. - Mackinder Roadblocks against Euro-Asian development & integration - introSilk Road routes