Monday, January 30, 2023

100 shades of Nordstream sabotage - part I

PREFACE/ISSUE

This post describes relevant thoughts about the NordStream affair.
Links = web link to news article. Check for more info!
I wrote these points in a document which I posted in October to my Twitter pined tweet
The purpose was to sort out things systematically to be able to understand what happened 

 

"Those 50 knowns and unknowns" 




#1  - The NATO has NOT conducted any official investigation into who is responsible. The organization has not openly officially blamed Russia. There are only 3 entries on the web pages - here.

#2 - The USA, UK have NOT conducted any official investigations into who is responsible. It is very surprising that such country as US with largest spy network, best technology, including satellites does not know who is behind the pipelines destruction. Same goes to UK with Northwood Headquarters .

#3  - Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Russia, and Nordstream AB have conducted their own official separate investigations. Sweden and Denmark did their due to Jurisdiction of blasts in their EEZ waters. So, five different investigations and no results of who is responsible have been shared with public except Russia blaming UK/AngloSaxons. It did made sense not to share speculations shortly after but now investigations have been supposedly concluded, results are non public until the investigation concludes.

#4  - There was a big distrust among EU countries. They did not initially share intelligence - report here. Later the Swedish and Danish officials started to cooperate - here. This hints that from the early on that NATO have distrusted each other as one may have been involved.

#5  - 
It is in each European country interest to learn who has been the saboteur. Each state had to make a working theory upon which a foreign policy continued. The lack of joint investigation team (JIT) is a sign that an ally is a suspect, and nobody knows whom to trust. Each state which investigates tries to protect its own interests, coordinates to some degree. The saboteur was most likely capable to effect the investigation. Aka, next clue that it was less likely Russia.

#6 - Leading Danish international practice lawyers, who noted that there are no norms in international law that allow a removal of Russia, as the owner of the gas pipelines, from the investigation - source. The company is listed in SUI so Switzerland could be part of investigation if it wants to.

#7  - Top leaders of EU, NATO had to be informed who is behind the sabotage yet there is a silence about who was it. If the saboteur is not Russia then it is a plain cover up for political purposes. Uncomfortable truth. This is bordering or is a direct criminal cover up. Politicians became captive. The information has been classified as top secret and EU official could be prosecuted if they disclose who was it. This saboteur had to think what next, had to have prepared a way out and it seems it worked so far. In other posts I elaborate on this and name names of possible suspects and their roles (my private investigation, my suspects).

#8  - Satellites have a capability to see under water, notice magnetic anomaly differences (MAD). Both NATO and Russia have the capability. No information about this has been shared with public. More about ASW detection here. Investigation teams of Sweden, Denmark and Germany had to ask for data. The data is therefore existing but it now classified. This is a "direct undeniable evidence" which public is not allowed to see. 

#9  - It is unclear what were the main and secondary objectives of the sabotage. They would differ if it was Russia, Germany, Poland, Ukraine, USA, UK, Norway or any other suspect. It is unclear if main and secondary objectives were even reached. Searching the suspect by trying to pick first the possible objective is unworkable. It is easier to go forward by eliminating who it is most likely NOT the saboteur ("If you exclude all impossible what is left, even improbable, must be the truth")

#10  - It is also unclear who are victims of the crime. Is it Europe, Russia, or EU citizens? From this point of view it is also better to start with a set of potential suspects rather than trying to pick who profits the most. From legal point of view this also makes a big difference. I elaborate on one possible driver.

#11 - There is only a limited amount of suspects. The Russia, EU states, Non-EU NATO states (US, UK, Norway), plus others (Ukraine, Turkey, Israel, China). EU states could be divided between these who are bordering Baltic Sea and those which do not have ports in Baltic Sea.

#12 - All non-NATO states could be safely excluded. Very low probability. They would not risk confrontation with the most powerful alliance. E.g. Turkey, Israel, China and other states could be safely excluded.

#13 - Ukraine has a very good alibi. It, would be proclaimed to be a terrorist state not worrying to bomb it´s allies infrastructure to get fees (about €1B/y) for transporting Russian gas. Both Germany and Russia would be seriously upset. Also Ukraine would certainly want to target the South Stream as well at the same time or even earlier than Nordstream.

#14 - Poland has also a very good alibi. It is sandwiched between Russia (Belarus) and Germany. Two strong countries who had interest and investment for the pipeline to continue in some unspecified time in future. Both would be very angry at Poland who has just opened its pipeline from Norway. 

#15 - For Germany the Nordstream could bring huge advantages. The cheap energy has been a driver for its economical success. The Nordstream 1 & 2 at full transition would make German products and the economy in whole more competitive even against their EU allies. The Nordstream would give Germany, which would become key entry point, certain economical/political leverage to arm-twist other EU states to follow their leadership. Self-sabotage is unimaginable.

#16 - The silence from Germany hints that the saboteur was of the same political weight or larger. Size-wise it would be only UK, and USA. France and Italy could be excluded. France is a Nordstream shareholder and Italy is less likely. Both had a chance to stop the project from within the EU by political process. Non EU states, UK and USA, did not have this opportunity which increases the probability it was one of them or both.

#17 - The attack against key EU energy infrastructure is defined differently by different actors. Russia has stated it is act of international terrorism. West has jointly stated it is an act of sabotage. These do have different legal definitions and would lead to different outcome for claims would the case go to international court. See current issues of qualification and difference between the act of terrorism and sabotage (details). Odds of terrorist attacks are very difficult to predict but the potential liabilities can be enormous. Governments are often providing backstop for the terrorism insurance market (details).

#18 - The West is trying to frame Russia as a sponsor of terrorism to confiscate its frozen assets. If Russia blew Nordstream it would be easy easy to blame and frame it for blowing key EU energy infrastructure. Western countries are not doing this. So again, less likely that it was Russia.

#19 - From the legal point there is no insurance claim payment if it would be found that it was an act of Russian or one of Nordstream shareholder´s self-sabotage, see here. There would also be no payments would the act be part of a war.  If Russia is found to be involved in the Nord Stream 1 damages, it could be considered an act of war, something that is typically excluded by insurance, here. Russian state assets could be used for damages.

    
Terrorism insurance is generally included in policies. To reduce the vulnerability of insurers in 2002, a specialist company covering terror-related property damage called EXTREMUS was created by the Government and the Association of German Insurers. The primary objective of EXTREMUS is to protect medium-sized companies against property and business interruption losses caused by terrorism. The first € 2 billion is covered by primary insurers and domestic and foreign reinsurers. Losses between € 2 and 10 billion are covered by state guarantee.

#20 - All insurers and reinsurers, underwriters of Nordstream 1 and 2 are unknown. According to industry sources familiar with the matter, Munich Re and syndicates within the Lloyd's of London market are among the major underwriters for Nord Stream 1. The Swiss insurer Zurich, also had exposure to Nord Stream 1. Russian Nobility, Constanta were sanctioned in 2022.

#21 - The fact is that destruction of the Nordstream was an unprovoked purposeful criminal act by a state actor. It was calculated, well planed and was aimed to reach certain for now unknown objectives. It does seem very unlikely that this was an issue between Russia and Ukraine only. There was no retaliation afterward to other state infrastructure, damages can not be net out. 

#22 - About 778 million cubic meters of gas leaked from Nordstream explosions yet there are no environmental damage claims by Sweden and Denmark against the saboteur. Natural gas in high concentrations is toxic to fish. No environmental organization, fishers association has filed a legal claim against unknown saboteur. No public body representing European public has filed a legal claim to unknown saboteur for damages by high energy prices. The west has frozen Russian assets yet there is no legal case against it concerning environmental damages. 

#23 - About 95 per cent of Norwegian gas production is exported via pipelines directly to the EU and UK. For NOR the UK is #1 export marketNorway accounts for the majority of the UK gas imports at around 1,440,000 metric tons.

#24 - Would UK blow the pipeline they would be worrying that Russia could retaliate in kind (eye for eye, pipeline for pipeline). It looks like this scenario was expected. NOR-UK started immediately protect their pipelines - here.

#25 - The NATO as an alliance has not immediately started to guard these pipelines but was ready to deploy The JEF – made up of the U.K., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden - a multi-national force on short notice to the North Atlantic.

#26 - The pipelines pass through the territorial waters and/or Exclusive Economic Zones of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany.  Would Russia sabotage pipelines environmental permits would be revoked. See permits on NS homepage. Neither one state revoked permits.

#27 - See also here the carefully selected location of 3 blasts compared to territorial waters of DK and SWE. Looks like blast locations were carefully selected so they would be not in international waters. It is unclear why 4th blow is in different place. 

#28 - Neither one of these five countries had withdrawn any permits. Neither one of these countries has asked Russia or Nordstream AB for Mitigating Environmental Impacts. Most affected countries were Sweden and Denmark. See Nordstream EIA. This is a next hint that the saboteur is know.

#29 - About 60% of the total cargo movement on the international scale for Russia takes place through the sea. Here is more about Russian main ports. Main trade ports are in Baltic sea and Black sea - map

#30 - Three major trade ports of Russia in Baltic Sea are: Port of Saint Petersburg (nr2),Port of Ust-Luga (nr3), and Port of Primorsk (nr5). Since 1720, the Baltic Sea has frozen over entirely 20 times, most recently in early 1987. For Russian trade it is crucial that sea trade lines are open.

#31 - These 3 ports are located in the Baltic sea. Damaging marine life of two states in their territorial waters could result in closing Baltic straights for Russian trade of these 3 ports. EU would not hesitate to impose Naval blockade to punish Russia and lower its ability to wage a war.


#32 - There are many classes and forms of evidence, they affect the case differently. For example: Presumptive, Demonstrative, Documentary, Impression, Testimonial, Character, Habit, Hearsay, Forensic, Trace, Expert witness, Exculpatory, Digital, Corroborating,... Is this sufficient to make conclusion with certainty? 

#33 - The direct evidence is available to investigators, it is classified. NATO members share data, satellite data, deployment of assets. If a Western state actor was found responsible, Reuters highlighted, the damage might be designated as an act of terror, which one broking source said might be covered by insurance. If Russia is implicated, insurance companies could argue it was “self-sabotage”, given Gazprom is state owned. If this is the case, as it was a deliberate act by the policyholder, they would not be allowed to file an insurance claim.

#34 - The saboteur of the Nordstream pipelines limited timeframe to install explosives. It would make sense to lay charges as close to the explosion day as possible to minimize exposure and possible removal but letting some time for safe escape. 

#35 - The Nordstream has a official check-ups in mid June - link. It is unclear if these checks include a visual underwater monitoring. It would make sense that explosives had to be delivered after this date. A window of opportunity is between Mid June to 25 September. The next day the sabotage happened.

#36 - Can Sweden, who wants to join a NATO, be objective in its investigation? Would it be possible to disclose a result of the investigation in case a NATO member is the saboteur? They seem to be the last known boats at the crime scene.

#37 - Swedish warships from Karlskrona naval base moved for four days, from 22nd to 26th, exactly in the area where the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up before the explosions on the night of Monday - news and mapIt is unclear which boats were used. The base hosts Stockholm-class corvette, 2 ships and Visby-class corvette, 2 ships. Both are well equipped for patrol and anti-submarine warfare.

#38 - It looks like the Swedish navy was tracking unidentified asset from Tuesday 22.09 to Friday 26/09. It is several days before the sabotage which happened on Monday 28/09 as SWE newspapers map, map, full map of movement here.

#39 - Questions: Why were they in the area? Were they on regular patrol or were they called due to possible unidentified threat? Was this operation Swedish or was it a cooperation between Sweden and Denmark? Were Swedish navy boats called due to joint protection of DK-SWE waters because the port is closest? Who initiated the mission and what was its objective? Are those Swedish sonar recordings from this event? 

#40 - The depth in which pipelines were blown is around 80m - 110m (265-360 feet) below sea level. Bronholm basin is deepest 105m, mean depth is 46m. Is this enough for a submarine to operate? Normally, an SSN (a nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarine) must have at least 15-18m (50-60 feet) of water under its keel for navigational safety; the corresponding depth for an SSK (a diesel-electric submarine specialized for anti-submarine duties) is 9m - 12m (30-40 feet).

#41 - What kind of delivery system was used when two areas are about 50km from each other? Explosives were heavy, some underwater delivery vehicle had to be used. The buoyancy of such vehicle had to be top notch as no margin of error was allowed. Only experienced divers used to work with explosives were most likely deployed. The complexity and chance of discovery is increased if 2 places were reached. Was the delivery possible from surface? Why was that explosives are on two places? Is the 2nd place a secondary targeted area as the first was no more available? Were saboteurs disturbed?

#42 - The Nordstream 1 and 2 were blown the same day on Monday 26th of September 2022. The southern first at 03:00, and the northern NS1 at 17:00. Could this may mean that the southern pipeline was set later but timer of charges were set to go earlier off to allow escape in case it was submarine?

#43 - The location of both blasts are as far West as possible. It is also closest to Danish straights. This again hints the attacker tried to minimize exposure and time spent in Baltic Sea. Seems the more to the west the better.

#43 - Locations where pipelines were blown are on deeper waters hinting that submarine was involved (82m deep). There are places where pipelines are closer to surface which would be better for divers descending from boat. If a submarine 

#44 - Nord Stream’s has minimum operational lifespan of 50 years - source.

#45 - EU states are less likely to be suspects. No EU member state would attack without prior note to others the joint EU critical/key energy infrastructure. No state is strong enough to face France and Germany, two main #NS shareholders.

#46 - Only a naval power with nuclear deterrence could of sabotaged pipelines. There is high complexity of response, high risk for retaliation. Limited suspects: FRA, RF, UK, and USA. It is very unlikely that a non-nuclear state would sabotage a key infrastructure of Russia without responses from its allies.

#47 - Danish straights are very tightly monitored. Denmark has hydro-acoustic sensors. No Russian asset would pass undetected. So Denmark must also have records of past suspicious activities. They had to look at their database of submarine sound recordings and potentially ask NATO allies for their recordings. NATO had to be informed about results of their findings due to information sharing.
 
#48 - The Denmark has hydro-acoustic records of #UK submarine operating in  the area before the sabotage ("Sweden and Denmark have the audio recordings"). Russia has also some sensors on the seabed as stated here. Sweden has those recordings because Sweden had in the area boats with anti-submarine capability. 

#49 - US considering offering to analyze underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations, here. But then A Navy spokesperson declined to confirm to CNN that the US had offered to look into the audio recordings here... Perhaps because it does not want to blow the cover of its ally?

#50 - Sweden, Denmark say Nord Stream leaks caused by ‘several hundred kilos of explosives’ - linkThis again hints that there was a submarine in the area, or some mini-submarine or submersible delivery vehicle which could bring such large amount of explosives precisely to the delivery point. It also hints that Swedish National Forensic Centre has a key forensic direct evidence -  “residues of explosives have been identified on several of the foreign objects seized,” - here.


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Underlined and summarized:




Additional note from 28/03/2023:

 Russia should get -1 point due to demands for independent investigation

Conclusion:

Based on these factors the UK looks like the prime suspect with 10 points
The next suspect in line is USA with just 6 points, Norway got 5 points. 


8 comments:

  1. Nice work. Like the JAGMAN-style numbered list. Not going to address all, but a few comments (more critical, but that's because more interesting, rather than all the points of agreement).

    I think if this was done by someone in the West, it would not be done without US notification/approval. I just can't imagine anyone doing it ad hoc. Too much blowback if Uncle Sam surprised.

    I agree that the very tame and slight comments about Russia and the lack of interest/anger in finding out who did it, from the West implies the West did this. After all, how much effort is OJ making to find the "real killer".

    There has been some blabla from commenters about Russia getting higher spot prices or the like. But it's insane for them to blow up a decades long asset like this. They may never have it again. After the war, they will want to resume normal relations. But now a major link is gone. Probably forever.

    I would really like to see detailed maps of the pipes (all 4) as well as the bottom. This has been something missing in the coverage.

    Note that your article is wrong about them not being in international waters...they ARE in international waters. This fits with a sub mission also. Penetration submerged inside 12 NM of a nonparticipant would be much dicir. But international waters is just fine to operate. Of course, this also just might be where the pipes were.

    Also, this is a small nit, but #17 link to insurance document actually treats sabotage and terrorism the same, in contrast to your text (war would be different).

    Agreed on the depth. It's feasible for a sub. Not ideal, but fine. Going under ice is actually much hairier in terms of shallow water transit, plus you are under ice!

    The salinity makes submerged operations trickier. Less buoyancy overall (and the sub would be stuffed with gear). Also salinity gradients/currents/"patches" can make depth control trickier. (This could affect divers, SDV, ROV also.)

    I think the major "huh" factors for me are:

    1. Why the 17 hour delay?

    2. Why the locations so far apart?

    3. Why not all four lines blown.

    I have to think there's something to be learned here. I find it unlikely the op was designed like this (except perhaps #2). Probably indicates some sort of issues (charges failed to go off, lines confused by divers, disturbance, what have you). I don't think the time difference fits with a submerged transit...too long and also could have still just used a time delay. More likely they needed a second pass with the P-8 (or whatever) to try to activate. But I donno.

    I'm not convinced it was a submarine operation. Could place mines with divers or ROVs or the like from a surface vessel. Either is possible.

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  2. Thank you for the feedback and excellent description.
    The #17 I will try to fix, I am having a draft post for the legal stuff to handle that separately. Need more time. Now trying to fix stuff, editing, etc. Your input is very valuable. I appreciate that, especially the critical part. I try to increase awareness and hint that there are reasons why UK should be included in between suspects.
    The 17h delay/location/ 3of4 blown could be different reasons, I extrapolated and put several possible explanations in twitter. Will try to add that to post 100 shades part 2. My working theory iis that SWE navy disturbed the sub/minisub so they went to location #2, mixed accidentally the pipeline NS2. Charges seemed to be double so I do not think they failed. The Poseidon P-8 from Iceland is a big give-away. The US did not trust NATO data from UK - Northwood so they sent own to see RU reaction real time. US national security. But that is a speculation... read other posts.

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  3. Russia did it. Clear as day. These pipelines were doomed anyway, and the Russians knew this. Europe was since Feb 24 working frantically to rid themselves of Russian natural gas imports. Ask yourself who would possibly benefit from leaving one pipeline intact? Why would a non Russian actor leave a single pipeline intact?

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  4. OK, so many people state with zero knowledge of contracts, investments, etc how RU did it despite all speaking against so I will make a separate post just for that. I ask each time those who propose this possibility - WHY? What is the motive?

    Economical motive - NOT
    1. The Ukrainian pipeline system is some 50+ years old, needs desperately investment and their law does not protect foreign investors, that is also a reason why FIN company Neste proposed in 1998 a Nordstream project to RU. Later it changed.

    2. The minimal lifetime of NS pipeline is 50+ years, with proper maintenance easily much more.

    3. Cost of pipelines is some NS1 €6.5B and NS2 €11B and sucked Gazprom investment money of last 7 years. All their profitability calculations etc. future profitability depended on it.

    4. The transport fees different states get are over €2B a year of which Ukraine was getting €1.2B/y. So a nice ROI once pipelines will run on full capacity.

    5. Now after NS pipes are damaged what? Who will invest and what money to Ukrainian old network? Ukraine? Europeans? Gazprom money reserved for investments is no more.

    6. The damage to internal market. The inability to export created oversupply in the domestic market, storages full and no large volume were agreed, no other pipelines connected. And to stop producing gas from a well is sometimes not possible. Its not like stopping your fosset, you can damage whole reserve, not just the well. That is why RU had to "flare" excess gas. Damage to other RU gas producers as well. And Gazprom made some 30% of RU state budget. Yeah, and all those pension funds who owned shares, and foreign investors were also quite unhappy.

    7. Piped contracts are closed for many years ahead, one can not compare them to spot prices which are now artificially elevated so a RU is saving by not exporting" is a very bad take. Prices fluctuate and for comparison some adjusted price could be used, not actual spot as I have seen several times dab takes.

    8. Customers do buy gas and often separately but the transport through different pipelines. The contract is not necessary invalidated by force majeure or when someone blows the pipe. Customers do demand what they bought to be delivered through different pipelines, now question is who will pay for higher transport fees? And RU is in a worse position as their storage capacities are at max.

    9. The domestic market price structure collapsed, the oversupply destroyed balance sheets of other producers, their loan structures, the domestic cost tanked, it helped industry and households but the economy got some domino effect as this external shock transferred the pain to other industries like banking , wealth asset management companies took hit, etc.

    10. What economical motive could RU have? They are The largest energy exporter, the EU is the Largest energy importer. A wedding of convenience. Each exporter tries to diversify, each important tries to diversify as well at the same time. The geography is given and settles at the end relations.

    11. Have you ever worked in a private company? The largest energy exporter destroying a joint NS1, NS2 projects with main customers (Germany, Austria, France, Netherland.. and the rest of EU) aka with most creditworthy and rich customers who are in bigger and bigger need to get energy?

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    Replies
    1. OK, so not an economical factor. Political?
      Please explain. The project was for 50 years minimally as stated on their web page. It got also yearly check-ups and RU paid next year re-insurances. Btw, do you know that in August the NS2 went in SUI to insolvency and had a bankruptcy proceeding? So, why to not just let that happen and why did RU and other shareholders fought for next 1/2 extension? Now in January 2023 next 1/2 extension was agreed. Why would they again pay for that would they want the project be dead? Why did they just told that they hope to mothball the pipes instead of just letting them rust?

      Are you going to take on my explanation? There much more in it, I am just scratching a surface, but tell me why would RU self sabotage its pipes what insurance strictly excludes payment in this case and in case of war (RU did not respond to attack)?

      Why would a country destroy its most modern, most profitable infrastructure project?

      Also, why would any EUropean country risk to put EU investment credit rating in down by notch or a few? What hit on NS means for world investors is that EU has been unable to SECURE private investment of its LARGEST infrastructure project. That the bureaucratic EU can not make up if they want the project or not. It plays in card just to two competitors - UK and US. The UK as I have shown has actively prepared its economic policy, warning importing companies and insurance companies to get out.

      So tell me, again same question, what is the RU motive?
      I see none and I did search and thought about that for a long time.

      Delete
  5. One more, please explain me why would Russia choose those Territorial waters of Denmark and Sweden to cause environmental damage?

    Would that not guarantee a NAVAL BLOCKADE for their merchant shipping? Why would they risk a cumulative effect of being blamed and then framed as "state supporting terrorism and making eco damage"... ?

    Was it not that West already froze Russian assets and only IF the UK would declare the RU to be a terrorist state, then frozen assets could be confiscated?

    Are Russian top strategists schizophrenic with masochists tendencies? Seriously?

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  6. It is normal for countries to conduct independent investigations. This happens a lot with for example plane crashes where each country involved will send their own team, they don't share to preserve the independence of the investigation and they often reach different conclusions. Basically, if each country can investigate alone then multiple investigations means more data, more study, more theories which is a good thing as a single one's conclusion might not please the country that agreed to go joint..

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  7. Thank you, that is very correct, I have explored it here:
    https://nordstreambymortymer.blogspot.com/2023/04/the-definition-severity-and.html

    The non-standard here is that the Nordstream AG is a company incorporated in Switzerland and has several private parties (RU, GER, NED, FRA shareholders) and Nordstream 2 AG is fully owned by Gazprom. This complicates investigation legally. In Gazprom RU state has 50+% share.
    So the SUI should be investigating on behalf of NS1, NS2 but is not. RU should ask, as majority shareholder in NS2, to be part of this separate investigation. There are 2 legal subjects affected and jurisdiction is EEZ of DK, SWE.
    The RU appeal to have international investigation failed as it was focusing on wrong aim. Do Note that Norway is nationalizing pipelines outside TZ (territorial zone) as the "saboteur/terrorist-?/unclear now" has exploited a legal hole in the investigation.

    Conclusion:
    From legal point of view. The EU MUST have known who has done the deed early on and decided to keep it secret. It is possible that UK is paying in some way to substitute those losses EU countries got.

    Regardless this is wrong, it was a crime. Period. Hence my investigation.

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