Sunday, November 26, 2023

090 - The UK Ministry of Defence - Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and Nordstream

LEGAL REQUEST

Sabotage of Nordstream2 Pipeline -

C. Williams made this Freedom of Information request to Ministry of Defence



-> HERE

"Dear Ministry of Defence,

It has recently been revealed by Jim Richards, via privilidged information from the US security community, that the UK was behind the recent sabotage of the Nordstream2 pipeline, with US approval. Such an act would be a clear violation of international law. Can the MOD now verify that this was indeed the case, and in doing so, explain to its citizens such as me, why I should be compelled to fund a criminal organisation? I would be very interested in hearing your justifications and seeing the responsible persons prosecuted and recieve jail time.

I look forward ot hearing from you.

Yours faithfully,

C. Williams"

ANSWER BY 

Ministry of Defence 

Main Building 
Whitehall 
London SW1A 2HB 
United Kingdom  

-> HERE

Dear C Williams

Thank you for your email of 29 November requesting the following information:

It has recently been revealed by Jim Richards, via privilidged information from the US
security community, that the UK was behind the recent sabotage of the Nordstream2
pipeline, with US approval. Such an act would be a clear violation of international law.
Can the MOD now verify that this was indeed the case, and in doing so, explain to its
citizens such as me, why I should be compelled to fund a criminal organisation? I
would be very interested in hearing your justifications and seeing the responsible
persons prosecuted and recieve jail time.

I am treating your correspondence as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). I apologise for the delay in you receiving this response.

This letter is to inform you that the Ministry of Defence can neither confirm nor deny that
information related to your request is held, because we believe the information falls within the
scope of the following qualified exemptions: Section 24(2) (National Security), Section 26(3)
(Defence) and Section 27(4) (International Relations)
.
scope of the following qualified exemptions: Section 24(2) (National Security), Section 26(3)
(Defence) and Section 27(4) (International Relations).

Sections 24, 26 and 27 are qualified exemptions and are subject to public interest testing which
means that the information requested can only be withheld if the public interest in doing so
outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Section 24(2) (National Security) has been applied to your request for information, which provides an exemption from the duty to confirm or deny whether information is held, where confirming or denying that information of a given description would make the UK or its citizens more vulnerable to a national security threat. 

For the purpose of this exemption, action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting the security of the UK. The public interest test found that confirmation or denial of whether the relevant information is held might increase public understanding and transparency of the UK’s response to the Russian invasion, support provided to Ukraine, and our relationship with Russia.

However, confirming or denying unsubstantiated accusations by unfriendly countries is likely to encourage further disinformation campaigns against the UK, potentially harming the security of the UK and its interests. The balance of the public interest was found to be in favour of engaging this exemption.

Section 26(3) has been applied to your request for information, which provides an exemption from the duty to confirm or deny whether information is held, where doing so would, or would be likely to, prejudice the defence of the British Islands or of any colony, or the capability of, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. This can include the defence or reinforcement of other countries.

The public interest test found that confirmation of whether the relevant information is held would increase public understanding and transparency of the UK’s response to the Russian invasion and support provided to Ukraine. However, confirming or denying unsubstantiated accusations by unfriendly countries is likely to encourage further disinformation campaigns against the UK, potentially placing UK personnel at risk. The balance of the public interest was found to be in favour of engaging this exemption.

Section 27(4) has been applied to your request for information, which provides an exemption from the duty to confirm or deny whether information is held, if doing so would or would be likely to prejudice the relations between the United Kingdom and any other State, relations between the United Kingdom and any international organisation or international court, and the interests of the United Kingdom abroad. The public interest test found that there is naturally considerable public interest in the events covered by your request and therefore an expectation of transparency wherever possible. However, confirming or denying unsubstantiated accusations by unfriendly countries is likely to encourage further disinformation campaigns against the UK, potentially harming the UK’s relations with other nations. It could also encourage unfriendly countries to engage in similar campaigns against the UK’s partners. The balance of the public interest was found to be in favour of engaging this exemption.

Setting aside these exemptions, under Section 16 of the Act (Advice and Assistance) you may find it helpful to note the UK’s position that the damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea is of serious concern. Intentional damage to civilian infrastructure is reckless and
irresponsible. We await the findings of the ongoing Swedish/Danish/German-led investigations into deliberate damage of the Nord Stream pipelines.


FURTHER INQUIERIES: 



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Tuesday, November 21, 2023

089 - IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS - Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU

June 2022 - IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS - Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU

ABSTRACT

The EU’s subsea data cable network is both vital for global connectivity and vulnerable. This study provides a systematic review of the current security threats, as well as the actors at the origin of these threats. Building on reports and expert input, the paper takes stock of current awareness, preparedness and response mechanisms, both at the EU and Member State level. A number of recommendations suggest how to improve the resilience of the cable network. Proposals build on the need to enhance EU-wide awareness, improve coordination and share information across EU institutions and Member States. In addition, surveillance capabilities must be advanced, response and repair mechanisms strengthened, and the topic mainstreamed across external action. 

AUTHORS ANDCONTRIBUTORS

Authors

Christian BUEGER, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark & Honorary Professor, University of Seychelles, Seychelles;

Tobias LIEBETRAU, Postdoctoral Researcher, Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Paris, France;

Jonas FRANKEN, Research Assistant, Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC), Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany.

Research Assistance

Anna SARASIBAR, Junior Consultant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands;

Jan ESSINK, Junior Consultant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands;

Tyren KONING, Student Assistant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands.

The chapters 2 and 3 draw on research funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Hessian Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and the Arts within their joint support of the

National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE and by the LOEWE initiative (Hesse, Germany) within the emergenCITY centre. Dipl.-Inf. Thomas REINHOLD (Technical University Darmstadt) provided valuable advice and support for both chapters.

PEER REVIEWER

Lars GJESVIK, Research Fellow at NUPI's Centre for Digitalization and Cyber Security Studies from the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo, Norway.

PROJECT COORDINATOR (CONTRACTOR)

• Alexandra RIMPLER-SCHMID, Senior Consultant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands.

This paper was requested by the European Parliament's sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

VERSION  English-language manuscript completed in April 2022

5.1.2 Modes of attack: Physical destruction



[MRT: Note that in September there were many exercises in the Baltic Sea:

Most of these exercises included ASW (anti-submarine-warfare).

At the same time there was large air activity wits also ASW capable assets here]


LEAD AUTHOR OF THE ANALYSYS: 


Christian Bueger - Professor of International Relations specialised in maritime security and ocean governance at University of Copenhagen

 5 October 2022Nord Stream pipeline sabotage: how an attack could have been carried out and why Europe was defenceless

But it is still unclear how the attacks were carried out. The investigations will probably take months to complete, but there are two likely scenarios. 

A first option is that the attacks could have been carried out as an underwater operation using advanced submarine technology.

This implies that we are looking at a state and its navy. Although the attacks took place outside the territorial waters of the Nato members Denmark and Sweden, they could be interpreted as an act of war.

The second scenario is an operation launched from a privately owned surface vessel, such as a fishing boat being used as a platform for divers or submersibles to place explosives. In this case, the attack vessel was hiding in everyday maritime traffic.

This scenario points us to so called “grey-zone” tactics: an attack by a group acting indirectly on behalf of state interests. The involvement of any government will then be very difficult to verify. This scenario implies that the Nord Stream attack was likely to have been the first ever recorded grey-zone activity in the European subsea.

[MRT: The Swedish investigator Mats Ljungqvist states that the state actor scenario is the main one.]


RELATED STATEMENTS OF THE SWEDISH INVESTIGATOR:

6 April 2023 - State actor involvement in Nord Stream pipeline attacks is 'main scenario', says Swedish investigator

There are certain companies that have certain special missions that mean they could, in theory, carry this out … We don’t rule out anything, but that it is a state actor who is directly or at least indirectly behind this is of course our absolute main scenario, given all the circumstances.

Chief Nord Stream investigator Mats Ljungqvist speaks:

 Same singular state-actor suspected on all sites.

7 April 2023 - State actor still main suspect behind Nord Stream sabotage, says investigato

The Swedish prosecutor, who was carrying the Nord Stream sabotage attack's investigation, said the “clear main scenario” was that there was the involvement of a state-sponsored group, as he expressed his doubt over theories that suggested an independent group's involvement in the pipeline blasts.

[MRT: CONCCLUSION base on the Christian Bueger´s first scenario is that "...the attacks could have been carried out as an underwater operation using advanced submarine technology..." ] 

[MRT: Collected statements of the SWE investigator are here]

Same author:

6 April 2023 - Next steps for the EU’s maritime security – briefing the European Council

 

 CONCLUSION:

->  A state using advance submarine technology has been involved  <-

->  The gray-zone attack by a Pro-Ukrainian group has been excluded  <- 


On 28-09-2022 CNN reports that:

"Russian submarines were also observed not far from those areas last week, one of the intelligence officials said... US officials declined to comment on the intelligence about the ships on Wednesday."

On 5 Oct 2022 - CNN - The USA considering offering to analyse underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations. Article speaks about “sonar signature”.

News and Analysis - Listening to the ocean – the secretive enablers in the underwater battle
 

->  There was a submarine in the area and it was not Russian  <-  

Note: The paper describes on outlines the FRA security of subsea infrastructure. This could explain the presence of the FRA navy on GER led September exercise Northern Coasts which later got extension for unknown reason and also the statement of the captain that France is in danger not alike Finland - see details in the post here


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Monday, November 20, 2023

088 - The partnership between United Kingdom and Sweden - Conflict of interests

 

Issue: The UK is a prime suspect, the NATO is interest in keeping the alliance intact. 

7 March 2023 - NATO - Joint press conference

with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Prime Minister of SwedenUlf Kristersson

Journalist

Question to both of you. What do you believe about the possibilities to reach a deal regarding ammunition to Ukraine at the meeting tomorrow, the meeting of the defense ministers? How do you comment the information that the Nord Stream could have been attacked by a pro-Ukrainian group?

Swedish Prime Minister

I don't know whether it's completely clear. With Kaja Kallas’ initiative from Estonia, that we should help each other, that European countries should help each other, for this, and from the European Commission’s initiative. I don't know all the minutiae, whether the agreement has been reached and how they should be turned out, so let me come back to you. When it comes to this second issue, I don't have any further comments right now. In Sweden there is now an ongoing criminal investigation when it comes to Nord Stream, so I don't plan to comment on this information at this stage

NATO Secretary General

Well, when it comes to Nord Stream 2 pipelines, the situation is that - what we know – is that there has been an attack, that this was sabotage, and that this was an attack against critical infrastructure for Europe. But there are ongoing investigations and inquiries, and it shouldn’t be right to speculate who is behind that until the investigations and inquiries have been concluded. What we can say for certainty is that these attacks show the vulnerability of crucial infrastructure (Sunak 2017) - internet cables, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, thousands of kilometers of critical infrastructure which is important for our modern societies.

And NATO for many years has been dealing with this security of infrastructure. But after the attacks in the Baltic Sea, we have doubled our military presence and the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. We have also increased the cooperation between NATO countries to exchange information and to strengthen preparedness to better stop further such attacks in the future. We have created a separate unit to coordinate the measures at the NATO Headquarters between the Member States and also private industry, which are also important role in terms of this infrastructure to increase the security for undersea [inaudible]. 

[MRT: It is acknowledged that the legal protection in EZs if weak. Excluding Russia from protection of European critical infrastructure speaks volumes. A member has done it and now NATO is worrying about possible perhaps "just" retaliation. Lets imagine a scenario in which the mission against Nordstream is defined as and "armed attack against a state" or even "act of agression" as specified here]. 

17 May 2023 - British-Irish lawmakers push for EU-UK defence cooperation on borderless threats 

[MRT: The EU is compromised in Nordstream affair case]

19 June 2023 - UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak Hosts Sweden's Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson

Rishi Sunak, UK prime minister, hosts Ulf Kristersson, Sweden's prime minister, for a bilateral meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, UK, on Monday, June 19, 2023. The Swedish government is seeking approval to become the 32nd member of NATO by the Vilnius summit mid-July.

[MRT: Really, seeking approval?]  

19 June 2023 - UK-Sweden Joint Leaders Statement: 19 June 2023 

The UK and Sweden are close security partners, and we welcome the strong and growing defence relationship. We are united in our strong support for Ukraine and in condemning Russia’s illegal and unprovoked invasion. We reaffirm our commitments made in the Political Declaration of Solidarity of May 2022.We will build on this to forge ever closer defence and security ties, bilaterally, as well as through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), and soon as NATO allies, to meet shared regional and global security challenges.

Through regular bilateral consultations, both in the Joint Staff talks and the 2+2 Defence and Security Dialogue, Sweden and the UK will identify opportunities for enhanced bilateral collaboration.

We will continue to train and exercise together to ensure our Armed Forces are able to operate together effectively across all domains. EU-UK cooperation in security and defence reinforces the bilateral UK-Swedish bond.

[MRT: IMHO the integrity of the SWE is compromised.]  

13 October 2023 - Strengthened partnership between United Kingdom and Sweden

On Friday 13 October, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak signed a strategic partnership between the UK and Sweden. This partnership builds on the two countries’ common interests and values, and aims to deepen and broaden their cooperation.

[MRT: The UK is a prime suspect.]  

The signing of the strategic partnership comes off the back of Mr Kristersson’s visit to London on 19 June. During the visit, Mr Kristersson and Mr Sunak agreed to draft and sign a strategic bilateral partnership agreement by the end of the year. 

[MRT: The UK is a prime suspect.]   

The UK is an important trade partner and ally on international issues.

Through partnership, Sweden and the UK further strengthen their strong cooperation on security and defence, which includes collaboration on counterterrorism and defence materiel exports. This strengthens Sweden’s relations with an important security partner, which is important to overall security in Europe 

[MRT: The statement of strengthening European security points to inability to reveal the perpetrator of Nordstream affair.]    

The strategic partnership applies to a large number of areas where Sweden and the UK see the benefits of increased cooperation, such as innovation, research, green transition and trade and investments. The two countries will also continue to cooperate on international issues such as support to Ukraine and the importance of a rules-based world order.

The strategic partnership with the UK is a political declaration of intent in line with Sweden’s obligations under EU law.

[MRT: Seems some EU law will be used to stop the SWE Nordstream investigation. And given that the DK investigation is almost non-existent public should start to question WHICH law has been applied.]

19 Oct 2023 HMS Queen Elizabeth made her first visit to new NATO partner,

Sweden, arriving in Gothenburg on 13 October for a week of defence diplomacy as part of the UK Carrier Strike Group deployment.

[MRT: A week of defense diplomacy? Considering the UK being the prime suspect of the Nordstream affair this COULD signalize a management of the investigation for public.] 

24 Oct 2023 - Joint press conference

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with the Prime Minister of Sweden, Ulf Kristersson

 Today, we also addressed recent damage to critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

Allies and Sweden are working together to establish the facts.

And NATO is strengthening our presence in the region.

This includes more surveillance and reconnaissance.

As well as more ships under NATO command.

NATO will always do this, and we will do what is necessary to protect and defend our Allies.

[MRT: Jens Stoltenberg is stating that NATO will stand behind and protect the perpetrator - the UK and protect the unity of NATO.] 

14 Nov. 2023 - Doorstep statement

by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union with Defence Ministers

Journalist: It’s the Ukrainian intelligence officer who could be involved in the Nord Stream attack, Roman Chervinsky. When did you hear first the name?

Secretary General Jens StoltenbergWell, there are ongoing investigations, national investigations, and I will not comment on them.

14 Nov. 2023 - NATO Secretary General addresses protection of critical undersea infrastructure, support to Ukraine with EU Defence Ministers

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg participated in a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union with EU Defence Ministers in Brussels on Tuesday (14 November 2023) to discuss the protection of critical undersea infrastructure and the importance of continued support to Ukraine.

The Secretary General stressed that the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines last year and the recent damage to the Balticconnector pipeline and cables show that infrastructure is vulnerable, and that threats are real and developing.

Since these incidents, NATO has stepped up air and naval patrols and increased presence in the Baltic and North Seas. At the Vilnius Summit in July, Allies agreed to establish a new centre on critical undersea infrastructure at NATO’s Maritime Command in the United Kingdom.

[MRT: Kind of obscure when the UK is the main suspect of Nordstream affair.] 

NATO and the European Union have also established a task force on the resilience of critical infrastructure. “Critical infrastructure is important, and it's an area where we once again see the relevance and importance of cooperation between the NATO and the European Union,” said the Secretary General.

On the situation in Ukraine, Mr Stoltenberg highlighted that intense fighting continues. “The situation on the battlefield is difficult. And that just makes it even more important that we sustain and step up our support for Ukraine because we cannot allow President Putin to win,” said the Secretary General. “Ukraine must prevail as a sovereign independent nation in Europe and it's in our interest to support Ukraine,” he said.

[MRT: Well, revealing the perpetrator is dangerous to NATO from the fracturing point of view. As for the EU and other creditors, the fall of Kiev would have serious consequences as creditors would need to take serious "haircuts" on their loans to bankrupt Ukraine- here.]  

 



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087 - Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence , 11 - 13 October 2022


12 Oct. 2022 - 13 Oct. 2022 - Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium

  • Short remarks by the NATO Secretary General and the US Secretary of Defense

3:13 Trans-Atlantic Security

  • Meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Defence Ministers session

    No public opening remarks, no media coverage

(previous statement)

  • Bilateral meeting with the Minister of Defence of Norway

    No public opening remarks, no media coverage

11 Oct. 2022 - Secretary General previews meetings of NATO Defence Ministers

NATO Defence Ministers will meet in Brussels on Wednesday and Thursday (12-13 October 2022) to step up and sustain support to Ukraine and continue to strengthen NATO’s own defences, against the backdrop of Russia’s most significant escalation since the start of the Ukraine conflict...

On Thursday, the Secretary General will chair a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group to discuss Russia’s dangerous nuclear rhetoric and the role of NATO’s nuclear capability in preserving peace and deterring aggression. Next week, NATO will hold its long-planned deterrence exercise, Steadfast Noon, “this is routine training, which happens every year to keep our deterrent safe, secure and effective.” Mr Stoltenberg said.

(read full remarks)

NATO Defence Ministers will meet this week at an important moment for transatlantic security.

We will review our progress on strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence.

We will further increase the protection of our critical infrastructure, in light of the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines...

...NATO is not party to the conflict... 

 We are closely monitoring Russia’s nuclear forces.

We have not seen any changes in Russia’s posture.
But we remain vigilant.

At the Madrid Summit in June, NATO leaders decided a fundamental shift in our defence and deterrence to respond to the new security reality.¨...

We will also address the protection of our critical infrastructure.

NATO has been working on this for many years.

And following the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, we have further enhanced our vigilance across all domains.

We have doubled our presence in the Baltic and North Seas.

To over 30 ships.

Supported by maritime patrol aircraft and undersea capabilities.

These efforts are closely coordinated by NATO’s Maritime Command.

Allies are also increasing security around key installations.

And stepping up intelligence and intelligence sharing.

We will take further steps to strengthen our resilience and protect our critical infrastructure.

Any deliberate attack against Allies’ critical infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response.

[MRT: The Nordstream was attacked by one member - this investigation and data set identified it was a UK, a submarine seems to be used. There are worries that Russia would consider the missin as an attack against its state asset aka declaration of war. Hence the framing of the event as a "sabotage". The alliance was worried about retaliatory response to the UK, retaliation in kind in which Russia would destroy the UK´s key infrastructure. Note the separate meeting with Norway and how that coincides with the 1909-2022 post here]

We will be joined by EU High Representative Borrell.

Because NATO and the European Union face the same security challenges.

[MRT: The UK is in general in a different strategic position hence the statement makes sense only if same security challenges the EU has are applied to the NATO - indirect confirmation that the UK has been involved in the Nordstream affair.] 

We have a difficult winter ahead.

[MRT: The NATO and EU have jointly decided to cover-up the perpetrator of the Nordstream affair.] 

So it is even more important that North America and Europe continue to stand united...

NATO Secretary General: Now is the right time to be firm and to be clear that NATO is there to protect and defend all Allies. And this is a long time planned exercise, actually planned before the invasion of Ukraine. It's a routine exercise, and it's an exercise to ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective. I visited this exercise a few years ago. We have been open about the exercise and I think it would send a very wrong signal if we suddenly now cancelled a routine, long time planned exercise because of the war in Ukraine. That would be absolutely the wrong signal to send. And we need to understand that NATO's firm, predictable behavior, our military strength, is the best way to prevent escalation. We are there to preserve peace, to prevent escalation and prevent any attack on NATO Allied countries.

So if we now created the grounds for any misunderstanding, miscalculation in Moscow about our willingness to protect and defend all Allies, we would increase the risk of escalation and that's the last thing we will do...

NATO Secretary General: We are constantly consulting among NATO Allies. We have already conducted three NATO Summits this year. We will convene a summit when needed, so we have the meetings we need, when we need them. And we are constantly assessing also the need to then convene yet another summit to ensure that we have consultations and the right messages from NATO at all levels. We will have a ministerial meeting this week, and that provides a good opportunity to send a clear message and then we'll make decisions on a potential summit when we think the right the time is right.

Then on the nature of the war. Well, this is an illegal invasion of another country. It is a clear violation of international law. Russia invaded a sovereign independent nation, violated its territorial integrity and sovereignty. That actually didn't start in 2022 or in February of this year. It started in 2014. But of course they scaled up their aggressive actions against Ukraine in February, and they have violated international law in a blatant way. And we have also seen horrendous and horrific attacks against civilians, we have seen the reports from Bucha, from many other places in Ukraine. And the important thing now is that all facts are made available, that we have thorough investigations, NATO Allies support the ongoing investigations, and that those responsible are held accountable for these atrocities...

NATO Secretary General: NATO is prepared for any threat, any attack, against any NATO Ally. And that's the reason why we have NATO, to be able to deter also nuclear threats. And this was important before the invasion of Ukraine, it has become even more important after. Not least in light of the nuclear rhetoric from President Putin and from Russia. This nuclear rhetoric, or veiled threats, are dangerous and reckless. Russia knows that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And we also conveyed clearly to Russia that they will have severe consequences if they use nuclear weapons in any way, including low yield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Then, by ensuring that we have credible deterrence and defence, we are helping to reduce the risk of escalation.

[MRT: My statement about Nordstream suspect: "Only a state sitting at the UN with nuclear deterrence could be safe from the retaliation after attacking Russian key export infrastructure. Excluding USA which left Baltic Sea before the mission escalated, as the data talk, the only such country left is the UK.] 

And therefore it is important that since 2014, we have implemented the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence since the end of the Cold War. So we were prepared when Russia invaded Ukraine in February. And since then, we have further stepped up, increased our presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. We activated our defence plans the morning of the invasion, and we made decisions in Madrid in June to further strengthen our collective defence.

The purpose of this is to prevent war, preserve peace, and including prevent any use of nuclear weapons.

 

Summary: The UK´s attack on the key EU an Russian energy infrastructure has severely fractured the transatlantic alliance. The NATO is "zombified". One member has acted outside the charter as a rogue state and forced the alliance to cover-up or face a breakup of the alliance. This also increased significantly the threat of nuclear exchange. See other statements by Biden here.  


RELATED POSTS:




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Uncovering the truth took over two years of self-funded, tireless investigation.
I decided to open it for free, no paywall, despite huge investment.
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