Wednesday, November 27, 2024

215 - Nordstream affair Crime sequence reconstruction - PART I


CRIME SEQUENCE RECONSTRUCTION

(pre 2022 events)

PART 1/15
 
(BASED ON NORDSTREAM FILES MASTER DATA-FILE) 


SUMMARY:

When journalists tell you what to believe in then that has nothing to do with journalism. 
The purpose of journalism is not to present what the journalist thinks about these facts. 
The facts must stand on their own.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Yes, I opened the investigation for all to read 
no paywall, no nothing,
you all can read, see real verifiable data.

The truth must be known!

-> then start ASKING your politicians What did they know?
-> then start ASKING journalists questions why are they not INVESTIGATING REAL DATA?

The story may have began here.
Yep, the UK has done it in the past.

FOREWORD:

The destruction of Nordstream pipelines redirected energy flows in Europe and had significant geo-political implications. How that happened? What preceded it?

The road to Nordstream crisis had very deep and old roots. It was not just a simple sabotage done by amateur group of drunken sailors (216). This was confirmed by head of Swedish investigation Mats Ljungqvist in several public statements in 2023 when he confirmed state involvement and excluded pro-Ukrainian amateur groups and chance some private company was behind was very low (214), he also stated that the rogue state had significant resources and knowledge plus he stated that Russia and USA were both excluded in several rounds (058). Ukraine was asking G-7 allies, IMF and World Bank to postpone loan payments in the mid September 2022 (085). To bite creditors hand by blowing up their main energy artery, despite deliveries being paused, is not convenient. There was no strategic gain for Ukraine and the attack on the pipeline could only alleviate negotiations with G7 or even cancelling those fresh deals and possibility of new loans. So who did it then? 

Prior to Swedish statements my own investigation, after long and thorough detailed research (001), concluded in April 2023 that elements in UK´s government were responsible for the Nordstream affair (045). The original pool of suspects contained 17 states (052). All known alternative takes and claims were carefully studied (045), null hypothesis & systematic elimination of possibilities (001) was done, motives including wider geo-political ones studied as well (010), etc. Note that not all material is uploaded to the blog which serves to publish progress and to share data with public. One page summary (061). Some possible historical character precedent evidence examined (018). The first simple crime sequence reconstruction was done in September 2023 after about half year of investigation (064). This first iteration was confirmed by all available data, cross-referenced and the investigation continued for next 1.5 years (013). 

The gradual progress was documented online in an open format. The investigation tried to follow best investigative processes used in normal criminal investigations, preliminary results were published in May 2022 (049). After conclusion cross-verifications against all available data was thorough-fully and transparently executed. There are no internal nor external discrepancies. 

The hypothesis so far holds, is able to explain all associated details, and has not been refuted despite many attempts. In fact, I have been challenging anyone to disprove the hypothesis. Nobody so far did. 

KEY TAKEAWAYS:

The UK among the strongest opponent of the project: The UK had been vocal in its opposition to Nord Stream 2. Positioning itself as a critic of the project, the UK government, particularly through statements from Prime minister Boris Johnson, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, and other official figures of UK government argued that the pipeline would enhance Russia's leverage over Europe, potentially at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty and European energy security.

Worsening of Ukraine crisis Late 2021 - Early 2022: Tensions between Russia and Ukraine escalated, with significant military build-up by Russia near the Ukrainian border. This situation was closely monitored by Western nations, including the UK, which saw it as an opportunity to highlight the risks of energy dependency on Russia. 


DATA:

THE NORDSTREAM AFFAIR IN DATA POINTS:

There exists lots of data for interested readers to examine many old pre 2022 official documents and statements (003). That is how the investigation started. But let´s just look at a few remarkable which gradually shaped narrative toward the affair and lay foundation to understanding motives, actors and moves how it all unfolded. 

A long time ago relations between the UK and Russia were rather positive and there was even a possibility for cooperation on energy issues. The first Nord Stream project was fully operational since 2012.  Projections shown that the UK´s demand can not be met from internal sources and so Russia explored UK as a possible destination market for its vast energy, one example could be news from April, 8 2013: "Gazprom, Gasunie to explore Nord Stream expansion to Britain. Russia's Gazprom GAZP.MM and Dutch Gasunie GSUNI.UL signed a letter of intent on Monday to explore the potential expansion of the Nord Stream pipeline to Britain, one of several deals signed during President Vladimir Putin's visit to the Netherlands." (027). 

But politics and international relations are complex, and often unstable, they change frequently. At this point the UK has been net energy importer for some 40 years. The UK started to be the loudest opponent of Russian energy exports after proposed second pipeline project. Nord Stream 1 was a fait accompli, but Nord Stream 2’s launch gave the UK a fresh target to contest Russian energy influence.


2014

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the subsequent outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine dramatically escalated tensions with the West. This crisis disrupted Russia-Ukraine gas transit negotiations, with Gazprom cutting off supplies to Ukraine in June 2014 over unpaid debts. The instability underscored Europe’s vulnerability to disruptions in Ukrainian transit routes (which carried about 50% of Russian gas to Europe), prompting Russia to prioritize direct pipelines like Nord Stream 2 to bypass Ukraine.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 prompted an immediate UK response within the EU and NATO frameworks. On March 17, the UK supported EU sanctions targeting Russian officials, signaling a shift toward countering Russian influence, including energy leverage. While Nord Stream 2 wasn’t yet formalized, the UK’s Foreign Secretary William Hague warned of Russia’s “energy weapon” in a March 23 BBC interview, referencing existing pipelines like Nord Stream 1. This laid the rhetorical groundwork for later opposition to Nord Stream 2, framing Russian gas as a security threat—a view echoed in a 2015 House of Commons briefing.

At the G7 Summit in Brussels, the UK, under Prime Minister David Cameron, pushed for a unified energy security strategy to reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian gas. The G7 communiqué on June 5 committed to diversifying energy sources, implicitly challenging projects like Nord Stream 2 that would deepen dependence. The UK’s role was pivotal in steering this agenda, with Cameron advocating LNG 
imports over pipeline expansion—a stance later applied to Nord Stream 2 debates.

The UK leveraged its EU influence to push for sanctions and energy diversification post-Crimea. At the March 2014 EU Summit, Cameron urged a “rethink” of energy ties with Russia, indirectly targeting future projects like Nord Stream 2. NATO statements in 2014, backed by the UK, also emphasized protecting energy infrastructure from Russian overreach.

The UK consistently backed Ukraine as a gas transit state, a position formalized in later years but rooted in 2014’s Crimea fallout. In July, the UK pledged £10 million in aid to Ukraine, partly to bolster its energy infrastructure, signaling opposition to Russia bypassing Ukraine via new pipelines. This indirectly targeted Nord Stream 2’s future aim to reroute gas flows, as noted in a 2018 Hansard debate reflecting on earlier policy. The UK also promoted LNG imports—particularly from the U.S. and Qatar—as a counterweight to Russian pipelines. In 2014, it expanded its own LNG capacity (e.g., South Hook terminal), setting an example for Europe and reducing the economic case for Nord Stream 2. This aligned with G7 commitments and later U.S. sanctions in 2019.

Following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014, blamed on Russian-backed separatists, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia’s energy, financial, and defense sectors. These measures intensified discussions about Europe’s dependence on Russian gas (then about 30% of EU supply). Germany and other Nord Stream advocates argued for secure supply routes, while Eastern European states pushed for diversification away from Russia, setting the stage for Nord Stream 2’s polarizing reception.

Despite sanctions, Germany maintained its pragmatic energy relationship with Russia. Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized energy security, and German firms like BASF/Wintershall deepened ties with Gazprom. In November 2014, a deal saw Gazprom acquire full ownership of Wingas (a German gas distributor) from Wintershall, in exchange for assets in Russia, reinforcing bilateral energy cooperation. This alignment foreshadowed Germany’s support for Nord Stream 2 as a “commercial” project.

The Ukraine crisis and EU sanctions heightened the stakes for Russian gas exports, making Nord Stream 2 a geopolitical tool to secure market access while bypassing Ukraine. Germany’s continued energy partnership with Russia, despite Western pressure, laid the political groundwork for the project, while Eastern European and EU concerns foreshadowed future opposition.

President Vladimir Putin announced the cancellation of South Stream, a $40 billion pipeline to southern Europe, citing EU resistance and Bulgaria’s refusal to grant permits amid the Ukraine crisis. This decision redirected Russia’s focus to northern Europe, accelerating plans for Nord Stream 2. It signaled to Germany and other partners that Russia was serious about alternative routes, leveraging the proven Nord Stream 1 model.


2015

In 2015, the Nord Stream 2 project was in its formative stages, with significant developments laying the groundwork for its eventual construction and sparking early political debates.

During the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with European energy companies—E.ON (Germany), Shell (UK/Netherlands), and OMV (Austria)—to develop Nord Stream 2, a second pipeline to double the capacity of the existing Nord Stream 1 (from 55 billion cubic meters to 110 billion cubic meters annually). This public announcement marked the official launch of the project, signaling its ambition to enhance Russian gas exports to Europe via the Baltic Sea.

Gazprom formalized the partnership by signing a shareholder agreement with five European companies: E.ON (later spun off as Uniper), Shell, OMV, ENGIE (France), and Wintershall (Germany). This agreement established the framework for Nord Stream 2 AG, the project company, with Gazprom holding a 50% stake and the European firms sharing the rest. This step was crucial for securing financial and technical support from major industry players, setting the project on a firm footing. Shareholder Agreement was signed on September 4, 2015. By early 2016, this entity was fully operational, headquartered in Zug, Switzerland, and tasked with planning, constructing, and operating the pipeline. This formalized the consortium and provided a clear organizational structure, marking a foundational step for the project’s execution.

Following the MoU, Nord Stream 2 AG began preliminary feasibility studies and route planning for the pipeline, which would run parallel to Nord Stream 1 from Vyborg, Russia, to Greifswald, Germany. Early environmental and technical assessments were launched to prepare for permit applications in the five affected countries (Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany).

The announcement of Nord Stream 2 drew swift criticism from Eastern European countries and Ukraine. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk called it an “anti-European and anti-Ukrainian” project, warning that bypassing Ukraine as a gas transit country would cost it $2 billion annually in transit fees and weaken its leverage against Russia amid the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltic states echoed these concerns, arguing it would deepen Europe’s reliance on Russian gas and undermine energy security.

The UK government didn’t issue an immediate public statement, but the House of Commons Library briefing later that year (November 2015) flagged it as a “contentious” development. This event catalyzed UK scrutiny, with Foreign Office insiders reportedly briefing MPs on its implications for European energy dependence—a precursor to formal opposition. 

A House of Commons debate, recorded in Hansard, saw MPs like Conservative Alan Duncan and Labour’s Barry Gardiner grill ministers on Nord Stream 2’s implications. Duncan called it “a Russian power play,” citing Nord Stream 1’s 40 bcm delivery in 2015 (BP Statistical Review) as a warning of deepening reliance. The debate urged the government to lobby the EU—still a UK domain pre-Brexit—to block the project, reflecting parliamentary unease post-Crimea.

At the G20 Summit in Antalya, Turkey, Prime Minister David Cameron emphasized energy security amid global instability, indirectly referencing Russian gas dominance. While not Nord Stream-specific, the UK pushed for diversified energy supplies, building on its 2014 G7 stance. A DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) report from late 2015 echoed this, noting Nord Stream 1’s role in supplying 27% of EU gas imports and warning that Nord Stream 2 could exacerbate reliance—a veiled critique of Germany’s support.

By 2015, the UK accepted Nord Stream 1 as an operational reality—delivering 55 bcm annually from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea since 2012. The government saw it as a mixed blessing: it stabilized EU gas supply (UK imports were minimal, at <1% from Russia via interconnectors), but entrenched reliance on Russia, which supplied 38% of Germany’s gas in 2015 per Eurostat. A 2015 House of Commons note called it a “done deal” but warned it set a precedent for Nord Stream 2, amplifying security risks post-Crimea. Unlike Germany’s economic justification, the UK saw Nord Stream 2 as a Russian bid to “divide and conquer” Europe, per a 2016 DECC official’s leaked remark,


2016

In 2016, the Nord Stream 2 project, aimed at building a second natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea, experienced significant developments both in terms of project advancement and political dynamics.

Nord Stream 2 AG began detailed route planning and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in 2016, submitting applications to the five countries along the pipeline’s path: Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. These assessments were critical for regulatory approval and demonstrated progress in aligning the project with international environmental and legal standards, a prerequisite for construction.

In early 2016, the UK Foreign Office publicly criticized Nord Stream 2, with a spokesperson telling Reuters on February 18 that it posed a “threat to European energy security.” This marked a shift from quieter 2015 diplomacy to explicit opposition, tying the project to Russia’s Ukraine aggression. The statement followed Gazprom’s January 2016 talks with EU partners (e.g., Shell, Engie) to secure Nord Stream 2 funding, amplifying UK concerns about its momentum.

The UK leaned on Germany, its key EU partner, to reconsider. Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond reportedly raised Nord Stream 2 in a May 2016 Berlin meeting with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, per a 2017 Telegraph retrospective, urging a security-first lens. Though Merkel held firm, the UK amplified U.S. pressure.

At the G7 Summit in Japan, Prime Minister David Cameron reiterated 2015’s energy  diversification push, per the May 27 communiqué. While Nord Stream wasn’t named, the UK’s advocacy for LNG and renewables—backed by a 25% rise in UK LNG imports (DECC data)—aimed to undercut Nord Stream 2’s economic rationale, building on Nord Stream 1’s established 27% share of EU gas imports.

The UK bolstered LNG as a rival to piped gas. Imports hit 14 bcm in 2016 (DECC), with terminals like Grain LNG expanding capacity. Cameron’s G7 pitch for U.S. and Qatari LNG—priced at $7–$10/mmBtu versus Nord Stream’s $4–$5/mmBtu—sought to erode Nord Stream 2’s cost edge, despite slower delivery (2–3 weeks vs. 2–3 days).

The UK’s Brexit Referendum vote to leave the EU on June 23, 2016 indirectly affected its Nord Stream 2 stance. While not a 2016 “event” targeting the pipelines, Brexit shifted UK influence from EU insider to external critic. A July 2016 House of Lords report noted Nord Stream 2’s divisive impact on EU states, with the UK’s DECC (Department of Energy and Climate Change) warning that post-Brexit, its ability to shape EU energy policy—e.g., against Nord Stream 2—would wane, though diplomatic efforts persisted. The trend was gradual, the closer to the explosion date the less other options were remaining. 

As an EU member until 2019, the UK pushed the European Commission to enforce the Third Energy Package on Nord Stream 2, demanding ownership unbundling and third-party access—conditions Gazprom opposed. In March 2016, the UK backed Poland’s call for an EC legal review, per a 2017 EC document, aiming to stall permits or force costly redesigns.

Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK) blocked on July 22, 2016 a proposed joint venture between Gazprom and its five European partners, citing concerns that it would strengthen Gazprom’s dominance in the European gas market and harm competition. This forced the consortium to abandon the joint venture structure, with Gazprom proceeding as the sole shareholder of Nord Stream 2 AG, while the European firms shifted to financing roles. This decision heightened political tensions and underscored Eastern European resistance to the project.

The United States began voicing concerns about Nord Stream 2 in 2016, framing it as a tool for Russia to exert political leverage over Europe and undermine Ukraine’s role as a gas transit country. While formal sanctions were not yet in place, U.S. lawmakers and officials, including members of Congress, started pressuring European allies to reconsider the project. This laid the groundwork for later U.S. sanctions threats in 2017 and beyond.


2017

In 2017 Nord Stream 2 AG, the project company led by Russia’s Gazprom, secured financing agreements with five major European energy companies: ENGIE (France), OMV (Austria), Royal Dutch Shell (UK/Netherlands), Uniper (Germany), and Wintershall (Germany). These companies agreed to fund 50% of the project’s total cost, estimated at €9.5 billion, marking a critical step in ensuring the financial viability of the pipeline. This move solidified the project’s momentum and demonstrated strong European industry support despite political controversy. Securing funds and materials ensured the project could move toward construction, despite later delays.

During an EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels, Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson publicly condemned Nord Stream 2, calling it “divisive and contrary to Europe’s energy security,” per a March 28 Guardian report. Johnson’s remarks, tied to Russia’s Ukraine actions, marked a high-profile UK escalation from 2016’s quieter diplomacy.

In May 2017 Nord Stream 2 AG awarded contracts for the supply of steel pipes, a key material milestone. Europipe (Germany) was contracted to supply over 50% of the pipes. Additional contracts were signed with United Metallurgical Company (OMV, Russia) and Chelyabinsk Pipe-Rolling Plant (Russia) for the remaining supply. These agreements secured approximately 2,400 kilometers of large-diameter pipes, ensuring the project had the physical resources to proceed once permits were granted.

Several key contracts were awarded to advance the physical construction. In March 2016–2017: Steel pipe supply contracts were finalized with companies like Europipe (Germany), United Metallurgical Company (Russia), and Chelyabinsk Pipe-Rolling Plant (Russia), ensuring the necessary materials were in place by 2017. In February 2017 Allseas, a Swiss-Dutch company, was contracted for offshore pipe-laying using vessels like Solitaire, Pioneering Spirit, and Audacia, laying the groundwork for the pipeline’s installation. In July 2017 Bokaalis-Van Oord won a $291 million contract for rock placement, a crucial step in preparing the seabed for pipe-laying. Major steps were taking place for pipeline works on the sea.

Nord Stream 2 submitted an official application for its route through Danish territorial waters in 2017. This was a pivotal moment as Denmark’s approval was necessary due to the pipeline’s path through its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and potentially its territorial sea. The application set the stage for future delays and political debates, as Denmark later amended its laws to consider security and foreign policy in such decisions.

Nord Stream 1 continued supplying gas, while Nord Stream 2 progressed with financing secured and construction permits pending, sharpening UK opposition. A House of Commons debate in June, 20 2017 recorded in Hansard, saw MPs like Conservative Bob Seely link Nord Stream 1’s 42 bcm delivery in 2016 (Gazprom data) to Nord Stream 2’s potential to “lock in” EU dependence. Seely urged the government to pressure Germany and the EU, citing Nord Stream 2’s threat to Ukraine’s $2 billion transit revenue (2.3% GDP, World Bank). Post-Brexit referendum, this reflected the UK’s shift to vocal critique outside EU decision-making.

The United States intensified its opposition to Nord Stream 2, viewing it as a geopolitical tool to increase European dependence on Russian gas and undermine Ukraine’s transit role. In May 2017, U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry hinted at impending sanctions on companies involved, a threat that materialized later in 2019 but was already casting a shadow over the project in 2017. In June 2017, Under Trump, new US sanctions against Russia targeting the pipeline were passed by a 98–2 majority in the United States Senate. The U.S. passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), signed by President Trump on August 2, targeting Russian energy projects, including Nord Stream 2. The UK government welcomed this, with a Foreign Office statement on August 3 praising “allied efforts to counter Russian aggression.” 

The European Commission, in a statement from June 2017, expressed skepticism about Nord Stream 2, arguing it did not align with the EU’s Energy Union goals of diversifying supply sources and routes. Countries like Poland and Ukraine voiced strong opposition, fearing the pipeline would weaken their geopolitical leverage and revenue from gas transit. Poland’s competition authority later imposed fines, but in 2017, the criticism underscored the project’s divisive impact within Europe.

At the G7 Energy Ministers’ meeting in Rome, the UK, under Energy Minister Jesse Norman, reinforced its 2016 LNG advocacy, per the April 10 communiqué. With Nord Stream 1 delivering 28% of EU gas imports (Eurostat), the UK pushed alternatives like U.S. LNG—up 30% in UK imports to 18 bcm (BEIS data)—to undercut Nord Stream 2’s economic case, despite its cost disadvantage ($4–$5/mmBtu piped vs. $7–$10/mmBtu LNG).

The UK raised Nord Stream 2 in bilateral talks. On a June´s 2017 meeting with Polish PM Beata Szydło, per a 2018 Telegraph recap—urging a united front. Post-Brexit, this shifted from EU lobbying to external influence.

Despite rising opposition, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian leadership, including Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller, maintained that Nord Stream 2 was a commercial project vital for energy security. This stance clashed with critics who saw it as a means for Russia to extend political influence. The German government’s unwavering support in 2017, even as political factors were acknowledged, highlighted the deepening rift between Germany and its EU/NATO allies. The stage was setting for a big geo-political confrontation which would attempt to remap European foreign policy.

The European Commission requested a mandate in November 2016 to negotiate with Russia on behalf of the EU regarding Nord Stream 2, reflecting unease about its compliance with EU energy regulations (e.g., the Third Energy Package, which requires unbundling of supply and transmission). Eastern European countries like Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltic states opposed the pipeline, fearing it would increase dependence on Russian gas, while Germany defended it as a commercial project. This highlighted a growing rift within the EU over energy security and Russia policy.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and government officials reiterated their support for Nord Stream 2, framing it as a private business initiative vital for Germany’s energy supply. This stance clashed with critics, including Ukraine, UK, USA which warned that bypassing its transit routes would cost Ukraine billions in revenue and weaken its strategic position against Russia. Germany’s position in 2016 solidified its role as the project’s primary European backer, despite mounting political opposition.

The UK bolstered Poland and Ukraine, key Nord Stream 2 foes. A £35 million Ukraine aid package in December 2017, partly for energy, reinforced Kyiv’s transit role, per a BEIS statement.


2018

Nord Stream 2 AG obtained critical construction permits from several countries along the pipeline’s route. On January 31, 2018 Germany’s Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency approved construction in its territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). On March 27, 2018 Finland granted permits for its EEZ, following environmental assessments. On April 5, 2018 Sweden approved the pipeline’s route through its EEZ. These approvals were essential for the project to proceed legally, leaving Denmark as the only country yet to decide (its delay would later complicate matters).

The UK dismissed Germany’s “energy bridge” rationale, framing Nord Stream 2 as a Russian bid to dominate Europe, per Johnson’s March remarks—a view sharpened by 2018’s supposed chemical attack.

What happened is still unknown even after 7 years. The alleged poisoning of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury by Russian agents using Novichok triggered a sharp UK response, with Prime Minister Theresa May expelling 23 Russian diplomats on March 14. On March 26, Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson linked this to Nord Stream 2 during an EU Council meeting, calling it “a project that emboldens Russia’s reckless behavior,” per a BBC report. This tied Nord Stream 2 to broader Russian aggression, amplifying UK calls for its reconsideration as Nord Stream 1 delivered 43 bcm in 2017 (Gazprom data). It is unclear what really happened in Salisbury but the usage of this crisis for putting wedge between Germany and Russia is well documented.

From february top November 2018 the European Commission proposed amending the EU Gas Directive in November 2017 to extend Third Energy Package rules (unbundling ownership and ensuring third-party access) to offshore pipelines like Nord Stream 2. In 2018, debates intensified, with Germany resisting changes that could derail the project, while Poland and other Eastern European states supported stricter oversight. The issue remained unresolved by year-end, highlighting EU disunity.

Denmark had not yet approved Nord Stream 2’s route through its territorial waters by 2018, citing security and environmental concerns. In April 2017, it had applied for an alternative route in Denmark’s EEZ, but delays persisted. This hesitation gave Denmark leverage to influence the project’s timeline and amplified political pressure from opponents like Ukraine and Poland, who urged a outright rejection.

Despite uncertainties on May 3, 2022 the construction of Nord Stream 2 officially started in Germany at the Greifswald landing site, where the pipeline would connect to the European gas grid. This marked the transition from planning to physical implementation, with initial work focusing on onshore facilities and preparatory seabed activities. It was a major milestone, signaling that the project was moving forward despite political opposition.

A Hansard-recorded debate from May 2018 saw MPs like Conservative Richard Benyon denounce Nord Stream 2 as “a strategic mistake,” citing Nord Stream 1’s 28% share of EU gas imports (Eurostat) and Ukraine’s bypassed 39 bcm transit network (Naftogaz). Benyon urged the government to leverage post-Brexit alliances—e.g., with the U.S.—to stop it, as Germany issued construction permits in January and March 2018, signaling Nord Stream 2’s advance.

At the NATO Summit in Brussels (July 11–12, 2018, the UK backed U.S. warnings that Nord Stream 2 investors risked CAATSA sanctions (enacted 2017). On July 11, Foreign Office Minister Alan Duncan told Parliament the UK “fully supports” U.S. efforts to deter the project, per Hansard. This followed Trump’s July 11 summit remark that Germany was “captive to Russia” via Nord Stream, aligning UK and U.S. pressure as construction began in German waters in May.

On 17 July 2018 - Boris Johnson wrote that he feels that Nord Stream 2 is divisive and could leave the EU’s supply reliant on “a malign Russian state”. He acknowledged that British interests are at stake and admitted that that "My primary concern is not the potential commercial losses for those private companies, or even the success—or lack of success—of former German Chancellors in their deal making, but the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and our friends and allies." He recognized the price for Gazprom, several years of their investment, their future income depends on it. “Nord Stream-2 and Turkish Stream are all deeply value-destructive projects that will eat up almost half of Gazprom’s investments over the next five years.” (003) 

Boris Johnson also stated that  "...the UK’s apparent unwillingness to come to a firm and fixed view on Nord Stream 2, has to end."

On 17th July 2018 In a debate between John Whittingdale and James Heappey about Nord Stream 2 the loss of income for Ukraine is quantified. "As my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin pointed out, Nord Stream 2 is essentially a political tool. The Polish Prime Minister has described it as a new hybrid weapon. If it replaces the Ukrainian gas pipeline—I think all of us believe that is the long-term objective—the consequence will be for Ukraine to lose up to 4% of its GDP, with an effect on government spending of a cut of about $2.3 billion." It is the amount the Ukraine gets for transport fees through its ageing pipeline system. 

The issue of Ukrainian neglected pipeline system was known. Gazprom has specifically chosen to invest in the Nord Stream 1 with the route to go through the Baltic sea to avoid 3rd party interference and to save money on paying transport fees for transit countries and to deliver to its largest customer Germany directly. 

In August 2018 during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel reaffirmed Nord Stream 2 as a commercial project vital for energy security, while acknowledging Ukraine’s transit role must be preserved. This balancing act reflected Germany’s determination to proceed despite growing U.S. and EU opposition, solidifying its position as the project’s key backer.

In 2018 - The Atlantic Council published article "Nord Stream 2: Understanding the Potential Consequences" which mentioned that "The Damage That Will Flow From Nord Stream 2 - Creating a Straits of Hormuz Risk for Europe". and that "...once Nord Stream 2 becomes operational, these interconnectors will be utilized by Gazprom on such a scale that it will be much more difficult for competing gas supplies to reach CEE customers..."

While the UK was still a member of the EU it was able to shape or influence joint policies directly, but after leaving the UK lost this political power. The UK was strong proponent of the several legal hurdles like "unbundling rules" to separate pipeline operator and gas exporters. Already in 2020, when the UK while still in EU, it was pressuring Germany to decouple from Russian energy.

Offshore pipe-laying began in the Gulf of Finland in September 2018, with the vessel Solitaire (operated by Allseas) laying the first pipes. Earlier, in July, preparatory seabed work (e.g., rock placement) had intensified. By year-end, over 200 kilometers of the 1,230-kilometer pipeline were completed, demonstrating significant progress and the project’s technical momentum.

On 3rd of October 2020 a news was published with message from UK that stated "Germany pressed to rethink Nord Stream 2 pipeline after Navalny poisoning". The Novichok case is still not solved, it is unknown if it was real or not but one issue is clear, it was used as a leverage against Germany to cool off growing economical and political relations with Russia.

In November, the U.S. Congress considered the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) to target companies involved in the project, though sanctions were not yet imposed. This intensified transatlantic friction and pressured European firms like Shell and ENGIE.

The UK bolstered Poland and Ukraine, key foes of Nord Stream 2. Poland’s 2018 Baltic Pipe talks with Denmark gained UK diplomatic nods, per a 2019 Commons debate, while a £50 million Ukraine aid package in November 2018 (BEIS) reinforced Kyiv’s transit role against Nord Stream 2’s bypass.


2019

Amid U.S. pressure, Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated Germany’s support for Nord Stream 2, meeting Putin in January and August 2019 to affirm its strategic importance. Concurrently, Russia and Ukraine, with EU mediation, signed a five-year gas transit deal on December 30, 2019, ensuring 65 bcm in 2020 and 40 bcm annually from 2021–2024 through Ukraine. This deal addressed Merkel’s pledge to preserve Ukraine’s transit role, reducing some criticism of Nord Stream 2’s bypass intent. Germany’s balancing act with Ukraine’s transit deal aimed to mitigate geopolitical fallout but couldn’t fully quell opposition.

With Nord Stream 1 fixed, the UK targeted Nord Stream 2—nearing completion—in 2019 via EU rules, U.S. sanctions, and alternatively through supporting allies in their objectives against the project. 

Until Brexit (January 31, 2020), the UK championed the February–April 2019 Gas Directive amendment, forcing Nord Stream 2 to comply with unbundling—rules Gazprom resisted. Hunt’s April 16 praise aimed to raise costs and delay certification (stalled until 2022), leveraging UK’s waning EU vote.

On April 17, 2019 the European Parliament adopted an amendment to the EU Gas Directive Amendment, extending Third Energy Package rules (unbundling and third-party access) to offshore pipelines like Nord Stream 2 entering EU territory. Germany negotiated a compromise ensuring it retained oversight of the pipeline’s German section, but the new rules, effective from May 23, 2019, introduced regulatory uncertainty and potential operational constraints, reflecting EU efforts to curb the project’s dominance. In 2022 after long battle the Amendment case was successfully challenged at highest EU court which could be the final trigger for launching a mission to take out the Nord Stream 2 out by physical force once and for all.

By mid-2019, Nord Stream 2 AG reported that over 1,000 kilometers of the 1,230-kilometer pipeline had been laid, surpassing the 50% completion mark. Pipe-laying vessels like Pioneering Spirit and Solitaire (operated by Allseas) worked in the Baltic Sea, with significant progress in Finnish, Swedish, and Russian waters. This milestone underscored the project’s momentum and brought it closer to operational readiness.

After years of delay, Denmark’s Energy Agency On October 30, 2019 grants construction permit, approving Nord Stream 2’s route through its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) southeast of Bornholm, following an alternative route application submitted in 2018. This was the final major permit needed, removing a critical obstacle and allowing construction to proceed uninterrupted across all five countries along the pipeline’s path (Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany). Construction of onshore facilities progressed, particularly at the landing site in Greifswald, Germany, where the pipeline would connect to the European gas grid via the Eugal pipeline. By late 2019, these facilities were nearing completion, aligning with the offshore pipe-laying schedule and preparing the project for gas flow, initially targeted for early 2020.

In December 2019 the U.S. Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020, which included sanctions under the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA). Signed into law on December 20, these sanctions targeted companies involved in laying Nord Stream 2’s pipes, notably Allseas, forcing it to suspend operations days later with only about 160 kilometers remaining. This marked a dramatic escalation of U.S. opposition, directly threatening the project’s completion timeline.

Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine intensified opposition, with Polish leaders calling Nord Stream 2 a “threat to European security” and urging its cancellation. NATO discussions, including at the December 2019 London summit, highlighted allied concerns about energy dependence on Russia, especially after its 2014 Crimea annexation. This amplified the project’s divisive impact within Europe and the transatlantic alliance.

The UK’s December 22 support for PEESA was pivotal. Allseas’ December 21 withdrawal—leaving 160 km unlaid—stemmed from U.S. threats the UK endorsed, per Pincher’s statement. This aimed to derail completion, though Russia later used its own ships (e.g., Akademik Cherskiy, 2020).

The five-year gas transit agreement signed in December 2019 between Russia and Ukraine took effect, ensuring 65 bcm of gas flowed through Ukraine in 2020. This deal, pushed by Germany and the EU, aimed to mitigate criticism that Nord Stream 2 would sideline Ukraine economically and geopolitically. It provided a temporary buffer but didn’t silence opponents who saw the pipeline as a long-term threat to Ukraine’s leverage.


2020

The UK left the EU on January 31, entering a transition period until December 31, shifting its Nord Stream 2 influence from EU insider to external ally. On February 10, Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab told Parliament that the UK would “continue opposing Nord Stream 2 post-Brexit,” per Hansard, citing Nord Stream 1’s 47 bcm delivery in 2019 (Gazprom) as a dependency warning. This framed 2020’s approach, leveraging U.S. ties over EU mechanism.

In a Commons session, UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, reflecting Johnson’s cabinet line, said, “We will continue opposing Nord Stream 2 post-Brexit to ensure Europe isn’t tethered to Russian gas,” per Hansard. Johnson endorsed this in a February 10 doorstep interview outside No. 10, stating, “Nord Stream 2 is a project we’ve long questioned—it’s not just about gas, it’s about Russia’s grip on Europe,” per Sky News.

On July 15 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that Nord Stream 2 would fall under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), broadening sanctions to include companies providing services, insurance, or port facilities to the project. The State Department expanded PEESA sanctions (from the 2019 NDAA) to target firms aiding pipe-laying vessels, further deterring European involvement.

With Allseas withdrawing due to U.S. sanctions, Russia mobilized its own fleet, including Fortuna and later Akademik Cherskiy (which arrived in the Baltic Sea in May 2020 after a journey from the Far East).  These less advanced vessels required adjustments, slowing progress but demonstrating Russia’s resolve to finish the project independently. Preparatory work, like seabed fortification, continued throughout the year. The onshore facilities in Greifswald, Germany, including the connection to the Eugal pipeline, were finalized in 2020. This ensured that the German end of Nord Stream 2 was ready to receive gas once the offshore pipeline was completed, keeping the project on track logistically despite offshore delays. Nord Stream 2 AG restarted work on a 2.6-kilometer section in Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), signaling determination to complete the pipeline despite the loss of Allseas’ advanced vessels. By year-end, about 94% of the pipeline (approximately 1,155 kilometers) was laid, with roughly 75 kilometers remaining.

The poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny with a Novichok nerve agent in August 2020, widely blamed on the Kremlin, sparked outrage in Germany, where he was treated and prompted UK outrage as Nord Stream 2 construction persisted. Calls grew within Merkel’s coalition, especially from the Green Party and some CDU members, to abandon Nord Stream 2 as a response. Merkel resisted, maintaining it was a commercial project, but the incident strained Germany’s justification and fueled domestic and EU criticism.

Johnson linked Nord Stream 2 to Russia’s chemical attacks, amplifying calls to halt it as pipe-laying resumed in December. In a weird schizophrenia Nord Stream 1’s reliability (47 bcm) contrasted with Nord Stream 2’s geopolitical risk. There were no objections against the Nord Stream 1 project. Johnson told reporters in London, “The Navalny case shows why we can’t let projects like Nord Stream 2 go unchallenged—Russia’s behavior demands a rethink of their energy stranglehold,” per a BBC September 6 report. He tied this to sanctions threats in a September 15 Commons address, saying, “We stand with allies to stop Putin’s pipelines rewarding his aggression.”

In a 10-point climate plan speech, Johnson said on November 18, 2020, “We’re boosting LNG and renewables—not shackling ourselves to Russian pipelines like Nord Stream,” per a Guardian transcript. He didn’t name Nord Stream 2 explicitly but implied it in a Q&A, noting, “Europe mustn’t double down on Baltic gas when we’ve got cleaner options.”

Shortly after that Boris Johnson's on 14 Dec 2020 revealed New energy security strategy which aimed to reduce the UK's dependence on imported fossil fuels and transition to cleaner, more sustainable energy sources.


2021

Following Joe Biden's inauguration in January 2021, the White House reiterated the U.S.'s long-standing opposition to Nord Stream, stating that Biden "continues to believe that Nord Stream 2 is a bad deal for Europe" and that his administration "will be reviewing" new sanctions. A February report by NBC News, citing congressional aides, noted that these sanctions had "strong bipartisan support" in Congress.

There were many debates in the UK Parliament and elsewhere about the Nordstream in relation to UK´s own energy insecurity and loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis Germany and the rest of the EU. One fine example is a debate from 2021. Volume 690: debated on Wednesday 10 March 2021 (079). The 2021 Integrated Review (into foreign, security and defence policy) which identified Russia as the “greatest threat”– while naming China as “a systemic challenge”. (003) As for USA their main threat is a peer competitor China and economically the EU. At this point the USA is not considering Russia their primary issue like the UK does.

In 16 March 2021 - UK published its strategy paper: Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy which provided objectives. The main one was "Shaping the open international order of the future" and "building resilience overseas". After Brexit the UK lost its role in EU institutions and was going through painful realignments. It realized it lots is political power and influence. 

As a way out of the post Brexit mess Boris Johnson planned to transform ‘Global Britain’ slogan into an inspiring strategic plan in which old statement that “Great Britain that has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” will be replaced by imposing UK on ambitiously improved standing as a relevant powerful state utilizing its assets. The military - the army and navy special operations will play its role (044)  

[The first Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy was published on 16 March 2021. The following week, the Defence Command Papers, ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’ and the ‘Defence and Security Industrial Strategy’ were published. The latest update was in July 2022. UK held our first evidence session on 23 March 2021 and subsequently held a further six evidence sessions. The report was updated several times before Nordstream pipelines were attacked.]

In 2021 Boris Johnson realized the gravity and criticality of the situation with UK energy security, balance of payments, trade, which was hit hard after Brexit. His team updated energy security strategy which aimed to reduce the UK's dependence on imported fossil fuels, he also previously proclaimed he wants to make from the UK a 'Saudi Arabia of wind power'. A vision which can not happen if this form of alternative energy is not competitive against low energy prices, if UK wind farms will not have demand, customers, who until now prefer long term piped gas deals from reliable Russian companies.  

The UK´s energy insecurity issue is that neither solar nor wind energy sources are competitive to Russian piped gas while Britain´s own low cost oil and gas fields in North sea are being depleted with no new discoveries to replace them. Exploring at low prices in deep sea is uneconomic. 

Energy trading through electricity interconnectors between the EU and Great Britain was after Brexit no longer managed through existing single market tools, such as "EU market coupling" which complicated building of new wind fields. So in other words, the end of energy market coupling has had significant implications for the UK's energy market, the excess energy when wind delivers strong would not be automatically sold to EU markets. It was a bottleneck for Johnson´s vision. (002) and (041).

On May 19, 2021, President Biden waived sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG and its CEO Matthias Warnig, a decision met with disapproval from both Republican and Democratic lawmakers. Republican Senator Jim Risch labeled it "a gift to Putin and will only weaken the United States." Russian and German officials expressed approval of the sanctions waiver, but Yuriy Vitrenko from Naftogaz criticized the decision, advocating for sanctions to halt the pipeline.

At a White House press briefing on May 25, 2021, President Biden explained his decision to waive the sanctions, noting that the pipeline was nearly complete and that imposing sanctions could damage relations with Europe.

On 4 June 2021, Vladimir Putin announced that the pipe-laying for first line of the Nord Stream 2 had been fully completed. On 10 June, the sections of the pipeline were connected. The completion of the second line's laying occurred in September 2021.

At the G7 Summit in Cornwall, Boriss Johnson told reporters on June 12, “We’ve got to break Europe’s reliance on Russian gas—projects like Nord Stream 2 just tighten Putin’s grip,” per a BBC transcript. The June 13 communiqué, shaped by Johnson’s hosting, emphasized LNG diversification, implicitly targeting Nord Stream 2.

Johnson, in a July 22 Commons Q&A, said, “I’m deeply skeptical of this Nord Stream 2 deal—it’s a mistake to let Russia bypass Ukraine and hold Europe hostage,” per Hansard. He added, “Nord Stream 1 already gives them too much leverage.” Johnson criticized the deal’s leniency, tying Nord Stream 2’s 55 bcm capacity to Nord Stream 1’s 48 bcm as a dual threat, pushing for tougher allied action despite UK’s post-Brexit limits. This linking of NS1 and NS2 as a dual threat was the first documented direct statement against both projects by UK top politician.

In early July 2021, the US advised Ukraine against criticizing an upcoming agreement with Germany regarding the pipeline.

The Biden administration and Germany reached a deal to mitigate tensions over Nord Stream 2. On July 20, Joe Biden and Angela Merkel finalized an agreement where the US could impose sanctions should Russia utilize Nord Stream as a "political weapon". 

This deal was designed to ensure that Poland and Ukraine do not lose access to Russian gas supplies. Ukraine was promised a $50 million loan for green technology development until 2024, while Germany committed to establishing a billion-dollar fund to support Ukraine's shift to green energy, compensating for the anticipated loss of gas transit revenue. The transit agreement for Russian gas through Ukraine would be extended to 2034, contingent on Russian government approval. The U.S. waived sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG and its CEO, Matthias Warnig, to preserve transatlantic unity, while Germany committed to supporting Ukraine with energy investments (e.g., a $175 million “green fund”) and ensuring Russia honored Ukraine’s gas transit role post-2024. Critics, including Ukraine and Poland, called it a “concession to Russia,” but it allowed construction to finish without further U.S. interference.

The July 2021 article in Guardian cited that "Britain plans to launch covert special forces operations against Russia and China" The RT reported that Royal Marines Brigadier Mark Totten revealed to the Times the UK Special Forces are about to concentrate on some new covert counter-state tasks with a focus on Russia and China. Totten said: "The British Royal Marines are to take over some of the “traditional” roles of the nation’s special forces units – the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) – as they are preparing for some new “higher risk” counter-state tasks." 

Guardian reported that the most secretive parts of the British military are likely to get a new focus and a new remit that would involve countering Russia and other state actors through secret missions.  Totten’s comments were a rare instance of a British military official openly admitting that London plans to deploy the UK Special Forces on covert missions specifically targeting Russia and China. (081)

On September 10, 2022 Nord Stream 2 AG announced the full completion of the 1,230-kilometer pipeline, with the final pipe section welded in Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by the Russian vessel Fortuna. This marked the end of offshore construction, begun in 2018, overcoming delays from U.S. sanctions and the withdrawal of Western contractors like Allseas. The twin pipelines were now physically ready to transport 55 billion cubic meters of gas annually.

UK Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Kwasi Kwarteng told a parliamentary committee September 22, 2021 that "We are not exposed to Russian supply as many of our EU counterparts are" (027). It was clear that any disruption of Russian export would not affect the UK´s energy security.

Truss became Foreign Secretary on September 15. In a London speech to the Chatham House, Truss said, “Nord Stream 2 hands Russia a dangerous tool—we must work with allies to stop it starting up,” per a Reuters October 20 report. She tied this to “Russia’s malign behavior,” citing Ukraine. This Truss’s first major Nord Stream 2 remark as Foreign Secretary aligned with Johnson, framing Nord Stream 1’s 41% German import share (Eurostat) as a prelude to Nord Stream 2’s threat, urging certification blocks.

The German federal election saw Merkel’s CDU/CSU lose power, with the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Free Democrats (FDP) forming a coalition by December. While SPD leader Olaf Scholz supported Nord Stream 2, the Greens, who opposed it on environmental and geopolitical grounds, gained influence (e.g., Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock). This shift signaled potential policy changes, though the pipeline’s completion preempted immediate cancellation.

The first of Nord Stream 2’s two lines was filled in October 2021 with technical gas (about 177 million cubic meters) for pre-commissioning tests, a critical step toward operational readiness. This process, completed by Gazprom, confirmed the pipeline’s integrity and preparedness to receive natural gas, pending regulatory approval from Germany and the EU. On October 21, 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that gas deliveries through the pipeline would commence the day following Germany's approval. Nord Stream 2 AG submitted its certification application to Germany’s Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) in September 2021 to operate as an independent transmission operator under EU rules. However, on November 16, the agency suspended the process, ruling that the operator, based in Switzerland, needed a German subsidiary to comply with the EU Gas Directive’s unbundling requirements. This delay pushed certification into 2022, keeping the pipeline idle.

At COP26 in Glasgow, Johnson said on November 2, “We can’t keep piping Russian gas through Nord Stream when we’re pushing net zero—LNG and renewables are the future,” per a Guardian speech transcript. He avoided naming Nord Stream 2 explicitly but later told press, “Europe’s addiction to these pipelines must end.”

On November, 4 2021 in another article named: "We must stand together for freedom and democracy" Liz Truss explains: "I want our friends across Europe to join us. That means standing together for example in opposing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline."

On November, 5 2021 - Article with headline "Stop guzzling Russian gas, Boris Johnson tells Europe" mentions that addressing the governments of Germany, Austria, Italy, France, and other European countries that import large amounts of Russian gas, Mr Johnson said: "We hope that our friends may recognise that a choice is shortly coming between mainlining ever more Russian hydrocarbons in giant new pipelines and sticking up for Ukraine and championing the cause of peace and stability, let me put it that way."

On 16 Nov 2021 - Boris Johnson warned EU to choose between Ukraine and Nord Stream 2. Writing in The Sunday Telegraph, Truss urged “Friends across Europe” to stand together in opposing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Same message was delivered in an interview for another newspapers 16 Nov 2021 "EU ultimatum! Boris warns bloc must chose Russian gas pipeline or 'stick up for Ukraine'" (042). In the USA only certain individuals, a faction, was against Nordstream but in the UK it was the key state representatives most opposing it voicing their policy.

On Nov, 18 2021 in another article named: "Nord Stream 2: Will you go to the Gazprom with me?" the same message was repeated, in it British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that “a choice is shortly coming for Europe".  (031)

In late November 2021, Germany mandated that certain assets of Nord Stream AG, registered in Switzerland, including the pipeline, be transferred to a business entity registered in Germany. Gazprom filed accordingly registrations.

Later in the same month on 30 Nov 2021 - Liz Truss urged Nato allies to block Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, stating that "It remains to be seen how far the UK can push its opposition to Nord Stream 2". (002)

Truss told Sky News, “Nord Stream 2 mustn’t go live—it’s a lever Putin’s using to squeeze Europe, and Nord Stream 1’s already too much,” per a December 13 broadcast. She pushed U.S. LNG as a fix.

Amid soaring European gas prices and an energy crisis, Russia was accused of withholding supplies to pressure certification of Nord Stream 2. Gazprom reduced flows via Ukraine and Poland, prompting Ukraine and Eastern European states to warn of “energy blackmail.” Germany and the EU faced criticism for dependence on Russia, amplifying political stakes as certification stalled and tensions with Moscow rose.

In December, 2021 the US and the European Union had accused Russian-owned Gazprom of not having delivered sufficient gas through existing pipelines, while Russia claimed that those pipelines were already delivering natural gas at full capacities. 

Bloomberg reports Birol saying: “While we understand Gazprom is fulfilling its contractual commitments under long-term contracts, it has reduced spot sales to Europe and this is despite the fact that the price under Gazprom’s long-term contracts are well below current spot price levels.” 

Following month on December, 11 2021 Truss said she wanted to work with other countries “to make sure that free democratic nations are able to have an alternative to Russian gas supplies.” She met on the sidelines of the gathering with Germany’s new foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, a politician from the environmentalist Greens who previously opposed Nord Stream 2.


...but that was just the beginning of the story,

things started to heat up in early 2022.

The Nordstream 2 was built, all was ready for a launch.

Gazprom was just waiting for certification.

- Part 2 -

- Part 3 -

- Part 4 -

- Part 5 -

- Part 6 -




(twitter post here)

It will be split between months... main highlights.

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update
28/11/2022
A milestone reached!

VIEWS O MY BLOG

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RELATED POSTS:

001 - The #1st post: 100 shades of Nordstream sabotage - part I
002 - UK government does not like Nordstream


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159 - Nordstream affair - The Opening Act - Hybrid attacks

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