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Historical Context: The UK's involvement in covert operations has a rich history dating back to the 16th century, prompting a discussion about the effectiveness of disruption strategies to meet modern objectives
Covert Operations: The UK has intensified its emphasis on covert operations, highlighted by a 2021 integrated review that promotes intelligence, special forces, and offensive cyber operations to tackle threats from adversaries like Russia and China.
Sub-threshold Warfare Focus: Evidence suggests a strong UK interest in sub-threshold warfare strategies. This includes plans for covert special forces operations, as reported in a 2021 Guardian article. Key military documents, such as the Integrated Operating Concept (2020) and the Defence Command Paper (2021), reflect a strategic pivot towards operations below the threshold of armed conflict, utilizing non-kinetic tools like cyber and electronic warfare
Military Doctrine Adaptation: The UK's military doctrine is evolving to include sub-threshold scenarios, with the Ranger Regiments playing a pivotal role. There is significant discourse in Parliament and public statements supporting these capabilities, along with research contributions from think tanks like RUSI
Cybersecurity Initiatives: Organizations like the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and 77 Brigade are focusing on cyber and psychological operations, while GCHQ has increased its public discussion about offensive cyber capabilities. Recent military exercises have also tested responses to hybrid threats, reinforcing the UK's commitment to these strategies
4 February 2021 - THE UNITED KINGDOM DOUBLES DOWN ON COVERT OPERATIONS
Two weeks ago, the British government published its most significant review of defense, security, and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. It will likely usher in a new era of British covert interventionism.
The 114-page integrated review, titled “Global Britain in a Competitive Age,” emphasizes “Global Britain,” a slogan coined by the governing Conservative Party in the aftermath of the country’s vote to leave the European Union in 2016. The review highlights that the British government wants to maintain global influence, including by tilting toward the geographically distant Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, however, Britain perennially lacks the capabilities sufficient to meet its ambitions—and even more so now given the damage Covid-19 has done to the British economy.
In an attempt to reconcile global ambitions with limited means, the review, together with an accompanying Defence Command Paper, emphasizes secret intelligence, special operations forces, and offensive cyber capabilities. They will be used to disrupt, deter, deny, and degrade Britain’s adversaries. All are tools of force multiplication; the power of the hidden hand will allow Britain to do more with less.
The defense paper emphasizes that special forces will maintain an impressive global reach. They will continue their “precision strike operations,” but will also maintain their equally important function of surveillance in hostile environments—a less glamorous role consistently overlooked in press coverage. Working alongside intelligence agencies in a whole-of-government approach, they will operate below the threshold of conflict to disrupt hostile states.
The paper also establishes new forces capable of special operations, creating a new “Ranger Regiment.” Apparently modeled on the US Army’s Green Berets, it will draw on four battalions and consist of between two thousand and four thousand soldiers. It will allow more British forces to discreetly train, advise, and—most importantly—accompany partners in high-threat environments. According to the review, it will “project UK global influence and pre-empt and deter threats below the threshold of war as well as state aggression.” And it will free up tier one special operations forces for more covert surveillance and deniable disruption work.
The review’s emphasis on intelligence and special forces is consistent with Britain’s traditional approach to covert operations. The United Kingdom has long used the hidden hand to influence events overseas in a deniable or unacknowledged manner. It has done so since before the United States was even created. Indeed, back in the sixteenth century advisors to Queen Elizabeth I talked of “covert meanes” to counter the Spanish.'
...Successive UK governments have long sought to disrupt adversaries, dislocate threats at source, and keep enemies—in the words of one recent chief of MI6—“in their half of the pitch.”
The danger here, however, is whether disruption is enough to meet the UK’s objectives. And the reviews are vague on this question. Using covert means, whether through special forces or offensive cyber operations, to disrupt hostile states will not solve the UK’s foreign policy problems.¨
And while the emphasis throughout the review on support for NATO allies makes sense, the review does not clearly define “partners.” In an accompanying press release, the Chief of the General Staff offered only “regular and irregular partners and proxies.”
The July 2021 article in Guardian cited that "Britain plans to launch covert special forces operations against Russia and China" The RT reported that Royal Marines Brigadier Mark Totten revealed to the Times the UK Special Forces are about to concentrate on some new covert counter-state tasks with a focus on Russia and China. Totten said: The British Royal Marines are to take over some of the “traditional” roles of the nation’s special forces units – the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) – as they are preparing for some new “higher risk” counter-state tasks. Guardian reported that the most secretive parts of the British military are likely to get a new focus and a new remit that would involve countering Russia and other state actors through secret missions. Totten’s comments were a rare instance of a British military official openly admitting that London plans to deploy the UK Special Forces on covert missions specifically targeting Russia and China.
Launched in September 2020 by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), this concept explicitly shifted focus toward operating below the threshold of armed conflict. It emphasized "persistent engagement" and the use of non-kinetic tools—like cyber, information operations, and economic pressure—to shape environments and deter adversaries without escalating to war. The document reflects a research-driven push to understand and operationalize these tactics, with the MoD stating the need to "think and act differently" in a continuum of conflict.
Parliamentary Debates and Questions
Hansard records show MPs raising sub-threshold warfare topics pre-2022.
For instance, on March 22, 2021, during the Integrated Review debate, Tobias Ellwood (then Defence Committee Chair) pressed the government on countering Russia’s “grey zone” tactics, asking about UK capabilities to “match or exceed” them. Defence Secretary Ben Wallace’s response emphasized “new tools” and “persistent competition,” hinting at research into offensive sub-threshold methods.
A July 13, 2021, Commons discussion on hybrid threats saw MPs like Stewart Malcolm McDonald question MoD investment in “non-kinetic effects” (e.g., influence operations), with replies pointing to ongoing “development” of such capabilities—suggesting active exploration.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s March 16, 2021, Integrated Review speech called for the UK to be “match-fit” for a world of “systemic competition,” with veiled references to wielding influence below war thresholds. His emphasis on “new domains” aligns with research into hybrid tactics.
General Sir Nick Carter, then-Chief of the Defence Staff, warned in a November 2020 BBC interview of “reckless” sub-threshold acts by rivals, advocating UK “innovation” to respond—later echoed in his 2021 RUSI lecture pushing “offensive cyber” research.
Defence Command Paper (March 2021)
Titled Defence in a Competitive Age, this paper built on the Integrated Review and outlined investments in capabilities suited for sub-threshold operations, such as cyber (£1.9 billion allocated over 2021-2025), electronic warfare, and special forces enhancements (e.g., Ranger Regiments). The MoD’s focus on "modernization" and "persistent global engagement" suggests active research into how to conduct such operations effectively, with a nod to countering Russia and China’s grey zone tactics.
By 2022, the UK Armed Forces were adapting training to include sub-threshold scenarios. For example, the Army’s Ranger Regiments, formed in 2021, were designed for "special operations" below the conflict threshold, with training emphasizing cooperation with non-military actors and allies. The MoD’s Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (updated pre-2022) hints at research into integrating military and civilian tools for such purposes, though specifics remain classified.
A 2020 King’s College London event (UK CMR and Sub-Threshold Warfare) featured a serving RAF officer, Paul Cole, discussing the military’s exploration of sub-threshold tactics and their civil-military implications, indicating internal research interest.
The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), established in 2016, and the 77 Brigade (formed 2015, restructured pre-2022) focus on cyber and psychological operations—key sub-threshold tools. The NCSC’s public stance by 2022 included offensive cyber capabilities, with the UK openly acknowledging their use (e.g., then-Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt’s 2018 speech on applying international law to cyber ops). This suggests research into how to deploy these tools covertly or deniably.
The 2018 UK position on cyberspace law, reaffirmed in NATO contexts, shows doctrinal research into conducting cyber operations below armed conflict thresholds, potentially as hybrid attacks.
Think Tanks and Academic Input
RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) published works like Countering Hybrid Warfare (2018) and The Future of Warfare (2021), often with MoD collaboration, exploring how the UK could develop sub-threshold strategies. These efforts included case studies (e.g., Salisbury response) and proposals for tools like disinformation or economic coercion—indicating a research ecosystem feeding into policy.
Intelligence Community Signals
The GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) ramped up public discussion of offensive cyber by 2022. Director Jeremy Fleming’s April 2021 speech at the CyberUK conference highlighted GCHQ’s role in “disrupting adversaries” below conflict thresholds, citing a 2020 operation against ransomware groups as a test case. This reflects research into cyber as a sub-threshold weapon.
The Dynamic Response 2021 exercise (October 2021), a NATO-led drill with significant UK involvement, tested responses to hybrid scenarios (e.g., cyberattacks, infrastructure sabotage). UK forces, including 16 Air Assault Brigade, practiced “proactive deterrence,” hinting at rehearsing sub-threshold actions.
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)The MoD’s Wargaming Centre, expanded in 2021, reportedly simulated grey zone conflicts, with a RUSI report (May 2021) noting UK scenarios involving “counter-disinformation” and “economic disruption”—tools that could be researched for offensive use.
The DSTL, the MoD’s research arm, advertised projects pre-2022 tied to sub-threshold domains. A 2021 call for proposals sought innovations in “multi-domain integration” and “effects below the threshold of conflict,” including AI-driven disinformation detection—and implicitly, generation. While framed defensively, the dual-use nature of such tech suggests broader research intent.
DSTL’s collaboration with industry (e.g., QinetiQ) on autonomous systems and electronic warfare by 2022 points to capabilities suited for deniable operations.
This paper urged the UK to clarify its legal and ethical stance on such operations, implying ongoing internal research to refine these capabilities without crossing into overt conflict.
The UK has a long history of sub-threshold operations (e.g., Cold War covert actions), and by 2022, this legacy informed modern efforts. The AUKUS pact (September 2021) and Global Combat Air Programme suggest investment in technologies (e.g., AI, drones) that could support deniable hybrid actions, with research likely underway in classified MoD programs.
The 2021 Integrated Review’s focus on “Global Britain” included a shift from warfighting to competition below conflict thresholds, with resources redirected to test and develop these methods (e.g., cutting conventional forces to fund cyber).
The UK´s interest in sub-threshold research aligns with capability exists. The Salisbury Novichok attack (2018) response—blaming Russia while enhancing UK cyber and special forces—shows a pattern of studying adversaries’ hybrid tactics to mirror or counter them.
No public data directly admits UK research into conducting such attacks, but the emphasis on "deterrence by denial" and "persistent engagement" implies exploring how to wield these tools offensively, not just defensively.
Yes, there’s substantial evidence of UK interest in researching how to conduct below-the-threshold warfare by September 26, 2022. Official strategies, military restructuring, cyber investments, and intellectual discourse all point to a deliberate effort to understand and potentially employ sub-threshold tactics—whether for deterrence or action. The capability and research interest were demonstrably present.
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