June 2022 - IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS - Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU
ABSTRACT
The EU’s subsea data cable network is both vital for global connectivity and vulnerable. This study provides a systematic review of the current security threats, as well as the actors at the origin of these threats. Building on reports and expert input, the paper takes stock of current awareness, preparedness and response mechanisms, both at the EU and Member State level. A number of recommendations suggest how to improve the resilience of the cable network. Proposals build on the need to enhance EU-wide awareness, improve coordination and share information across EU institutions and Member States. In addition, surveillance capabilities must be advanced, response and repair mechanisms strengthened, and the topic mainstreamed across external action.
AUTHORS ANDCONTRIBUTORS
Authors
• Christian BUEGER, Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark & Honorary Professor, University of Seychelles, Seychelles;
• Tobias LIEBETRAU, Postdoctoral Researcher, Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI), Sciences Po Paris, France;
• Jonas FRANKEN, Research Assistant, Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC), Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany.
Research Assistance
• Anna SARASIBAR, Junior Consultant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands;
• Jan ESSINK, Junior Consultant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands;
• Tyren KONING, Student Assistant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands.
The chapters 2 and 3 draw on research funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Hessian Ministry of Higher Education, Research, Science and the Arts within their joint support of the
National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE and by the LOEWE initiative (Hesse, Germany) within the emergenCITY centre. Dipl.-Inf. Thomas REINHOLD (Technical University Darmstadt) provided valuable advice and support for both chapters.
PEER REVIEWER
• Lars GJESVIK, Research Fellow at NUPI's Centre for Digitalization and Cyber Security Studies from the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo, Norway.
PROJECT COORDINATOR (CONTRACTOR)
• Alexandra RIMPLER-SCHMID, Senior Consultant Security & Justice, Ecorys, The Netherlands.
This paper was requested by the European Parliament's sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE).
VERSION English-language manuscript completed in April 2022.
5.1.2 Modes of attack: Physical destruction
Most of these exercises included ASW (anti-submarine-warfare).
At the same time there was large air activity wits also ASW capable assets here]
[MRT: Note that it was Norway which blew a whistle about the plot]
[Note: The paper describes on outlines the FRA security of subsea infrastructure. This could explain the presence of the FRA navy on GER led September exercise Northern Coasts which later got extension for unknown reason and also the statement of the captain that France is in danger not alike Finland - see details in the post here. More research is needed in new directions. -> NOR, FRA involvment, and knowledge of the plot before it happened and after.]
16 Sept 2022 - NOR: The Minister of Defense will visit FFI on 16 September
Bjørn Arild Gram will visit the Norwegian Defense Research Institute (FFI) on 16 September at Kjeller.
During the visit to Kjeller, Bjørn Arild Gram had his political adviser Marie Lamo with him. Major General Henning Frantzen, department director Marianne Magnæs and senior advisor Idun Mostulien also participated.
In just under three hours, Gram got an insight into some of the many tasks the institute is responsible for. FFI's support for defense planning is central. Research leader Sverre Kvalvik and research leader Mona Guttelvik both work at the Strategic Analysis and Joint Systems department. They met an interested minister.
Compound attacks
Together they finally visited FFI's CBRE preparedness laboratory (Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives).
16 Sept 2022 - NOR: Støre: My colleagues are talking about a war economyThe laboratory has an important role when unknown and potentially dangerous substances are discovered. Research leader Helene Thorsen Rønning and senior researcher Janne Tønsager both work at the Total Defense department, and have extensive knowledge of the challenges facing society in this area.
The Prime Minister met the oil and gas companies to discuss the energy crisis in Europe. After the meeting, he emphasized the seriousness of the energy crisis.
LEAD AUTHOR OF THE ANALYSYS:
Christian Bueger - Professor of International Relations specialised in maritime security and ocean governance at University of Copenhagen5 October 2022 - Nord Stream pipeline sabotage: how an attack could have been carried out and why Europe was defenceless
But it is still unclear how the attacks were carried out. The investigations will probably take months to complete, but there are two likely scenarios.
A first option is that the attacks could have been carried out as an underwater operation using advanced submarine technology.
This implies that we are looking at a state and its navy. Although the attacks took place outside the territorial waters of the Nato members Denmark and Sweden, they could be interpreted as an act of war.
The second scenario is an operation launched from a privately owned surface vessel, such as a fishing boat being used as a platform for divers or submersibles to place explosives. In this case, the attack vessel was hiding in everyday maritime traffic.
This scenario points us to so called “grey-zone” tactics: an attack by a group acting indirectly on behalf of state interests. The involvement of any government will then be very difficult to verify. This scenario implies that the Nord Stream attack was likely to have been the first ever recorded grey-zone activity in the European subsea.
[MRT: The Swedish investigator Mats Ljungqvist states that the state actor scenario is the main one.]
RELATED STATEMENTS OF THE SWEDISH INVESTIGATOR:
6 April 2023 - State actor involvement in Nord Stream pipeline attacks is 'main scenario', says Swedish investigator
There are certain companies that have certain special missions that mean they could, in theory, carry this out … We don’t rule out anything, but that it is a state actor who is directly or at least indirectly behind this is of course our absolute main scenario, given all the circumstances.
Chief Nord Stream investigator Mats Ljungqvist speaks:Same singular state-actor suspected on all sites.
The Swedish prosecutor, who was carrying the Nord Stream sabotage attack's investigation, said the “clear main scenario” was that there was the involvement of a state-sponsored group, as he expressed his doubt over theories that suggested an independent group's involvement in the pipeline blasts.
[MRT: CONCCLUSION base on the Christian Bueger´s first scenario is that "...the attacks could have been carried out as an underwater operation using advanced submarine technology..." ]
Same author:[MRT: Collected statements of the SWE investigator are here]
6 April 2023 - Next steps for the EU’s maritime security – briefing the European Council
CONCLUSION:
-> A state using advance submarine technology has been involved <-
-> The gray-zone attack by a Pro-Ukrainian group has been excluded <-
On 28-09-2022 CNN reports that:
"Russian submarines were also observed not far from those areas last week, one of the intelligence officials said... US officials declined to comment on the intelligence about the ships on Wednesday."
On 5 Oct 2022 - CNN - The USA considering offering to analyse underwater audio recordings to aid Nord Stream pipeline sabotage investigations. Article speaks about “sonar signature”.
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.
Every bit helps keep this mission alive!
No comments:
Post a Comment