Wednesday, February 22, 2023

015 - Have sanctions against Nordstream Insurers created Catch-22 situation?

PREFACE/ISSUE

Devil is in details as the saying goes


catch-22 is a paradoxical situation from which an individual cannot escape
because of contradictory rules or limitations. 

...could we find some footprints in legal documents and legal definitions, or legal cases?

Are those broken Nordstream pipelines possible to get fixed now?


I. Do sanctions against Nordstream insurance companies prevent claims to happen?

The sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project and its insurers may have various impacts, including limiting the ability of the project to obtain financing or insurance coverage. 
 


Regarding the insurance coverage for Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 projects, the impact of sanctions could depend on the specific terms of the sanctions and the scope of the insurance policies.

If the sanctions prevent or limit insurance companies from making payments to the project in the event of a claimit could potentially affect the project's ability to recover losses and continue its operations.

 However, it's worth noting that insurance policies often contain exclusions and limitations that may apply in the case of certain events, including those that are caused by sanctions or other geopolitical risks.

In general, sanctions against insurance companies can have a significant impact on their ability to conduct business, particularly if the sanctions are issued by powerful countries or international bodies.

In some cases, sanctions may prohibit companies from doing business in certain countries, or may limit their ability to engage in transactions with specific individuals or entities. The impact of sanctions on insurance companies can vary widely depending on the specifics of the sanctions, the size and scope of the company, and the nature of its business operations.

Insurers of NS1: 

The project is insured by a consortium of companies, including:
  • Zurich Insurance Group: Zurich Insurance Group is a Swiss multinational insurance company headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland.
  • Allianz SE: Allianz SE is a German multinational insurance company headquartered in Munich, Germany.
  • AXA S.A.: AXA S.A. is a French multinational insurance company headquartered in Paris, France.
  • Hannover Re: Hannover Re is a German reinsurance company headquartered in Hanover, Germany.
  • Munich Re: Munich Re is a German reinsurance company headquartered in Munich, Germany.
These companies provide a range of insurance coverage, including property damage, business interruption, and liability insurance, among others. It's worth noting that the insurance coverage for the Nord Stream 1 project may have changed since its construction and completion, as insurance policies are subject to renewal and changes over time. 

Insurers of NS2:  

24 Feb 2021 - 15 Insurers Stop Doing Business with Nord Stream 2 Pipeline to Avoid Sanctions: Reuters

These 15 insurers that were providing insurance coverage for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project as of February 2021 (insured some part of project, those first 4 were major ones):

    • Zurich Insurance Group (Switzerland)
    • Munich Re (Germany)
    • Hannover Re (Germany)
    • Swiss Re (Switzerland)
    • Chubb (United States)
    • Aspen Insurance Holdings Limited (United States)
    • Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (United States)
    • HDI Global SE (Germany)
    • Atrium Underwriting Group Limited (United Kingdom)
    • Antares Syndicate (United Kingdom)
    • Hiscox Ltd. (Bermuda)
    • StarStone (United Kingdom)
    • CNA Hardy (United Kingdom)
    • Markel Corporation (United States)
    • Apollo Global Management (United States)

It's important to note that insurance coverage for the Nord Stream 2 project may have changed since the publication of this article, and the current composition of the insurance consortium may be different. 

 

II. The "Act of Sabotage" vs "The act of terrorism"

The acts of sabotage and terrorism by a state have different legal implications and are governed by different sets of laws and conventions.

Sabotage by a state is typically defined as an act of destruction or damage to property or infrastructure, carried out with the intent of causing harm or disruption to another state. The act of sabotage is generally considered a violation of international law, and can be subject to legal consequences, such as economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or even military retaliation.

Terrorism by a state, on the other hand, is typically defined as an act of violence or intimidation carried out by a state or its agents against civilian populations or non-combatants, with the intent of creating fear or forcing a political or ideological agenda. Terrorism by a state is considered a violation of international law and can be subject to legal consequences, such as economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure, as well as possible criminal prosecution for individual perpetrators.

The key legal difference between the two is that sabotage typically involves the destruction or damage of property or infrastructure, while terrorism typically involves violence or threats of violence against civilians or non-combatants.

Sabotage is generally considered to be a violation of international law, while terrorism is widely considered to be a crime against humanity.

It's worth noting that both acts of sabotage and terrorism can have serious political and diplomatic implications, and may result in military or other forms of retaliation by affected states.

The international community generally condemns both acts and calls for their prevention and prosecution.

[M: Note the post - "Who said it is a "Sabotage" first?" It tells a lot about who has done it and has not] 


III. US, EU, UK policy toward insurers

December 2019, the United States passed legislation authorizing sanctions against companies involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, including those providing services such as insurance and certification. The US government has since imposed sanctions on several companies involved in the project, including insurers.

Similarly, the European Union passed a regulation in 2020 allowing for sanctions to be imposed against individuals and entities involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The regulation allows for sanctions to be imposed on companies providing financial, technical, or material support to the project, which could include insurers.

The sanctions imposed on Nord Stream 2 insurers have had a significant impact on the project, as they have made it difficult for the pipeline's operators to obtain the necessary insurance and certification to complete construction.

Published 18 March 2014 The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 ensure sanctions relating to Russia are implemented effectively after the UK leaves the EU.

The sanctions were introduced in 2014 following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. The sanctions target individuals and entities that are deemed to be undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 project.

In 2020, the UK government imposed further sanctions on entities involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, citing concerns about the project's impact on European energy security and Ukraine's position as a transit country for Russian gas. 

On 21 July 2022, the UK’s recent sanctions against Russia came into force. This latest round of sanctions impacts the oil, insuranceenergy, gold and coal markets, as well as providing for certain restrictions on the provision of professional and business services to Russia. Whilst broadly looking to align themselves with existing EU sanctions, there are notable differences between how these UK sanctions will be applied which are now discussed within this update.
 
Impact on UK Insurance Sector
The restriction on providing financial services to oil and oil products has implications for the UK’s insurance sector, given that the definition of “financial services” includes the provision of insurance and reinsurance services (as defined under Section 61(1)(a) of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018).

 As a result, from 31 December 2022, UK insurers will be prohibited from providing insurance services in respect of the import, acquisition and supply or delivery of the listed oil and oil products that originate in Russia or are located in Russia, that are destined for the UK.

Notably, however, there is no equivalent UK restriction to that of Article 3n of the EU Regulations. 

Alignment with EU Oil Ban

There are subtle differences between the two jurisdictions’ restrictions. For example, the EU restrictions are limited to oil products under commodity codes 2709 00 (crude) and 2710 (other petroleum oils). Meanwhile, the UK sanctions include a significantly broader list, comprising products falling under commodity codes 2709 to 2715 (including petroleum gases and jelly), 2207 (ethyl alcohol) and 3826 (biodiesel oil).

Further, whilst the EU sanctions separate the wind-down periods for CN Code 2709 (crude, 5 December 2022) and CN Code 2710 (certain petroleum oils, 5 February 2023), the expansive list of oil and oil products under the UK restrictions are simply prohibited from 31 December 2022. Accordingly, under the UK rules, all transactions caught by the new restrictions described above must be concluded by 30 December 2022. 

The sanctions have been a major source of controversy, with some arguing that they represent an overreach of US, UK and EU power and others arguing that they are necessary to address concerns about the pipeline's potential impact on European energy security and geopolitical stability.

11th May 2022 - Russian sanctions and the insurance industry

The challenge now for financial institutions globally is to ensure that their sanctions and AML programmes are sufficiently robust, to ensure effective compliance in this rapidly evolving landscape. For the insurance industry this may cause loss of business and trigger loss claims. Some of the sanctions are directly aimed at blocking Russian entities and interests from accessing global insurance markets, and many other restrictions may affect insurers’ business.

The pace of change will be a challenge for the industry and will render companies unable to insure a sanctioned person or reinsure a sanctioned insurer, irrespective of the type of business. While keeping tabs on sanctions as business as usual will continue to be a challenge.  


IV. Insurers and Nordstream in 2019 and 2021
 
In December 2019, the US government imposed sanctions on several companies involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, including the Swiss-based Allseas Group, which was responsible for laying undersea pipes for the project. Following these sanctions, Zurich Insurance Group announced that it was withdrawing from the Nord Stream 2 project and would no longer provide insurance coverage for it.

In February 2021, it was reported that Allianz SE had resumed coverage for the Nord Stream 2 project, joining other insurers including Munich Re and Hannover Re.  

However, in April 2021, Zurich Insurance Group announced that it would resume coverage for the Nord Stream 2 project, despite ongoing opposition from some Western countries. The company stated that it had reviewed the situation and concluded that it was appropriate to resume coverage for the project. The resumption of insurance coverage is seen as a boost to the project, which has faced significant delays and opposition in recent years.

[M: Note that UK told their companies to get out of Russia - post here]

 

IV. Was the EU Top Court or the Swiss court decision The Trigger for blowing Nordstream pipelines?

July 2021 - European ParliamentThe Nord Stream 2 pipeline - Economic, environmental and geopolitical issues   

12 July 2022 - Gazprom’s Shunned Nord Stream 2 Wins Spat Over EU Pipeline Rules

  • EU top court says gas project’s challenge is admissible
  • Lower EU court will have to rule on substance of dispute

Russia’s shunned Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline won a legal boost in its pre-war challenge against European Union rules that subjected all new and existing pipelines involving foreign suppliers to the EU’s energy market-opening requirements, after the bloc’s top court said its appeal can be heard. 

While the ruling is a win for Nord Stream 2, its impact may have been overtaken by events in Ukraine, which led Germany to withdraw its backing for the project. 

19 August 2022 - Reopen Nord Stream 2 to ease our energy crisis, senior German politician urges

A senior figure within one of Germany's ruling parties has said the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia should be reopened, in a sign of an emerging rift over energy supplies as winter approaches...

 8 September 2022 - Swiss court gives Nord Stream 2 more time to avoid insolvency. 

In May, the court granted a provisional moratorium against bankruptcy proceedings for the first time, which was valid until September 10. This period has now been extended by another four months.

 

V. Was this supposed to be the Catch-22 but did it fail? 

31 October 2022 - Nord Stream insurance position unclear following major explosions

The lack of clarity surrounding responsibility for the explosions that impacted both Nord Stream pipelines last month has left the insurance position in limbo.

Should the insurance not be renewed, any prospect of repair for the pipeline and the recommencement of gas supplies via the pipeline to Europe would become more unlikely than they are already. 

 

VI. Exclusion clauses

Definitions: ...self sabotage or war, neither of which are generally covered by insurance.

What Is a War Exclusion Clause in an Insurance Contract?

war exclusion clause in an insurance contract refers to the protection of an insurer who will not be obligated to pay for losses caused by war-related events.

  • A war exclusion clause in an insurance policy excludes insurance coverage for damages related to war or similar activities.
  • The reason insurance policies have war clauses is that insurance companies cannot accurately compute the premiums to charge for damages sustained by war.
  • Insurance companies also do not cover war damages because the cost of the claims could potentially be astronomical, driving the company into bankruptcy.
  • War exclusion clauses were expanded and became standard after the September 11 terrorist attacks. 

Damaged Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline in re/insurance dilemma

...if Russia is implicated, insurance companies could argue it was “self-sabotage”, given Gazprom is state owned. If this is the case, as it was a deliberate act by the policyholder, they would not be allowed to file an insurance claim,.. 


VII. Latest developments 

22 Nov 2022 - Gazprom wins appeal against huge Nord Stream 2 antitrust fine in Poland

Russia’s Gazprom has won an appeal against a fine of over €6 billion imposed on it by Poland’s antitrust authority, UOKiK, for constructing the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline without first seeking Polish approval. UOKiK now says that it plans to challenge the ruling.

 22 Nov 2022 - Polish regulator to appeal annulment of $6.3 billion fine imposed on Gazprom

Poland's consumer rights watchdog, known as UOKiK, will appeal a court ruling that annulled fines imposed on Russian energy giant Gazprom and five other companies responsible for building the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, the Polish regulator said on Nov. 21...

In 2020 the regulator fined Gazprom over 29 billion zlotys ($6.33 billion) for building the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline without Warsaw's approval

28 Dec 2022 - Nord Stream 2 pipeline firm gets 6-month stay of bankruptcy

A Swiss court has granted a six-month “stay of bankruptcy” to the operating company for the never-opened Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which was built to bring Russian gas to Germany but put on ice shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine in February.

Nord Stream 2 AG, a subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom, is based in Zug. Nord Stream 2′s court-appointed administrator, Transliq AG, sought the extension.

9 Jan 2023 - Nord Stream 1 and 2 – Outcome of the Commission's investigation  

04 April 2023 - Exclusive: German insurers renew cover for blast-damaged Nord Stream gas link

[M: this news has huge implications (!)]


Do sanctions against repair companies prevent pipelines to be fixed? 

01 Feb 2023 - EU sanctions blocked Nord Stream repairs – company

Norway’s Equinor on Wednesday revealed that it was the government in Oslo and EU sanctions that blocked it from responding to a request for assistance in dealing with the damage to Nord Stream pipelines.  

Equinor is the Norwegian oil company that administers the Pipeline Repair and Subsea Intervention (PRSI) Pool, established by Oslo to deal with leaks and ruptures. The Swiss-based operators for Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 are among the 72 members of PRSI, and sent requests for assistance in October, shortly after both pipelines were damaged by undersea explosions.

Because PRSI “adheres to current legislation related to sanctions,” it “notified NS1 and NS2 (operators) that we were not able to do work as requested,” Equinor said in the statement. 

22 February 2023 - Failure to find out how the Nord Stream blast happened & who is responsible may encourage the malign actors to take advantage of the situation and even give rise to more terrorist acts. This puts the interests of all countries at stake, and they have every reason to be concerned. 


 Addendum - legal - case

Germany is well-positioned to characterize the project suspension as a permissible and proportional countermeasure to induce Russia’s compliance with the Charter of the United Nations and jus cogens prohibitions against unilateral use of force and continuing forcible annexation of territory in Ukraine.

One can well anticipate that Gazprom could, down the line, bring Germany to investor-State arbitration under the 1989 Germany-Russian Federation BIT, alleging possible damages from investment treatment obligations of Germany relative to the suspension of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. 

  Addendum - legal - maritime law

The explosions have been described ‘acts of sabotage’ (here), which may be criminal acts under some domestic laws. But, the sabotage of pipelines/cables as such is not specifically prohibited under the law of the sea – albeit other rules of international law, including obligations to preserve and protect the marine environment, may be violated by such conduct.i

 Conclusion

There are no insurance payments being prevented due to any bombing incident on Nord Stream pipelines. However, the project has faced significant political and regulatory challenges, including pressure on insurance companies. However, sanction against companies which could repair pipelines are still in place and prevent pipelines to be put back in service.

 

Concluding questions:

[M: Several questions:

  • Did sanctions had any reverse unintended impact on European energy security and geopolitical stability?
  • Has the state actor researched policies of insurance companies have toward Nord Stream 1 & 2 companies and warned them to withdrew? 

  • Why are some states proposing that it was an act of sabotage and not an act of state terrorism? Does this mean cover/collusion?
  • West is pushing for "Sabotage" while RU, CN state "terrorist act". Why?
  • Was the UK The first to impose sanctions affecting NS insurance companies pushing them out of contracts? Who was 1st?] 


SUM: o get one step further one needs to find out who promoted the "sabotage" definition -> see here


[M: On personal note - I have written to these insurers about my investigation several times.]



***

***
Uncovering the truth took over two years of self-funded, tireless investigation.
I decided to open it for free, no paywall, despite huge investment.
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.

Every bit helps keep this mission alive!

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Tuesday, February 21, 2023

014 - The UK chain of command toward SBS

PREFACE/ISSUE

Since searching for information is time consuming I tried: "Chat GPT".

Own research as well as what Russiaan claim show possible involvement of UK SBS (Special Boat Services) team. If it was behind the Nordstream affai what was the top down chain of command toward this unit?

The reason was to identify key people which could be considered as "suspects". Then I would run keywords if they had some statements about Nordstream, Russiia, etc. and look if there were some suspecting actions like promotions, or someone being fired as only 3/4 pipelines were disposed off. 


The UK CHAIN OF COMMAND toward SPECIAL BOAT SERVICES (SBS)

Lieutenant General Roly Walker, as 
Director of Special Forces (DSF), is the most senior officer in charge of the United Kingdom's Special Forces (UKSF).

Here is a general overview of the chain of command in the UK military leading up to the DSF:
  • The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) is the most senior military officer in the UK and is responsible for overseeing the operations of the British Armed Forces. The CDS reports directly to the Secretary of State for Defence.

  • The Secretary of State for Defence is a member of the UK government and is responsible for policy and strategic direction of the British Armed Forces.

  • Under the Secretary of State for Defence is the Minister for Defence Procurement, who is responsible for overseeing the procurement and delivery of equipment and support services for the British Armed Forces.

  • Under the Minister for Defence Procurement is the Chief of Materiel (Joint Enablers), who is responsible for delivering the equipment and support services needed by the UK's military.

  • Under the Chief of Materiel (Joint Enablers) is the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability), who is responsible for providing military strategic direction for the British Armed Forces.

  • Under the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability) is the Commander of Joint Forces Command, who is responsible for overseeing joint military operations and for the readiness of the UK's joint military capabilities.

  • Under the Commander of Joint Forces Command is the Director Special Forces (DSF), who is responsible for the UKSF and reports directly to the Commander of Joint Forces Command. The DSF is the most senior officer in charge of UKSF and is responsible for the strategic direction and coordination of special forces operations.

Some info may be outdated/incorrect/old:

So, in summary, the chain of command in the UK military towards Lieutenant General Roly Walker, the Director Special Forces, would be: 

 Chief of the Defence Staff 

 (Admiral Sir Tony RadakinHe is the professional head of the United Kingdom's Armed Forces and principal military adviser to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Defence.)

-> Secretary of State for Defence

 (Ben Wallace was appointed Secretary of State for Defence on 24 July 2019The Secretary of State for Defence is a member of the Cabinet and reports to the Prime Minister. 

 --> Minister for Defence Procurement

(Alec Edward Shelbrooke MP served as Minister of State for Defence Procurement in the Ministry of Defence from September 2022 to October 2022, fired in 1m after the NS affair, and 1 wk after I asked UK DoD about possibility that UK submarine Ambush was involved in the affair - through these twitter tweets, and this one "I have one question..."; wiki: "Shelbrooke was then immediately sacked on 26 October 2022 by the new Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak". Btw, I have special relationship with Alec, his visit to Faslane-Clyde hinted me that UK may have been involved - read here)  

---> Chief of Materiel (Joint Enablers

(Lieutenant General Richard Wardlaw)

----> Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Capability, CDS) 

(Lieutenant General Richard Nugee)

-----> Commander of Joint Forces Command (CJFC)

(General Sir Patrick Sanders)

------> Director Special Forces

 (Lieutenant General Roly Walker)

 

Check through ChatGPT:


Very interesting now about how to find SBS hierarchy:



The command further down is - classified: 

Post about "SBS team": here


Britain’s culture of no comment (July 2016 - by Emily Knowles)


"The blanket opacity policy that the UK has for its SOF is not standard practice. Other countries, such as the US, Canada, and Australia, make public statements about SOF deployments to active conflict zones, and respond to questions about their mandate and strategy.

 The US has increased its transparency over SOF in recent years without it restricting their ability to deploy SOF. The fact that the UK public, and the parliament that represents them, do not have access to any official information about the deployment of SOF means that there can be no meaningful, informed debate about the UK’s role in some of the most important conflicts of our age. This opacity could have damaging implications for the effectiveness, accountability, and legitimacy of UK military options abroad..." 

 

Access Denied!

3 Nov 2022 - UK’s Defence Committee refused access to UK Special Forces in heated debate with Defence Minister.

In a British Parliamentary Deference Select Committee on the 2nd November, 2022, the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, has been challenged for his failure to permit members of the Defence Select Committee access to UK Special Forces.

In a heated exchanged, the Committee chair, Tobias Ellwood MP said that the UK Special Forces were not the best in the world ‘about scrutiny’, and that the Special Forces – including units such as the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Services (SBS) – were “not above scrutiny.”

When asked if the Ministry of Defence could facilitate a visit to Hereford, home of the SAS, the Deference Minister said “no” and went on to argue that “this committee does not have oversight of Special Forces and its operations.”

The chair of the Defence Committee disagreed, saying: “I’m sorry, we have oversight of the Armed Forces in the UK Defence.”

Mr Wallace then said the Special Forces were very busy in operational work.

...Earlier this year, Action on Armed Violence raised concerns about a lack of parliamentary oversight of the UK’s Special Forces...

 

The Diving and Threat Exploitation Group (DTXG) 

It is a specialized unit within the British military's Special Boat Service (SBS) that is responsible for conducting a wide range of underwater operations, including diving, underwater demolition, and intelligence gathering. The DTXG is composed of highly trained and experienced divers who are proficient in a variety of specialized skills, including diving, underwater navigation, demolition, and the use of specialized equipment for conducting underwater operations.

 It's worth noting that the use of explosive devices, including underwater explosions, is tightly controlled and subject to strict rules of engagement, both domestically and internationally. Any use of explosives would need to be authorized and carried out in a manner that is consistent with established rules of engagement and applicable international law...


My research about this DTXG team

and its possible involvement

in the Nordstream Affair is: here 



Naval Mine and Maritime Device Exploitation (NM&MDE) capabilities

The Royal Navy has several units that specialize in Naval Mine and Maritime Device Exploitation (NM&MDE) capabilities.

 These units are responsible for identifying, rendering safe, and exploiting mines and other maritime devices that pose a threat to naval vessels, ports, and shipping lanes.

The Royal Navy's NM&MDE capability includes a range of specialized skills, techniques, and equipment, which may vary depending on the specific unit and mission requirements.

 Some of the capabilities that may be involved in NM&MDE operations include:

  • Minehunting and mine clearance operations
  • Underwater search and recovery operations
  • Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
  • Intelligence gathering and analysis related to maritime threats
  • Forensic analysis of recovered maritime devices
  • Training and support for allied forces and partner nations
Overall, the Royal Navy's NM&MDE capability plays a critical role in ensuring the safety and security of naval vessels, personnel, and infrastructure, both at home and overseas.


QUESTION:

If Russia is right about the UK specialist team, how high the command went?

If the UK was involved, am I looking at the right chain of command?

What did UK’s Defence Committee want to ask SBS team anyway?




OTHER UK RELATED POSTS

most of the research about UK´s role, motives has been conducted in 2023
The summary is here:




***

***
Uncovering the truth took over two years of self-funded, tireless investigation.
I decided to open it for free, no paywall, despite huge investment.
Because the truth matters.
Please consider supporting my work with a donation.

Every bit helps keep this mission alive!

(retweet and follow)

Monday, February 20, 2023

013 - INDEX (Posts #1 - #212)

Mortymer´s Nordstream Affair Hyphotesis



******************************************
UPDATED INDEX OVERVIEW (Posts #1 - #206):

2023
The #1st post: 100 shades of Nordstream sabotage - part I
002 - UK government does not like Nordstream
003 - Historical ROOTS of Nordstream affair
004 - 100 shades of Nordstream sabotage - part II
005 - WHAT HAPPENED AROUND 26-09-2022? - The Timeline
006 - 20 points about UK submarines, DDS, SWCS, MK11, deep divers, DTXG team
007 - My Suspects of Nord Stream job
008 - 100 shades of Nordstream sabotage - part III
009 - USA vs Nordstream, Poseidons and submarine, Search for a submarine?
010 - Mackinder Roadblocks against Euro-Asian development & integration
011 - The NATO is dead (the zombie style)
012 - Whose submarine visited Bornholm Deep before the Nordstream was blown up?
013 - INDEX (Posts #1 - #206) 
014 - The UK chain of command toward SBS
015 - Have sanctions against Nordstream Insurers created Catch-22 situation?
016 - Tracking Astute submarines in 2022
017 - Nordstream - Battle Royale: Hersh´s exposé vs Mortymer001´s Hypothesis
018 - Sinking ships to Denmark, cutting cables to Germany - UK has done it in the past
019 - Identified submarine threat in the Baltic Sea and the German led "Northern Coasts" exercise
020 - The Operation TAPESTRY
021 - The UK and French relationship
022 - Nordstream emergency response plan and yearly check-ups
023 - About the UK-USA "special relationship"
024 - About the GER-USA Nordstream 2 AG deal
025 - Russian Motives to blow Nordstream pipelines
026 - The $1.5 Trillion Margin Call on EU energy Utilities
027 - Mission accomplished - UK - from Energy Importer to Energy Exporter
028 - Norway energy exports to EU were at the limit. Why to blow Nordstream then?
029 - The Act of Retorsion allows Gazprom legal suspension of deliveries to Europe
030 - Who said it is a "Sabotage" first?
031 - About The forgotten attack on Turk Stream and about UK Tackling Russian income from hydrocarbons
032 - Attempts To 'Renormalize' Relations With Russia were curbed
033 - UK has changed its security structures on 23-09-2022
034 - Beware of Spin-doctor Muppets in the Nordstream affair
035 - The (government size) elephant in the Nordstream affair room
036 - What explosives were used Sherlock? Russian mines. Elementary, my dear Watson
037 - Denmark & Nordstream affair
038 - Switzerland & Nordstream affair
039 - Belgium & Nordstream affair
040 - Which western companies in Russia’s oil and gas exited before Nordstream affair?
041 - Brexit as a root-cause of UK instabilities
042 - UK warns about the energy storm coming before Nordstream is taken down
043 - The role of JEF & NATO MARCOM in Nordstream Affair
044 - London's attempts to implement ‘Global Britain’ concept failed
045 - The state as a suspect in Nordstream Affair - Criminal Profiling
046 - The Definition, Severity and Accountability of the Nordstream Affair
047 - The Prague Summit & possible cover-up of Nordstream affair
048 - 101 questions about Nordstream affair journalists should be asking and are not
049 - The 2 crimes in Nordstream Affair case - Preliminary investigation results
050 - Data show Biden has not ordered Nordstream destruction
051 - Rishi Sunak´s 2017 report about vulnerability of subsea internet cables
052 - List of 17 states and their top officials who were considered suspects
053 - Anglo-Saxons and Nordstream affair - the Russian perspective
054 - Liz Truss as a UK PM & Nordstream affair
055 - The criminal case against EU top politicians
056 - Anchoring near Nordstream pipelines
057 - Ukraine and Nordstream Affair
058 - Investigations, Sweden: Mats Ljungqvist - the Swedish investigator
059 - I filed several Criminal cases and investigations
060 - Open letter to journalists
061 - One pager summary of the Mortymer´s Nordstream hypothesis
062 - Which suspects have already resigned?
063 - The Sikorski moment in the Nordstream affair
064 - Nordstream crime sequence reconstruction
065 - The Hall-of-Fame & Wall-of-shame: I. EUropean Ministries of Foreign affairs
066 - The Hall-of-Fame & Wall-of-shame: II. Insurance companies
067 - The Hall-of-Fame & Wall-of-shame: III. Newspapers & Journalists
068 - It is Over!
069 - Was Norway briefing USA about possible threat to undersea pipeline infrastructure on 19-09-2022?
070 - The final post?
071 - Icy times
072 - Was the decision to take out Nordstream done in June, July or August?
073 - Did the United States notify its allies on September 21st that it was removing its naval assets from the Baltic Sea?
074 - The Hall-of-Fame & Wall-of-shame: IV. Non-EUropean Ministries of Foreign affairs
075 - The Rekin-22 naval exercise and Poland in mid September
076 - Archipelago Endeavor 22 exercise and Sweden in mid September
077 - What the heck happened on Friday 23-09-2022 that Liz Truss scuttled out of the chamber and went into hiding?
078 - Antony Blinkein and those odd post Nordstream attack Tremendous opportunity remarks on 30-09-2022
079 - UK: Nord Stream 2 Pipeline - Volume 690: debated on Wednesday 10 March 2021
080 - Who hasn't heard of Mortymer's Nordstream hypothesis yet?
081 - The United Kingdom's secret war against Russia?
082 - UK: Defence chief has 'serious' talks with PM and chancellor in face of cash squeeze and Ukraine war
083 - The UK at the UN Security Council & Nordstream affair
084 - The UN and The Nord Stream Incident: Closed Consultations
085 - 14 Sept 2022: Statement by Group of Creditors of Ukraine
086 - 6 October 2022 - Remarks by President Biden at Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee Reception
087 - 13 October 2022 - Meeting of NATO Ministers of Defence
088 - The partnership between United Kingdom and Sweden - Conflict of interests
089 - IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS - Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure – consequences for the EU
090 - The UK Ministry of Defence - Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and Nordstream
091 - TRUSS - But this cannot be a one-off
092 - The origin of "remote detonated explosives" claim used for destroying Nordstream in the news
093 - Former mine clearance diver of the French Navy Philippe Chêne talks about Nordstream
094 - The USA de-escalates possible Russian nuclear response even before Nordstream is hit, NATO protect Trans-Atlantic alliance afterwards
095 - The Nordstream affair, West Red herrings and Mats Ljungqvist - the Swedish investigator - PART 1
096 - TRUSS and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
097 - The Nordstream affair, East Red herrings and Mats Ljungqvist - the Swedish investigator - PART 2
098 - November 2022: Internal investigation into UK Special Forces denied
099 - Red herrings in the east, red herrings in the west, red herrings everywhere - Part 3
100 - The Atlantic Future Forum and Nordstream
101 - The REPMUS-22 and DYNAMIC MESSENGER 22 exercises in September
102 - Were commentators planting seeds of destruction in the Nordstream affair?
103 - Was the Nordstream 2 used as an energy weapon?
104 - How the Nordstream 2 did not got its certification
105 - Boris Johnson: Europe needs to snip the drip feed into our bloodstream from Nord Stream
106 - Liz Truss is ready to try and beat global aggressors at their own game
107 - About Liz Truss and ending the EU´s strategic dependency on Russian hydrocarbons
108 - UK officials love to play Hide and Seek
109 - The British pound reacts to the instability during the Nordstream crisis
110 - Russian anti-submarine exercises in the Baltic sea in Mid September 2022
111 - The USS Task Force 61/2 deployment in the Baltic sea during September 2022
112 - Did the Dutch NH90 and US HM-60R detect and stop Nord Stream's first mining attempt in early September?
113 - Russian nuclear positioning before the Nordstream is attacked
114 - How Powerful were UK Nuclear Weapons?
115 - Nov 2022 - FRA: “Europe is not sheltered anymore from missile and drone strikes. And we must integrate this reality,” Macron
116 - One NATO flag is missing
117 - Metter Frederiksen "Things can happen that we have not had the imagination to imagine"
118 - German Vice Admiral Jan Christian Kaack and Nordstream
119 - The day before the attack on 25 Sept 2022: Blinken on a potential U.S. response to nuclear weapons | 60 Minutes
120 - What happens in Norfolk stays in Norfolk - A series of strategic meetings aboard USS Ford on 19-09-2022
121 - Hersh´s claim vs Hard data - and - Mortymer´s Nordstream hypothesis recap

2024
122 - Sweden announces it lacks jurisdiction in the Nordstream case
123 - Russian-linked Nord Stream files claim after 2022 blast
124 - Donald Trump on who blew up the Nord Stream pipeline
125 - Putin & Carlson on who blew up the Nord Stream pipeline
126 - The Norwegian Defense Intelligence Service assesses that there is no increased military threat to Denmark
127 - NOR-DK-POL Inconsistency? Nope
128 - Atlantic Council - What will the impact be if Nord Stream 2 is completed? - Transport fees, liability
129 - The NATO Retaliation statement oxymoron
130 - Dmitry Peskov: Danish investigation ends, Friend or Foe comment
131 - Nordstream: US authorities have reportedly warned Germany several times
132 - Despite explosions: The NordStream companies in Zug live on
133 - Nordic Times - The Who-did-it Cat is out of the Nordstream Bag
134 - Liz Truss discusses European energy with Macron, Kishida, Leyen, and Biden just before Nordstream is blown up
135 - The origin of "US Poseidon P-8 flight" claim used for destroying Nordstream in the news
136 - Nordstream and Lack of Jurisdiction by Sweden and Denmark
137 - Nordstream and Sergei Naryshkin, director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service - The jigsaw puzzle was put together
138 - Nordstream: The UK military silenced
139 - The Legal Trigger - PCA CASE No. 2020-07, PROCEDURAL ORDER NO. 11
140 - Nordstream AG and the insurance case
141 - Jens Stoltenberg´s Freudian slip in Nordstream case?
142 - UK´s impasse in the case of Nordstream affair?
143 - Euro Asian Trade bottleneck countries in Mackinder Roadblocks hypothesis
144 - German Navy Commander: Russia's capabilities at the bottom of the sea - Germany KNEW
145 - FGS Sachsen conducts ASW search near Rügen - Germany KNEW II.
146 - German fleet tracker wk37 and wk38 in Baltic sea
147 - The UK´s helps Ukraine to purchase more gas before the Nordstream is blown-up
148 - "NATO's Article 5 dog that didn't bark
149 - Comments by Polish State Secretary Stanislaw Zaryn
150 - The USS Gerald R. Ford and multi-national #NATO Strike Group after Nordstream affair
151 - Nord Stream 2 AG insurers deny policies covered war risks in UK lawsuit
152 - Did USA specify how they will End the Nordstream 2 project in February 2022?
153 - The Nord Stream AG operator justified his claim against insurers
154 - UNCLOS - The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea AND Nordstream
155 - Nord Stream 2 AG and INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION European Union
156 - Nordstream affair - Does this mean the red phone is working again?
157 - Gazprom Export case - Uniper terminates Russian gas supply contracts
158 - Viktor Orbán on Nordstream affair: "under American direction"
159 - Nordstream affair - The Opening Act
160 - January 2022 - Nord Stream 2 AG has founded a German subsidiary Gas for Europe Gmb
161 - January 2022 - Biden, Blinken: Nord Stream 2 pipeline is ‘leverage’ for Europe against Russia
162 - February 2022 - Germany suspends Nord Stream 2: Q&A on what happens next
163 - Nordstream affair - The planning begins
164 - Security Law: Guidelines for Grey Zone Naval Incidents
165 - Security Law: Did an Alleged Ukrainian Attack against the Nord Stream Pipelines Violate the Law of Armed Conflict?
166 - Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Channel One’s The Great Game political talk show, Moscow, March 10, 2023
167 - About the NATO statement: "deliberate, reckless, and irresponsible acts of sabotage"
168 - Hungary: The sabotage on Nord Streams is an Act of State Terrorism
169 - German Government: Blowing up Nord Stream is a crime
170 - Former Bulgarian Minister of Economy Rumen Gechev - comment
171 - September 2022 - The UK sabotaged Nord Stream AG by not delivering INCOTERMS
172 - December 2022 - Vladimir Putin on Nordstream attacks: There is no real investigation
173 - July 2022 - Vladimir Putin about maintenance of Nordstream turbines
174 - October 2022 - Putin: Gas spot price change caused 2% loss of European GDP
175 - The #VVHG725 #AE4FE2 USN MH-60R Strike Hawk after Kearsarge left Baltic Sea
176 - November 2022 - Nord Stream terrorist attacks chiefly benefit US, says Russian security chief
177 - The Poseidon P8A submarine hunting aircraft and magnetic anomalies on 21-09-2022
178 - DDG 117 - USS Paul Ignatius in Baltic sea in September 2022
179 - NOR - FIN - SWE - GER - RU - LIT - USA were simultaneously preparing for a hybrid attacks from a hidden actor
180 - Poland - Sikorski - The USA had foreknowledge of preparations for Nord Stream sabotage attack
181 - The Poseidon P8A submarine hunting aircraft flights from 21-09-2022 to 26-09-2022
182 - Welcome on board a US NAVY P8 'POSEIDON' Patrol Aircraft - A quick tour inside the P-8 Poseidon
183 - NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg - another type of escalation - escalation beyond Ukraine
184 - Norway - Drones or Seagulls?
185 - Two year anniversary of Nordstream attacks - statements by Dmitry Peskov
186 - DK - Christiansø harbor master about US ships
187 - NEWS UPDATE: Nord Stream U-turn! Russia to sue four countries & Naryshkin´s statement
188 - October 2024 - UN: The Nord Stream Incident: Open Briefing
189 - Ursula von der Leyen and the Nordstream affair
190 - Nordstream: Ursula von der Leyen meets with Jens Stoltenberg the day of the explosion
191 - Two weeks of Russian news and statements from after the Nordstream attacks
192 - The 6th and 7th of October 2022 - The Nordstream mop up news
193 - Astana S.E. Naryshkin statement about Nordstream
194 - Awards, promotions and demotions in the Nordstream affair
195 - NATO Joint Force Command Brunssum, Commander JFCBS, General Luigi Guglielmo Miglietta and Nordstream affair
196 - NATO Maritime Command MARCOM, Commander Vice Admiral Keith Blount and Nordstream affair
197 - The UK led NATO sub-group - Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and Nordstream affair - PART 2
198 - Vladimir Putin´s 2022 comments about the Nordstream affair
199 - Consistency of Russian claims about Nordstream affair
200 - US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and the Nordstream affair
201 posts of Mortymer´s Nordstream hypothesis
202 - Kwasi Kwarteng The -1 Day: "...if there is an exogenous, extreme event..."
203 - Was the secrecy of the mission against Nordstream blown up already on 21-09-2022 just six days before the event?
204 - US Secretary Antony Blinken and Nordstream Affair
205 - Statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the Nord Stream attacks on the 29-10-2024
206 - Nordstream_Files_Data_Files_2022_Collection
207 - Progress report
208 - Consistency of non-Russian claims about Nordstream affair
209 - Law expert opinion: Damages to submarine cables and pipelines in time of peace and war: the nord stream sabotage
210 - Law: Definition of the crime of aggression and the Nordstream affair
211 - NETCOM: Enabling Decision Dominance! & Nordstream affair
212 - Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen spills beans and nobody notices

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OLD RETIRED POST was called:

"Mortymer´s Hypothesis suggested READING ORDER":

...and is outdated:
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Overview of suspects:

Different states and the NS affair:
Legal aspects and related
Technical
The timeline of events:
Geopolitics & History:

Communication with Seymour Hersh:




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